Judgment, deliberation, and the self-effacement of moral theory

Date of this Version


Document Type

Journal Article

Publication Details

Citation only

Cox, D. (2012). Judgment, deliberation, and the self-effacement of moral theory. Journal of Value Inquiry, 46 (3), 289- 302.

Access the publisher's website.

2012 HERDC submission. FoR code: 220305

© Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2012





In developing moral theories, philosophers seek to fulfill at least two tasks: to guide moral judgment and to guide moral deliberation. In moral judgment, moral agents assess moral status. In moral deliberation, moral agents decide how to act. It is important to work out how these two things are related. One suggestion is to posit a direct connection between them according to which moral agents are required to deliberate in terms of correct moral judgment. There are various ways of spelling out this requirement. For example, moral agents might be required to rank prospective actions according to a correct moral judgment of them and choose the highest ranked action. Moral agents would thus be required to choose the morally best action available to them. Alternatively, moral agents might be required to separate prospective actions into those that are permissible actions and those that are impermissible and choose, perhaps on non-moral grounds, from the class of morally permissible actions.

This document is currently not available here.



This document has been peer reviewed.