Positive-sum games in the Asia-Pacific region

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Abstract
Extract:
Massive changes are occurring politically, economically and socially in the Asia-Pacific region. With the virtual end of Cold War legacies, two of the most intensely militarised and war-prone regions of the world, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, are reappraising their strategies for the next two decades. The end of the Cold War has led to an intense quest for new ways to conceive relations between nations.

Keywords
Asia-Pacific region, globalisation, foreign policy, Russia, militarily
VIEWPOINTS:

Positive-Sum Games in the Asia-Pacific Region

by R. James Ferguson.

Introduction

Massive changes are occurring politically, economically and socially in the Asia-Pacific region. With the virtual end of Cold War legacies, two of the most intensely militarised and war-prone regions of the world, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, are reappraising their strategies for the next two decades. The end of the Cold War has led to an intense quest for new ways to conceive relations between nations. Terms such as New World Order, New World Disorder; Single Superpower predominance, Multipolarity, the New Regionalism, Tribalism, Imperfect Globalization are concepts which hint at the ongoing debates concerning the future of the world as an interconnected political and economic system. This desire for a renewed vision of the future is at the heart of these reappraisals. The key advantage derived from the end of the Cold War and slow reduction of tensions in Asia is that it allows the de-emphasis of military force as the basis of national security, and a stronger emphasis on economic and cultural aspects of international life. From this viewpoint national security must include a broader sense of safety and welfare, not just for nation-states, but for their economies and the welfare of their citizens. This policy has often been termed comprehensive security. It forms the heart of Japanese security policy, but has also had a strong impact on the foreign affairs agendas of South Korea, China, Singapore, Indonesia, and is one of the underlying trends which is pushing the European Union towards both a widening and deepening of the integration process in Europe.


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In this discussion I will outline Comprehensive Security as applied to the Japanese views of the Asia-Pacific region. Comprehensive national strength and related conceptualisations influence Chinese foreign policy. One of these is the attempt to strike a balance between two crucial concepts, Wen and Wu. Wen stands for culture and all the achievements of civilisation. Wu represents the arts of war. The current foreign and economic policy of the People’s Republic of China emphasizes the transforming process of Wen, but retains Wu as a reserve force designed to protect national sovereignty. From this perspective, a China which is still engaging in massive modernisation and economic transformation needs to retain a certain military power in an uncertain world environment. The rapid changes in the current world system suggest that it can be viewed as being rather like the ancient Chinese Spring and Autumn period. This classical period, in which Confucianism and many other Chinese philosophies developed, lasted from the 8th to mid-5th century B.C. and was a period of intense conflict and contests for power between different states and varying social groups. This period led onto an even more destructive Warring States period after 464 B.C. The ‘Arts of War’, then, were and are recognised as central for survival, but strangely enough are largely disesteemed in Chinese culture. A strong reliance on direct forms of warfare, in fact, signals a major political or cultural failure. The Wen aspect of this policy allows for cooperation with others, but a direct challenge to national interests could result in a very negative form of destructive competition, i.e. a return to policies based on the confrontational elements based in the Wu strategy. This dichotomy, discussed in more detail below, impacts on China’s approach to current world affairs, and to certain regional problems.

Lastly, these conceptions have a direct bearing on the future of various international organisations in the Asia-Pacific. Issues embedded within these ways of looking at the world will affect the success of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperative), the alternative EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus) as favoured by Dr. Mahathir of Malaysia, and various other groupings over the next decade.

Comprehensive Security

There has recently been considerable interest in redefining security, strategic and defensive doctrines to be more inclusive than the past consideration of straightforward
Positive-Sum Games

military concerns. In large measure, this is due to the recognition that military power, by itself, is unable to secure the fundamental purposes of defence. Graeme Cheeseman has provided a useful general summary of these basic purposes for liberal democratic states:

The fundamental purposes of defence are to protect from outside attack or threat of attack the lives and property of a national community and to preserve its basic cultural and political identity and values. Defence can also be concerned with preventing the overthrow of a legitimate government by an armed minority, and with protecting the community from internal dissident groups which seek to use force to impose their ideas on society or to repress freedom of association or political expression. 6

Traditional military forces are most effective against external attack, and have a limited and more difficult role in preventing internal subversion. A special internal role for military forces can be framed within the notion of a dual-function military, with specific political and social-development goals being emphasized, as in the case of the People's Liberation Army of China, as well as the armies of Vietnam, North Korea, and Indonesia. Indeed, from the 1980s onward, it might be wise to add a third function to the PLA as a major economic entity and producer in its own right: up to 65% of its civilian production profits might be added at exceptional times to the military budget. 7 At least 10,000 'production and industrial units' are run by the PLA, and this is a conservative estimate. Similar extensions of the military into economic and political affairs are also most notable in Indonesia. 8

In any case, it is clear that a range of policing, economic, political and cultural factors would need to be mobilized to begin to meet these wider security concerns. As noted by Stuart Harris, in the end 'security is concerned with maintaining community values and the institutional arrangements that support those values'. 9 These wider concerns structure the nature of comprehensive security doctrines. The first of these is the significance of economic affairs in maintaining security. This goes beyond the recognition that a strong economic base is required to maintain a strong army and to wage war, and more than the doctrine of striking at economic resources as a means of destroying a nation's ability to continue waging war. Rather, it defines security in terms of broader national interests that mere survival, sovereignty, or territorial control. Security also includes reasonable access to and a level of control over the economic means which are the basis of national and citizen welfare. In general terms, comprehensive security does not equate simply with defence policy; nor can it exclude

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most of the issues associated with foreign policy and economic planning. As noted by J. Mohan Malik:

Security has traditionally been seen in military terms. However, the rise to prominence of new global issues has meant that traditional geo-strategic considerations no longer dominate the foreign policy agenda. Today the notion of security is assuming a more comprehensive, multidimensional character. The military dimension is decreasing in significance relative to economic and environmental concerns. Economic strength rather than military capability: a country's Gross National Product (GNP) and per capita income rather than the number of nuclear-armed missiles and men under arms will be the dominant themes of international relations of the nineties and beyond. In other words, as economic strength becomes the single most important index of national power, the 'high politics' of diplomacy and security give way to 'low politics' of economy and trade. After all, it was economic bankruptcy which led the former Soviet Union to withdraw from the superpower competition and which brought about the end of the Cold War.

This broadening of the concept of security has come about as a result of the recognition that non-military threats to security - such as problems of maritime passage and seabed boundaries, refugee and population flows, terrorism and rising sea-levels - are as important as military threats. The nature of these threats and the need to take countermeasures at regional and national levels will also necessitate a change in the concept of nation state and sovereignty.

This shift is a move towards a more positive-sum game, a game where all participants can gain to some degree, though competition for accruing relative advantage does remain. This comprehensive security approach does not require the destruction or threat of serious damage for opponents, as is implied in the use of direct military force. Balance of power, forward defense, and power projection models of security require a huge investment in terms of technology, economic resources, personnel and their training. This older approach is largely a zero-sum or even a negative-sum game in that victory can be achieved by destroying an enemy and that every gain for an enemy is defined as a domestic defeat. In times of peace this means that massive resources, physical, financial, technological and in terms of personnel, are tied up in a huge military machine which it is hoped will never be used. Excessive strengthening of such forces can lead to the classical security dilemma whereby all other enemies or potential enemies feel they need to augment their own power. This can lead to an arms race, or an acceleration towards war as the side with dominant power may feel that it needs to move before its opponent becomes too strong. Attempts to secure a fair balance of power are possible, but have not been successful in stopping major world or regional wars in the twentieth century. It was only within the context of nuclear deterrence based on fear of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) that such balances could be temporarily sustained.

Although a huge military-industrial complex does provide employment and spin-off effects into the broader economy, this is based on indirect and limited rather than direct effects on national economy. Certainly the Soviet Union found such costs prohibitive, and some American thinkers such as Chalmers Johnson feel that this huge economic burden, sustained for over 50 years, is one of the reasons for relative American

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economic decline in the 1990s\textsuperscript{12}. Alternative models can be conceived. For example, the Japanese in their very modern Self Defense Force and the technologies supporting it rely much more on spin-on, i.e. where advanced techniques already developed in the civilian market are then consistently employed to improve their military\textsuperscript{13}. This reduces the real cost of military technology, reduces external reliance, and provides new technologies in non-military export industries.

For Japan, with the disastrous legacy of World War II, and as a nation with limited natural resources and an absolute reliance on open world trade, it has been important to avoid buying into the negative aspects of a military solution to her security problems. While relying on US strategic forces and the special treaty with the US, Japan has in the 1980s developed a strongly economic approach to national security. The general perception of this comprehensive security policy has been outlined by Edward Olsen:

"This doctrine places equal stress on the non-military elements of security such as the pursuit of political, economic, and diplomatic harmony with other states. In practice, this rather idealistic doctrine has become a rationale for Japan to rely on the United States to shore up the most difficult portions of Japan's broad-based security, while Tokyo copes very cautiously with other elements. Tokyo's efforts at coping with these elements have been overwhelmingly economic, focusing on the positive geopolitical atmospherics that can be achieved through trade and investment. This accounts for Tokyo's extreme sensitivity to any signs that Japan's economic activities abroad are engendering frictions. Tokyo arduously pursues harmony in these relationships, fearing that any severe disruptions would undermine the comprehensiveness of Japan's security in ways that might compel it to invoke the less benign portions of its security doctrine. Tokyo fervently wants to avoid doing so.\textsuperscript{14}"

This combined approach has been summarized by Paul Keal: -

"Since 1980 Japan has adopted this concept which encompasses political and economic policies as well as military power as a means to achieving national security. It includes fostering a more peaceful international order and the maintenance of a free trade system; efforts which Japan can make in promoting cooperation between itself and the states and international organisations which effect its welfare; maintaining a strong self-defence force with the capacity to deny an easy conquest of Japan; safeguarding energy supplies; maximising self-sufficiency; and maintaining productivity and competitive export power.\textsuperscript{15}"

There have been significant shifts in recent decades from Japan's earlier policy of low international profile and passive diplomatic manoeuvre. While Japan emerges as an\textsuperscript{12}. JOHNSON, Chalmers "The Empowerment of Asia", Research Paper, (advance copy, available from ACAS, Sydney University), 1994a; JOHNSON, Chalmers "To the End of the Japanese American Alliance", Public Seminar, University Of Queensland, 17 November 1994b.


\textsuperscript{14} OLSEN, Edward "Japan", in MALIK, J, Mohan et al. (eds.) Asian Defence Policies: Great Powers and Regional Powers (Book I), Geelong, Deakin University Press, 1992, pp127-128.

economic superpower, and as the US seeks to contain defense expenditure, there has been renewed debate on Japan taking a stronger economic and political role in world affairs. There have also been calls for Japan to shoulder security responsibilities, firstly in her own region, then through stronger involvement in U.N. operations which go beyond a 'cheque book' role. The aspirations of, and problems for, Japan taking on an enhanced international political role congruent with her economic power, has been spelled out by Takashi Inoguchi:

The pressures on Japan to play a greater role in world affairs are beginning to overwhelm the countervailing obstacles. Japan, in short, will probably play a more active role internationally in the future than it has in the past. Moreover, this development should be encouraged, provided two conditions are met. First, Japan's policies must be in harmony with those of the international community as a whole. In practice, this means that Japan's actions should be linked to multilateral undertakings wherever possible. Second, Tokyo's initiatives need to be grounded by a solid domestic consensus about the broad course and content of Japan's foreign policy.

This involvement with international and multilateral undertakings has already had a cautious start through the 1990s. Though the Japanese government has been extremely cautious in responding to such overtures, her financial support for the Gulf War and the willingness to send small medical teams attached to recent U.N. operations indicates a slight shift towards a more involved policy. However, it must be stressed that this slight shift in Japanese policy may be extremely significant. A shift towards a more independent international role could help Japan balance her role in the Pacific as a whole, help to avoid excessive reliance on the US as their trade relationship becomes more complex, and to find a more engaged role with Asia. The current apparent confusion in Japanese political circles since the LDP lost control of political affairs, may really be part of an attempt to forge a consensus on a stronger political, technological and economic role for Japan in Asian affairs.

It must be stressed that comprehensive security concepts are not a dogma in Japanese government circles, nor are they pursued in a totally consistent way. Indeed, Bill Emmott argues that different institutions and agencies in Japan have very different priorities in relation to the economy and international relations:

The groups that matter in Japan do have goals and strategies. However, they are not identical, and they cannot all be achieved or carried out simultaneously. In some respects, they conflict with one another. To a large extent, domestic strategies and goals conflict with international aims. The most striking aspect of the Japanese system is its relative inability to achieve a consensus about what constitutes Japanese national interest, either in domestic affairs or in foreign policy.
This notion of 'Many Japans, Many Strategies'\(^\text{21}\) rightly takes into account the complex range of actors who help formulate foreign policy and the even wider range of participants involved in formulating economic activity at the domestic and international levels. In the case of Japan, the different approaches and powers of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, MITI, budget, and the SDF cannot be said to generate a fully consistent economic policy. Furthermore, there can be real conflicts between internal and external interests, e.g. Japan has an interest in preserving the open trade agenda implied within the GATT and the new World Trade Organisation agreements, but also has to deal with a powerful Japanese farm lobby which is against a sudden ending of their special support by the government\(^\text{22}\). We can see this in the example of rice farming and sensitivity on allowing this sector of the economy to complete against low-cost international imports\(^\text{23}\). Indeed, during APEC talks in early July 1995 Japan seemed willing to consider a South Korean proposal that the North-East Asian nations, including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China should group together into a mini-block which share a desire to protect certain 'sensitive sectors', probably including some of their agricultural production areas\(^\text{24}\). At the same time, this case indicates that contradictions can exist between different aspects of security - Japan needs relatively open and fair trade, but the policy of food security also mitigates against the destruction of the domestic rice-growing industry. This conflict, however, is not fatal for the doctrine of comprehensive security - any policy prescribing choices and creating priorities has to risk not fulfilling one potential in favour of another.

Another argument against the 'cheque book' interpretation is that Japan's foreign activities, though partly based on the need to maintain economic buoyancy, incorporate certain features concerned with status. In fact, the notion of finding an 'honourable' role is central to many elements of Japanese foreign policy formation. Japan has shown considerable restraint in the face of international opinion; she has declined, for example, from overly penetrating economic markets due to political sensitivities, e.g. avoidance of too intensive investment in Burma, though this interest increased rapidly upon the recent announcement of the end of house arrest for Aung San Soo Kyi, and an attempt to keep a low profile in her growing investment in Southeast Asia. Japan has also avoided large-scale investment in Russian Siberia for her own political reasons, and even apologies over World War II issues by Yeltsin have not reduced tensions over the lost Northern Territories\(^\text{25}\). At the same time, the need to stabilize Russia has not

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
\(^{22}\) Ibid, p64.
\(^{25}\) McGREGOR, Richard "Yeltsin Apologises to Japan", The Australian, 13-10-93, p6; in general see MACK, Andrew & O'HARE, Martin Japan and the Soviet Union: The 'Northern Territories' Dispute.

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stopped Japan being part of an aid package worth more than $11 billion being negotiated in April 1993\textsuperscript{26}. As such, though Japan has been influenced by 'comprehensive security policies', it has not yet generated and applied an integrated 'comprehensive security doctrine'. Nonetheless, even within the pluralism of actors in a complex active environment, Japan has been able to implement a general approach to economy, trade and self-defense which effectively fits into the broader definition of security outlined as 'comprehensive security'. Bill Emmott is thus incorrect to suggest that there 'is no such thing as a Japanese economic strategy', though he correctly notes that Japan's economic strength does not equate with a foreseeable 'hegemonic' dominance\textsuperscript{27}.

What are some of the positive elements of comprehensive security for Japan in the future? Japan has shown a strong interest in two areas which reflect strongly on future economic management at the global level. These are 'surveillance' and 'systems design'. From this perspective, 'surveillance is the monitoring of data pertaining to global management and to the improvement of indicators and measurement for such monitoring' - this includes detailed 'economic, technological and social activities\textsuperscript{28}'. Systems design has been outlined by Takashi Inoguchi:

\begin{quote}
Systems design includes envisioning, conceptualizing and institutionalizing agencies and mechanisms for global management. Requests for such a role have been increasingly heard from within and outside Japan. The need for systems design covers virtually all major fields, including manufacturing (for example, the Intelligent Manufacturing System, a system of jointly constructing and utilizing manufacturing technologies), environmental protection (for example, a system of controlling carbon dioxide emission around the globe), administrative institutions (for example, a system of recruiting and training bureaucrats) and economic development (for example, a system of state-led, yet market-based, economies, much like Japan's in the 1950s and 1960s).\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

At first this might seem like an obscure branch of economic and technological future studies. In reality, however, there have already been several serious steps towards the monitoring of global systems, e.g. weather and climate studies in Europe and the US, as well as the human gene-mapping programme which was undertaken in research centres world wide. More importantly, such a 'systems design' project in fact entails a massive collection of intelligence information on the key factors underlining trends in the 21st century. One key area in which this has begun is a reconsideration of economic development models. Bill Emmott suggested that the Japanese may use aid to influence

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{26} MACFARLANE, S. Neil "Russia, the West and European Security", \textit{Survival}, 35 no. 3, Autumn 1993, p20.
\bibitem{27} EMMOTT, Bill "The Economic Sources of Japan's Foreign Policy", \textit{Survival}, 34 no. 2, Summer 1992, p69.
\bibitem{28} INOGUCHI, Takashi "Japan's Role in International Affairs", \textit{Survival}, 34 no. 2, Summer 1992, p80.
\bibitem{29} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
recipient states 'to adopt Japanese economic and organizational practices'. The strong involvement of state and bureaucracy has generated a model of capitalist production which is very different to Anglo-American or European models. Prior to 1992, World Bank Executive Director Masaki Shiratori pushed through a study of economic strategies for South Korea, Indonesia and India suggesting that state intervention was needed to promote economic development, indicating a need to a change in World Bank policies. Likewise, the Japanese Economic Planning Agency had suggested plans for the reform of the Russian economy which are much slower than either the Shatalin or Gaidar plans, but probably much more stabilising. The People's Republic of China, Vietnam, Mongolia, and potentially Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan could seek to combine economic reform with strongly centralised government power in order to avoid excessive disruption of political life as economic reforms transform social relationships.

Since such a global 'systems design' could only operate through multilateral arrangements with international organizations, this would be part of a positive-sum game rather than a narrowly nationalist policy. Indeed, Japan would need to make their own economic system less 'opaque' to develop and integrate into such a global system. Surveillance in this broader sense has been described by Inoguchi as of particular concern to Japan:

It is particularly interested in surveillance systems and in the systems design of other international security-related matters. Surveillance involves the monitoring of data pertaining to global management, and the improvement of indicators and measures for such monitoring. Systems design involves the conceptualization and institutionalization of devices and mechanisms for global management. It is the widely held assumption of many leading members of the Japanese government that the next 20 years will be a transitional period of uncertainty, that the monitoring and understanding of global developments are therefore of the utmost priority and that any schemes for insuring against uncertainty should be developed and implemented for the global community.

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31. INOGUCHI, Takashi "Japan's Role in International Affairs", Survival, 34 no. 2, Summer 1992, p81; INOGUCHI, Takashi "Japan in Search of a Normal Role", Adelphi Paper 275, Conference Papers: Asia's International Role in the Post-Cold War Era, Part I, (Papers from the 34th Annual Conference of the IISS held in Seoul, South Korea, from 9-12 September 1992), March 1993, p64.
33. INOGUCHI, Takashi "Japan's Role in International Affairs", Survival, 34 no. 2, Summer 1992, p81.
Such surveillance and systems design seem to be part of a larger conceptualization of 'global society' in the twentieth century.\footnote{35}

Figure 1: The Four Quadrants: Comprehensive Security Relationships

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<th>WORLD SYSTEM</th>
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<td>Regional Stability</td>
<td>Diversify Markets</td>
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<td>Non-Aggression</td>
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<td>Devalue Military Options</td>
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<td>Greater Future Role</td>
<td>Cultural Diplomacy</td>
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REGIONAL & GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE

GLOBAL SYSTEMS DESIGN

At least one scenario which has been envisaged is that Japan and the United States, as the world's two economic superpowers, would take a leading role in the formulation and maintenance of such a community, partly utilizing the kind of mandate provided by


by the UN in recent years. This approach, while congenial to the 'haves' in the
capitalistic, liberal democratic world, is still so heavily tainted with ideological
assumptions that it will continue to be regarded with extreme caution by a number of
international players. Unless genuinely international and cooperative, such an
approach would alarm China, Indonesia and Russia perhaps more than would
straightforward Japanese rearmament. To date, Japan has tried to retain a very positive
relationship with China, both in economic loans and investment, but also through using
a soft approach on issues of democracy and human rights. Nor is it likely that Japan
and China will emerge as straightforward competitors or straightforward allies.

Here Japan has had to take a very cautious line as it fulfils numerous aspects of
international activity. I will simply summarise these by outlining four 'quadrants of
activity' which relate Japan to the Asia-Pacific and the World environment (see Figure
1).

China: International Cooperation and Struggle

One of the alarming trends in recent years has been a certain rhetoric between the US
and China which suggests they could come to see each other as major threats, at least at
the diplomatic level. Numerous accounts of China's territorial claims, of being
militarily adventuresome, of human-rights abuses, of resistance to democracy, as well
as fears of military modernisation, and potential regional instability fill the
international relations journals. Other fears and hopes include coming confrontations
between China and Japan. Perhaps one of the most hysterical of these is Gerald Segal's
1993 paper which suggests the growing economic power of China could only be
welcomed 'if it is as several de facto Chinas, as coastal China fragments into rival
economic regions'. Segal goes on to suggest that although no one wants China to fall
apart totally, that a 'more federal China would be less likely to be a heavy defense
spender and probably less militarily adventuresome' - it is for these reasons that the
'regionalism that encourages greater fragmentation offers Japan and the other G-7 states
new opportunities to play off one part of China against another'. With the centre
sufficiently weakened, then we would have 'a China that is looser and more

37. JOHNSON, Chalmers "To the End of the Japanese American Alliance", Public Seminar, University Of
39. SEGAL, Gerald China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy, London, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 287, March 1994; SHAMBAUGH, David "Growing Strong:
"China at the Crossroads: Conservatism, Reform or Decay", Adelphi Paper 275, Conference Papers:
Asia's International Role in the Post-Cold War Era, Part 1. (Papers from the 34th Annual Conference of
the IISS held in Seoul, South Korea, from 9-12 September 1992), March 1993, pp36-48.
40. SEGAL, Gerald "The Coming Confrontation Between China and Japan", World Policy Journal,
Summer 1993, pp27-32.
41. Ibid, p32.
42. Ibid.
The article expresses fears of a powerful and independent China, and suggests that the encouragement of cross-border natural economic territories (NETs) can be used to pin down the Dragon. The entire article is profoundly flawed in its arguments and its agenda. Firstly, to date the federal nation with the greatest state powers is probably the U.S.A. - it also has a defense budget several times higher than that of China and the strongest military machine in the world. There is no guarantee whatsoever that a federal China would reduce defense expenditure. Secondly, if excessive integration of parts of China into adjacent regions in Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and South Korea does occur, then there may in fact be intensified motives for the Chinese government to feel that it needs to project power into those external regions, which are now even more crucial to the survival of its main economic regions. Lastly, the entire position taken by Segal is nothing less than a proposal that Japan and the West should seek to undermine the political power of Beijing, reduce Chinese defence capability, and through aiding centrifugal forces, turn her into a tame adjunct of Western agendas in the Asia-Pacific. If such an agenda was taken seriously, I could think of no better pretext for Beijing to even further increase defense spending, and harshly curb all trends towards federalism. Fortunately, to date there is no strong evidence that Japan, the U.S., or even China, has taken such ideas seriously.

In spite of numerous threat perceptions, most leaders in both China and the US recognize that such a confrontation would be extremely dangerous, and that it is in no one's interest for China to break apart. The clearest statement of this was made in an interview with Admiral Richard C. Macke, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, who noted that 'the worst thing in the world we could do is isolate or confront China' and that China at present has neither the means nor intention for serious territorial expansion. Likewise, although Beijing may be reluctant to have the US interfering too closely in Chinese economic affairs, or pushing too rapid an agenda of change in North Korea, it is likely that they find the US military presence in Japan relatively stabilizing, as well as recognising a positive role for them as an external balancer in Southeast Asia. The question then is how China's role can fit into the Asia-Pacific region, bearing in mind that sensitive disputes remain over the Spratly Islands, over its different view on human rights, and the fact that China views arms control and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty very differently to the West?

I would suggest that one very dangerous approach is to engage in the war game approach. In late 1994 the US engaged in theoretical war games against China, and on a separate occasion a U.S. aircraft carrier group in the Yellow Sea was challenged by Chinese aircraft and ships (27-29 October 1994). Even though the task force was in international waters, China regarded the carrier-group as a direct threat to her security and Chinese officials apparently said they would 'shoot to kill' next time. Likewise,
several Western based strategists at a recent 'India Looks East' Workshop in Canberra seemed keen on some kind of containment policy whereby India, ASEAN and other countries could control and outbalance China (see the 'India Looks East' report in this issue of The Culture Mandala). Likewise, as a superpower without a serious countervailing military opponent, it is tempting for the US to use its superior abilities to engineer regional relationships. Through an overt preponderance of power, backed up by suitable ad hoc regional and Western alliance partners, it can gradually direct a global agenda. It is possible to interpret US policy in relation to the Gulf War in this way, and it is possible to construct systems of diplomacy whereby the US and its allies can shape 'the regional security environment' in the Persian Gulf to exclude regional or external challengers. However, the US managed to pull back from punitive actions such as embargoes in relation to North Korea in the dispute over its nuclear weapons programme. The Clinton administration does not seem keen on pursuing such risky forms of brinkmanship. Such 'containment' or 'preponderance of power' approaches are extremely dangerous in that they are likely to induce the Wu-aspect of Chinese foreign policy.

At this stage, it is important to clarify further the complementary concepts of Wen and Wu. In Chinese classical and imperial history, non-violent civil methods (wen) and conflict resolution were preferred as a means of promoting state interests wherever possible, though the exact relationship of wen and wu remained a major feature of ancient Chinese debate. The word wen, though originally referring to that which is 'decorated or adorned', came to signify all kinds of order, elegance, ceremony, and culture. It was precisely this refinement which helped to establish authority at the ideological level through the regulation of human relationships - as such, it had a greater economy of means than brute force, and was also the very basis through which military force could be mobilized and directed. The transforming effects of culture and morality to unify a state is found in Mencius' dictum: -

Mencius said: 'One who uses force while borrowing from benevolence will become leader of the feudal lords, but to do so he must first be the ruler of a state of considerable size. One who puts benevolence into effect through the transforming influence of morality will become a true King, and his success will not depend on the size of his state. Tang began with only seventy li square, and King Wen with a hundred. When people submit to force they do so not willingly but because they are not strong enough. When people submit to the transforming influence of morality they do so sincerely, with admiration in their hearts.

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46. On these issues, see LAYNE, Christopher & SCHWARZ, Benjamin "American Hegemony - Without an Enemy", Foreign Policy, no. 92, Fall 1993, pp5-23.
47. See the recommended policies in KHALILZAD, Zalmay 'The United States and the Persian Gulf: Preventing Regional Hegemony', Survival, 37 no. 2, Summer 1995, p118.
48. RAND, Christopher C. "Li Ch'uan and Chinese Military Thought", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 39, 1979, p107. For further discussion of the impact of wen and wu in contemporary China, see DELLIOS, Rosita "Foreign Policy Directions in the Post-Deng Era", in this issue of the Culture Mandala, pp1-12.
50. MENCIUS IIA:3, translated by D.C. Lau.
Edward Boylan has observed that contemporary and ancient Chinese military thought has shown 'an emphasis on psychological warfare, on attempting to gain victory by stratagem rather than by brute force alone'. By the early Han period it was possible to represent a scholar as stating that 'Weapons are the instruments of ill fortune; they cannot be lightly resorted to time and again'. Even when a problematic and aggressive foe was faced, the government traditionally considered two possible responses: a straightforward military solution, called "extermination" (chiao or mieh); or an indirect politico-economic solution, called "pacification" (chao-an, chao-fu, or similar terms suggesting "summoning and appeasing"), supported by real, but muted, threats of military action. These processes were only fully refined during the later imperial periods, but they were already being developed during the complex manoeuvring of the Spring and Autumn period.

An exceptional understanding among the ancient writers of the need for direct force is expressed in the 2nd century B.C. Huai Nantse, which argues:

Now the militarists condemn culture while the scholars look down on force. They disapprove of each other and are not conscious of the exigencies of the times. This is to comprehend a little corner but to be ignorant of the vastness of the eight extremities.

This passage argues for the value of military means under certain contingencies, but also recognizes that scholars and the administrative functions they perform in peacetime are also required. We can get a glimpse of this tension in a dialogue discussed by Donald Jensen. We can see the lessons of history drawn out to indicate a balance of policy under the Han dynasty:

In his audiences with the emperor, Master Lu on numerous occasions expounded and praised the Book of Odes and the Book of Documents, until one day Kao-tsü began to rail at him, 'All I possess I have won on horseback!' said the emperor. 'Why should I bother with the Odes and Documents?' 'Your majesty may have won it on horseback, but can you rule it on horseback?' asked Master Lu... 'To pay attention to both civil and military affairs is the way for a dynasty to achieve long life. In the past King Fu-ch'ü of Wu and Chih Po, Minister of Chin both perished because they paid too much attention to military affairs. Ch'in entrusted its future solely to punishments and laws without changing with the times, and thus eventually brought destruction on its ruling family. If, after it had united the world under its rule, Ch'in had practiced benevolence and righteousness and modelled its ways upon the sages of antiquity, how would Your Majesty ever have been able to win possession of the empire?'

However, for the philosophers military methods should only be used as a last resort and on justified grounds. To resort to warfare was an admission that the means of *wen*, cultural and civil behaviour, had failed⁵⁶. As noted by Benjamin Wallacker, the disesteem of the bureaucracy was directed not really against 'war' in a general sense, but against physical 'battle', which was always destructive, wasteful and often inefficient⁵⁷.

Today's leadership in China, though still wishing to retain elements of socialism and a firm central political control, have tended to rely on Wen. Here economic transformation is also regarded as a Wen policy, changing and improving human relations and skills. The current collective leadership in China, which is mildly progressive and includes Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rhong Ji and Li Peng, has emphasized this approach. This need for economic relationships with the West, however, does not mean that China has totally ignored Wu as an option. In general, this contrast between military and civil means parallels two other dichotomies of some importance in Chinese political thought. The first is the well known distinction between *yin* and *yang*, with *yin* representing the female, passive, receptive, *yang* the male, active and assertive. Within Taoism generally the main trend has been to try to ascend above these poles, but at the same time accepting that one can change into another. Excessive strength can lead to rigidity and give way to weakness, for example. If anything, *yin* is favoured because it is more receptive, able to adapt to circumstances, and can change more rapidly. These conceptions, developed in texts such as the *Tao Te Ching*, the *Chuang Tzu* and *Huai Nantse*, emerge as doctrines of strategic invisibility, surprise attack, strategic retreat and people's war in a range of classical strategists running from Sun Tzu and Sun Pin through to Mao Zedung⁵⁸.

Another dichotomy, between the notion of cooperation (*Her*, which can be taken to include notions of harmony and kindliness) and struggle, is also very significant⁵⁹. These ideas, like many other complementarities in Chinese thought⁶⁰, do not so much constitute opposites but are mutually necessary poles of a continuum in political processes (see Figure II below). Unity in this sense was central to human organization

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at all levels in the perspectives of Mencius and Sun Tzu. It was upon this basis that the just way of government, Wang-Tao, is established, rather than the use of 'force, trickery, punishment and suppression' as found in the short term successes of Ba-Tao. It is Ba-Tao that emphasizes force and militaristic strategies, while Wang-Tao uses policies 'of mollification and of pacification', with the use of civil virtues, economic wealth, and symbolic exchanges of gifts to establish tranquillity. As noted by Confucius, it is not enough to desire harmony; it must be established through a proper understanding of the li, or rites and codes of conduct that allow it to be established in human society. These considerations, of course, have also been taken up and modified in the dialectical aspects of Maoist thought and in contemporary analyses of Chinese socialism, in which conflict and consensus are both important elements of Chinese political culture. Within terms of the modern global situation, Min Jiayin, a scholar at the Institute of Philosophy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing) notes that certain lessons can be drawn from this dichotomy:

This is the first inspiration we draw from: we cannot place too much one-sided emphasis on cooperation, just as we cannot place too much on struggle. We must, by the original meaning of dialectics, "grasp opposites in the unity of opposites," look for cooperation, yet not evade a necessary struggle. We must carry on struggle, yet only on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint.

Here Chinese politics, though sometimes viewed as violent and pugnacious from the standpoint of Western conceptions, can still be interpreted as an attempt to hold a moral highground, or at least justify actions within a constellation of Chinese and socialist values. This combination can result in unexpected behaviour, e.g. harsh claims over sovereignty combined with relatively open economic stances. Hence, China has made it clear that it will never give up its sovereignty claims over the Spratlys, but will consider joint economic development programmes in the South China Sea. The gradual approach by China in making its nationalist claim to the Spratlys, including

63. Ibid, p184.
64. Confucius Analects 12:1.
diploatic, military and economic initiatives, indicates the real complexity of seizing disputed economic resources.

Fortunately, not all strategists wish to play the challenge and containment game outlined earlier. Here I would suggest that in terms of the Asia-Pacific, China must be encouraged to go further down the Wen path. Any direct threat to sovereignty, or to internal stability, could shock China back into a more belligerent role. This means that hotspots of confrontation must be approached laterally rather than head-on. The Chinese nuclear tests conducted in 1993, 1994 and 1995, even while the future of the nuclear non-proliferation and the nuclear test-ban treaties are under serious discussion, indicates a clear statement of national priority directed towards self-strengthening. Likewise, the July 1995 PRC missile tests conducted in sea and air space not far from Taiwan also suggest a willingness both to push ahead with military modernisation and to send a signal of robust independence from Western opinion, especially concerning the issue of the future independence of Taiwan. To be quite frank, the West is simply not powerful enough to force China to accept policies it is not ready for without an expensive and costly use of coercive force. Instead, a policy aiding the economic growth of China, and then making the slow transformation of its political culture less threatening, is most likely to be constructive in building a positive Asia-Pacific environment.

Figure II. Dichotomies in Chinese International Relations

CURRENTLY FAVOURED

YIN
Receptive

WEN
Arts of Civilisation

COOPERATION
Aiding Peaceful Change

LOWER PRIORITY, BUT RETAINED

YANG
Assertive

WU
Arts of War

STRUGGLE
Forcing or Resisting Change

Prospects for the Asia-Pacific Region

The roles of China, Japan and the US remain central to the future of the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, relationships between these three powers need to be considered closely. Here some caution needs to be expressed in relation to Australia’s preferred option, APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). Although the most inclusive of the options, APEC has several areas where it can face possible opposition. The first of these is in its ‘free trade agenda’ as established in the Bogor declaration of the 1994 APEC
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Indonesian summit, whereby all members would aim for free trade regimes, developed nations by 2010, and developing nations by 2020. Unfortunately, as Chalmers Johnson has noted, this could be difficult for both the US and Japan. The current acrimonious negotiations on trade between the US and Japan suggest firstly, that the US needs to have managed trade with relation to Japan, not free trade as such. Second, if non-tariff barriers are considered, certain segments of Japan’s economic strength, and hence its comprehensive security, could come under threat. Ironically, to diffuse these concerns, Japan may need to bolster even further the growing intra-Asian trade, and in the long term be willing to accept manufactured products from Asia into its own market. This can only be done if development in Asia is further stimulated, and Japan can move away from low-technology competition with its Asian neighbours. Here, ironically, the US-Japan Trade dispute, though complicating debates on APEC, is also one of the best arguments for improving regional trade relationships through a ‘rapid upgrading of the process’ of APEC. This process could include a wide range of agreements which go beyond the issues of tariff barriers and could include ‘proposals for mutual recognition of product standards and domestic testing and monitoring procedures, cooperation in national competition (including anti-dumping) policies, avoiding region-wide problems from rules of origin included in the various subregional agreements (including NAFTA), annual ministerial review of the entire “trade facilitation” program, and technical cooperation in promoting infrastructure projects such as higher education and telecommunications networks.

The People’s Republic of China, too, could have difficulties with the APEC agenda. To date the PRC has not yet come into line with all the requirements of GATT and the new World Trade Organisation. It is extremely unlikely that with the current US opposition to its membership, that China will meet the self-planned-target of gaining admittance in 1995. In as far as China is concerned, serious issues on the trade front including tariffs, quota restrictions, and ‘illiberal’ policies to certain sectors of foreign imports suggest that meeting free trade targets through the APEC agenda by 2020 is indeed a serious commitment by PRC leaders. Here APEC may wish to avoid being too ambitious and realise that some progress is better than aiming at an absolute standard which might force a reappraisal or even an abandonment of the APEC agenda within 20 years. In this context, the more ambitious agenda suggested by the Pacific Business Forum that all trade barriers come down by 2010 is simply unrealistic. Here the

69. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
European Union can provide an interesting example - to retain basic consensus, some individual member states are allowed to use op-out clauses to avoid certain aspects of the integration process, e.g. Britain's reluctance to go to the European monetary unit, the Ecu, and lose the pound sterling. Likewise, there has been some softening of economic requirements for existing and new members in the European Union in recent years. Here Mahathir Mohamad's ability to add an addendum to the free trade aspects of the Bogor declaration, whereby the 2020 date was a non-binding target, should not be of particular concern - far from being a 'dangerous precedent', this flexibility signals that the APEC forum is indeed based on consensus and cooperation, not on competitive coercion\textsuperscript{75}. The aim should be to encourage and persuade member states, not strong-arm them into agreements they will be tempted to revise.

Next, if competitive, zero-sum games are allowed to intrude too closely on the APEC political process, then certain members may fear that APEC is in the interests of some members, but not others. Here Dr. Mahathir of Malaysia has already expressed fear that Australia is really a cover for U.S. desires to take over the regional cooperation process. He has suggested an all Asian EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus) which excludes the US and Australia. Likewise, in July 1995, Korea suggested a smaller grouping of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China which would be allowed to protect certain sensitive areas in their economies (as noted above). Once again, we can see that an APEC trade agenda cannot work without its policies being sensitive to the core concerns and threat perceptions of its members. Two such central interests are the notion of comprehensive security, and for China the \textit{wen} and \textit{wu} options within its foreign policy.

A third major factor to be taken into account is a slow but steady progress towards a shared East Asian consciousness. This emerging consciousness is only in its infancy, but several shared characteristics of East and Southeast regional awareness has already been identified by Noordin Sopiee (among other roles, Dato' Dr. Noordin Sopiee is the Director General of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia's member in the Eminent Persons Group of APEC). These factors include:

- First, as in the cultural realm, there is the discovery of a common perception, empathy and position on the key issues of our time - human rights, democracy and the environment - as vigorously pushed by the West.
- Second, the fact and the perception that East Asia is increasingly coming under siege; the region is perceived to be increasingly under economic and political attack.
- Third, given the rise of East Asian economic, cultural and political confidence and pride and its continued vulnerability and comparative powerlessness, there is the natural desire for empowerment on the world stage.\textsuperscript{76}

Likewise, there has also been serious discussion of an Asian need to re-assert indigenous cultural values in conjunction with economic development in order to avoid de-humanising aspects of modernisation and Western capitalism\textsuperscript{77}. These perceptions need to be taken into account in the diplomatic process which builds common ground

\textsuperscript{75} Contra "A Dream of Free Trade", \textit{The Economist}, 19-11-94, p29.


\textsuperscript{77} ALATAS, Syed Farid "Asia May Re-assert Own Cultural Values", \textit{NST}, 30-5-1995, p12.
in institutions like APEC. If this sense of vulnerability and attack is further heightened by strident Western criticism, it is unlikely that the APEC process will succeed. Even in the security area, while basically recognising that there has been some benefit in the U.S. military presence, some independent thinking has emerged over the last two years. As noted by Jonathan Clarke:

Meanwhile, Asian attitudes have come full circle. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in Winter 1993, Yoichi Funabashi, Washington bureau chief of *Asahi Shimbun*, described Asia as yearning to break free from its American apron strings. This attitude finds repeated expression in Asian actions: the Chinese have refused to give ground over human rights; as tensions mounted in mid-1994 over North Korea's nuclear program, the South Koreans have expressed alarm that American bellicosity over the North Korean nuclear program, far from enhancing their security, was instead imperiling it; the Thais have resisted American pressure to widen the scope of their COBRA GOLD joint military exercises, on the grounds that this might antagonise China and Vietnam; Mahathir Mohamad, the Malaysian prime minister and long-term skeptic about pan-Pacific cooperation, declined to attend the Seattle APEC summit as a protest against putative American hegemonic ambitions for that organization and has instead advocated the formation of an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) that would exclude the United States. Meeting in Bangkok in July 1994, the nations of Southeast Asia collectively rebuffed American representations to the contrary and decided to press ahead with their policy of "constructive engagement" with Burma.17

It is in this context of an empowered Asia and a more independent Japan that Dr. Mahathir's proposals for EAEC seem to have gained some support in Japanese public circles: his visit to Japan in October 1994 received widespread publicity, and the book he jointly authored with Shintaro Ishihara called *The Asia That Can Say No*, was a fast seller79. To date, of course, the Japanese government has neither opted out of the APEC process, nor officially signalled a formal preference for this EAEC grouping. Both concepts, however, are alive in debate among elite circles. We can sense this careful balancing of options in one interpretation of Japanese diplomatic interests in late 1994:  

At this week's APEC summit, Japan's diplomats explained that they supported the idea of more free trade, but on one important condition. Whereas other developed states emphasise that falling trade barriers in Asia mean extra jobs back home, Japan stresses that liberalisation must not hurt APEC's poorer states. Japan therefore wants to balance liberalisation with extra aid for the region.80

However, this is not a case of 'squirming on the fence'81. On the contrary, to aid open trade flows and generate stability through economic aid are two counter-balancing elements in the Japanese conception of comprehensive security. Japan needs to ensure continued trade, access to resources and markets in East Asia, but at the same time it cannot let these trends result in subregional impoverishment or excessively unequal development. Such a balanced approach could also use APEC as a forum to help moderate the 'North-South' divide between richer and poor states in the Asia-Pacific82.

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80. Ibid.

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This is much better than allowing an enduring North-South gap to continue to divide and complicate regional relationships, as in the complicated relationship between North Africa, the Middle East and Europe.

This cautious approach, which incorporates a sensitivity to the changing political environment of East Asia, is to be recommended. Yet it has been criticised by many Western commentators, the most explicit of which argues:

While it may fall to other powers more distant from China to articulate a vision of a China that is looser and more cooperative, Japan will also have to make some tough decisions. Japanese foreign policy has, until recently, been much like the art of growing bonsai, which requires careful cultivation but never leads to a large plant. In the post-Cold War world there are a number of reasons why Japanese foreign policy must move beyond the bonsai stage. But the most important reason is close to home, for if the Chinese challenge is not met, the impact will be felt throughout the international system.

The problems of conceptualising China as a 'challenge' to be 'met' have been discussed above. Gerald Segal, however, has also misidentified his plants. Japan's diplomacy is not tending a bonsai, but attempting to plant a hardwood sapling with roots in the Western, Southeast Asian and Chinese worlds. Japan has had a complex relationship with China for hundreds of years, longer than the entire history of the United States of America. In looking forward to longer time scales than is common in the West, most Asian states recognise that this sapling will have to be carefully tended and developed, with numerous irritants removed and dangers prepared for. APEC is just one nutrient in this transformation of the East Asian landscape. It is crucial that the competitive desire to gain a one-sided advantage in domestic economies, in terms of security advantages, or the dominance of one cultural system over another, not be translated into the way international organisations are led.

If these trends of East Asian identity and Western assertiveness dominate the next decade, then the EAEC option is a more likely regional grouping, and the best that Australia and other 'non-Asian nations' could hope would be a role as associate or dialogue members, as in the ASEAN Regional Forum. This would be much more limited than an active APEC role, but would be much better than holding out for a stalled agenda which simply demonstrates the entrenched differences between the participants rather than brings them together. However, a solely East Asian grouping does risk the potential of furthering a serious split between the North America and Asian sectors of the Pacific region. To date, there is a real chance that the APEC process can continue, but only as long as the real situations and needs of East Asian states are given a central place in policy formation and agenda setting. This must include the Japanese need for comprehensive security, and China's sense of technological and political vulnerability as it continues to modernise itself. Furthermore, this is not just an Asia-Pacific problem: tariff reductions through the

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The proposed APEC agenda can not only increase GDP in the PRC, ASEAN nations, and the region as a whole, but also contribute to world economic growth and act as a catalyst for further progress in World Trade Organisation agreements. If these and other concerns are taken into account, then there can be a slow but progressive shift towards more positive-sum games in the Asia Pacific region.

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