Notes and References

Introduction


2. For 3000 years China regarded itself as the 'Middle Kingdom', surrounded by less civilised peoples (or 'barbarians'). China's 'sudden catastrophic demotion', to use Toynbee's expression, is dated from the Anglo-Chinese War of 1838-42. (Arnold Toynbee, 'Introduction', in Arnold Toynbee (ed.), Half the World: The History and Culture of China and Japan, Thames & Hudson, London, 1973, p. 10.)


1 People's War: A Conceptual Odyssey


6. 'You fight in your way and we fight in ours; we fight when we can win and move away when we can't.' - Lin Piao [Biao], 'Long Live the Victory of People's War', Peking Review, 3 September 1965, p. 19.

7. Selected Military Writings, p. 234.

8. Ibid., pp. 210–11.

9. Ibid., pp. 181, 211.


12. Ibid., p. 230.

13. Ibid., p. 304.

14. Ibid.


17. Selected Military Writings, p. 129.

18. Ibid., p. 149, note 10.

19. Ibid., p. 129.


21. Ibid., p. 131.


25. Ibid., p. 8.


30. It is also significant that the writings of Clausewitz (which had influenced Lenin) are of continued interest to the PLA. This is evidenced by the inclusion of a chapter on Clausewitzian strategic thought in its 1985 Handbook of Military Knowledge for Commanders, parts of which are translated in US Joint Publications Research Service [hereafter, JPRS], China Report, 7 Mar. 1988, pp. i-439.


33. Sun Tzu, op. cit., p. 80.

34. Ibid., pp. 96–7.

35. Ibid., pp. 96, 97.


38. Sun Tzu, op. cit., p. 77.

39. 'All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers' (November 1957), Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 5, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1977, p. 517. This proposition is of continued relevance to contemporary Chinese military thinking as shown by its inclusion in the Handbook of Military Knowledge for Commanders, op. cit., under the sub-heading, 'Despise the Enemy Strategically and Respect the Enemy Tactically'.


41. Ibid., p. 12.

42. Ibid., pp. 6, 37.
218  Notes and References

44. ‘Keeping the City Gates Shut – Tight’, *Asiaweek*, 15 February 1987, p. 64.
46. ‘China Invents the Entrepreneurial Army’, *The Economist*, 14 May 1988, p. 79.
52. Similarly, Jonathan D. Pollack, ‘Rebuilding China’s Great Wall: Chinese Security in the 1980s’, in Godwin, loc. cit., has advised that we should ‘resist the temptation to impose an “externally approved” model of a force structure and doctrine upon the PRC’ (p. 13); Segal, loc. cit., speaks of ‘artificial and western-centred’ suggestions (p. 29), along with an ‘inflexible commitment to the weapon categories and capabilities’ (p. 23) advanced by Ngok, in a review article, states that ‘one should bear in mind the fact that the Chinese do not necessarily operate on the basis of Western models and concepts’ (*Dimensions of China’s Defence Policy for the 1980s and Beyond*, *Asian Studies Association of Australia*, November 1985, p. 135).
53. For example, the PLA newspaper has stated that ‘people’s war under sustained modern conditions is the fundamental strategic doctrine for crushing a superior enemy’ (Ji Lianyiu, ‘Assessment of Balance of Power’ (p. 23)). Also stated in the *Commanders’ Handbook* loc. cit., especially p. 79. Also discussed in the Commanders’ Handbook loc. cit., especially p. 79.
55. *Introduction to National Defense Modernization*, loc. cit., p. 16.
60. Ibid. In the case of the *Handbook*, Mao’s military thought is emphasised as the opening chapter of the ‘Section on Military Thinking and Strategic Policies of China’s Armed Forces’.
61. *Introduction to National Defense Modernization*, loc. cit., p. 18. This view was also expressed to a French military delegation in China: ‘We have chosen to defend a certain number of key points along the border and inside the country. We would use mobile warfare to draw enemy forces onto battlefields of our own choice.’ (Agence France-Presse, 3 May 1979, in FBIS, *Daily Report: People’s Republic of China*, 4 May 1979, p. 1.)
62. *Introduction to National Defense Modernization* loc. cit., p. 18. This is also discussed in the Commanders’ *Handbook* loc. cit., especially p. 79.
63. See, for example, Wang Zhiyun and Jiang Shaowei, ‘An Inch of Land – Notes on Yunnan Border Area’s Defense’, *Renmin Ribao*, 12 August 1983, p. 4, in JPRS, *China Report*, 11 October 1983, p. 84, in which the slogans ‘fight for every inch of land’ and ‘fight to the death in defense of our positions’ are noted. Also of interest is the emphasis given to the defence of cities. Veteran marshal and Politburo member, Nie Rongzhen [Nieh Jung-chen], speaking at the 1978 National Militia Conference, stated: ‘Cities . . . are our political, economic, and cultural centers and pivots of communication, and will be the enemy’s main targets for sabotage and capture. The defense and security of cities is of great significance to stabilizing the war situation, preserving our war potentials and supporting a protracted war’ (FBIS, *Daily Report: People’s Republic
of China, 9 August 1978, p. E7.) In another speech, delivered to the City Defence Symposium held in 1980 and reported by Jilin Ribao in March of that year, the First Secretary of the Jilin provincial party committee, Wang Enmao, said: 'We should consider city defence construction as a strategic issue and never underestimate its importance.' (Cited by Lee Ngok, 'Chinese Strategic Thinking', op. cit., p. 17.) Finally, the Commanders' Handbook, loc. cit., devotes attention to this within its section, 'Defensive Warfare'.

64. Hsu Hsiang-chien, 'Heighten Our Vigilance . . .', loc. cit., p. 10.


66. Ibid., p. 19.


68. Introduction to National Defense Modernization, loc. cit.


71. Ibid., p. 182.


73. Ibid., p. xii.

74. Ibid.


76. Passive defences are defined as 'non-weapons measures – such as civil defence and hardening – which protect important assets against attack', as distinct from active defences which 'utilize weapon systems to protect national territory, military forces, or key assets'. ('Soviet Strategic Defence Programs', a joint US Department of Defense and Department of State Report, Backgrounder, United States Information Service, 10 October 1985, p. 4.)


82. Segal, Defending China, op. cit., p. 21.

83. This is distinct from the appropriation of ideology for internal power struggles, as revealed by events in June 1989.

84. Ching and Bloodworth, op. cit.


2 Defence Development: The Mid-Tech Path to Modernisation


3. Prof. H. Gelber, University of Tasmania, personal communication, October 1988.

4. The four modernisations were re-introduced by the late premier Zhou En-lai (Chou En-lai) in 1975 after more than a decade's delay associated with the Cultural Revolution. They were accepted in revised form in 1978 and then again, after further revision, in July 1979. It is worth noting that in the 1975 listings defence came third (before science and technology) rather than fourth as it did later. Zhou had signalled changes in investment priorities as early as 1959–60.


6. Ibid., p. 17.


8. Ibid.


13. An outstanding example of such modifications is the 1976–85 '10-year plan' for development of the national economy, belatedly announced in February 1978. An admission that it had been overtargeted came as early as 1979 when a 'three-year plan' of economic readjustment and consolida-
tion was launched. The CPC Central Committee decided on the revision barely 10 months after the original plan's announcement. The 1985 constraints marked a further decision to decelerate the pace of modernisation, as did the 1988 decision to slow down because of an 'overheated' economy.


20. This is strongly associated with the rate of social change. As Alvin Toffler postulates: 'in a changing society and culture ... the past becomes a less sure guide to present decisions and future possibilities. In this circumstance, thinking clearly about future possibilities and creating new ideas to cope with them becomes essential to survival. The time-bias of the culture must shift toward increased future-consciousness.' (Alvin Toffler, Previews and Premises, Pan Books, London, 1984, p. 181.) Chinese interest in futurist thinking is evident in their translation and publication of The Third Wave, an earlier work by Toffler; Sleepers, Wake, by Australia's Minister of Science, Barry Jones, in 1986; as well as the incorporation of Edward De Bono's ideas on education through the use of 'lateral thinking', and – as Toffler states (loc. cit., p. 179) – the establishment of 'think-tank' style futurist studies. For background on the latter, see 'Decision-Making: Rise of the Think-Tanks', Asiaweek, 5 October 1986, pp. 75, 77.


28. One may offer the tentative speculation that the former case served as communication of a deterrent signal to the Soviet Union less than a week prior to US President Reagan's visit to China. Zhou may have been playing his 'Western card' at a time when it could draw maximum effect. Yu Qiu's statement, however, would appear to be targeted at the United States. By drawing attention to the PLA's inadequacies, he may have been appealing for favourable treatment in weapons sales and technology transfers.


36. 'More Clout for the Army?', loc. cit., p. 23.

37. Ibid.

38. Outlook Weekly quoted in ibid.


41. The Economist, 16 May 1986, p. 32.


44. Hall, loc. cit., p. 134.


47. Yang Dezhi, Chief of PLA Staff, quoted in China Daily, 2 June 1984.


52. Bradly Hahn, 'Quick Nuclear Leap Leads to Credible Nuclear Deterrent', Pacific Defence Reporter, May 1987, p. 29. According to information provided by Jencks, these SRBMs are based on the Soviet FROG and SCUD-A. The former is unguided, solid-fuelled, has a launch weight
of 3000 kg and a range of 25-65 km; the latter is guided by radio command, relies on liquid fuel, has a launch weight of 4500 kg and a range of over 100 km. (Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1982, p. 295.)


58. Christopher Chant and Ian Hogg, The Nuclear War File, Ebury Press, London, 1983, p. 76. The differences between a neutron and standard fission warhead are such that the latter would have to be 10 times more powerful than the former to produce the same effects.


70. Ibid., p. 29.


75. Ibid., p. 225.


78. Ibid. Apart from a special section on defence under NBC conditions, the subject is also subsumed within discussions on offensive and defensive combat.


the 1970s, Praeger, New York, 1972, p. 341; and in Johnston, op. cit., p. 26, note 21. In people's war to 'destroy the enemy' means 'to disarm him or ‘deprive him of the power to resist'”. (Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1966, p. 230.)


92. As Samuel Griffith states: 'Peking [Beijing] demonstrated during the border fighting with India that she could very effectively deploy and support limited but still significant conventional land power beyond her borders under particular conditions. This she had previously demonstrated, on a much larger scale, in Korea.' (Samuel B. Griffith, 'The Military Potential of China', in Alastair Buchan (ed.), China and the Peace of Asia, Chatto & Windus for the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1965, p. 67.) In his analysis of Chinese risk taking, Whiting also notes that 'the PLA has repeatedly projected its power across China's borders' and that it has adopted 'a belligerent forward posture as opposed to a passive role remaining behind the PRC border or withdrawing from positions of potential conflict' (Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, The University of Michigan, USA, 1975, p. 236.)


94. Ibid.

95. Lee Ngok, loc. cit., p. 5. Professor Lee has been particularly helpful (via personal correspondence, 1988) in stimulating thought on the initial stage of war in relation to the concerns of this study.

3 The Nuclear Guerilla

1. Speaking in his capacity as Defence Minister at the 51st anniversary of the PLA. (Quoted in Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, War and Peace: The Views from Moscow and Beijing, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1984, p. 128.)


6. Of interest is Wong-Fraser's comment on the meaning of the word 'deterrence' in Chinese:

While frequently rejecting Western ideas and theories about deterrence, the Chinese concept of deterrence, which is translated as hezu liliang (literally: the power to force inaction by frightening), can be simply embodied within pre-existing notions of war and politics: to win victory without fighting a war is the best strategy (bu jan er churen zhijing).

(AGatha S.Y. Wong-Fraser, 'China's Nuclear Deterrent', Current History, September 1981, p. 245.)

This observation is congruent with Sun Tzu's teachings and the psychological focus of people's war discussed in Chapter 1.

7. Magnus Clarke, 'Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Deterrence', Book D, Australian Defence and Strategic Studies (ADASS), Deakin University, Victoria, 1985, p. 17. To illustrate the destructive potential of relatively few warheads, he adds that 'the destruction of only the 50 largest cities [of the Soviet Union] would mean 20 per cent of its population as casualties and the destruction of 38 cent of its industries'.


9. The possibility that the Chinese would use nuclear weapons on their own territory has been raised by a number of authors, including Jonathan Pollack.


17. Tim Colebatch, 'We Have Star Wars: Soviets', The Age, 2 December 1987, p. 6.

18. Dr Magnus Clarke, personal communication, Deakin University, January 1988.


22. Clarke, loc. cit.

23. This is evident in Xing Hua's comments of August 1985:
Notes and References

228

Strong in maintaining the independence and self-reliance of Western Europe, France is worried that the US plan would cripple nuclear deterrence and render its independent arsenal powerless, so French leaders are suspicious of the US plan. The United States, they contend, will not truly treat the West European nations as partners. Therefore, France put forward its Eureka proposal, which calls for a joint West European research effort in six new-born technologies.

(Xing Hua, ‘SDI: Western Europe Faces Challenge’, Beijing Review, 5 August 1985, p. 24.)


26. Ibid.

4 The Kingdom in the Middle: Threats to China


7. Ibid. The Military Balance does not include artillery divisions in its totals as they are not manoeuvre formations.

8. As Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger has observed:

Because China is unable to deploy and project power far beyond its borders, and has little political influence in the Middle East, it cannot deal with the Soviet presence and contain it farther away from its borders in the Middle East and the Gulf regions. Hence the importance of the land ‘stitch’ between the Middle East and South Asia, that is, Pakistan and Afghanistan. At the same time Soviet naval dominance in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the western part, could play an important supportive role in an attempt to dominate South Asia. Thus the most important elements in China’s counter-encirclement strategy are: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Indian Ocean, in this order.

(China’s Southwestern Strategy: Encirclement and Counterencirclement, Praeger, New York, 1985, p. 6.)


10. This is well illustrated by an item in World Affairs Report, California Institute of International Studies, California, No. 1022790: the Soviet press in 1981 spoke of ‘Great Khan expansionism’ and quoted a number of writers, going back to Kan Yu Wei, the nineteenth-century political leader who foresaw the day when the yellow dragon flag (the flag of the revolutionaries) would fly over all countries.


12. Deng Xiaoping, quoted in Ming Bao (Hong Kong), 4 March 1979, p. 1.

13. Thai Ming Cheung, ‘Computer War Games Catching Up’, Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1988, p. 23. The outcome which was predetermined (a matter raised earlier in Chapter 2), and with which foreign assessors disagreed, was a PLA victory. Despite Soviet technological superiority, the Chinese won because of such factors as ‘tactics’ and ‘bravery of soldiers’.


15. Ibid., p. 308.


23. An excellent investigation of Soviet writings on the campaign, and lessons drawn from it, is provided by Lilita I. Dzirkals, ‘Lightning War in Manchuria: Soviet Military Analysis of the 1945 Far East Campaign’ (P-5589), RAND Corp., Santa Monica, California, January 1976.

24. Hunt, loc. cit., p. 112.

25. Nelson notes that the Wuhan MR (now absorbed into the Jinan MR) ‘serves as the strategic reserve area for the others . . . presumably because of its central location, large industrial base, and good rail communications with the others’ (Harvey W. Nelson, The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 2nd edn, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981, p. 123.) During the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979, for example, main force units had been drawn from Wuhan, as well as Chengdu in
the south and Fuzhou in the east (Hunt loc. cit., p. 107).


30. Ibid.


32. Lee, ibid., p. 4.


35. Ibid., p. 175.

36. Green and Yost, op. cit., p. 141.

37. Ibid., p. 142. The authors have quoted from Vigor Louis, *The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire*, Times Books, New York, 1979, p. 147.

38. Vigor, loc. cit.


40. Sun Tzu, op. cit., p. 92.

41. In support of the proposition that the US would avoid direct military involvement, Thomas Pepper and London’s IISS information officer, Maj. S.R. Elliot, are worth citing. The former described a US nuclear response to an Asian nuclear war as ‘unlikely’; and the latter has stated: ‘If there is any conflict in the Asiatic theatre, I suspect it will be limited and there will be a strong lobby to keep other states out of the conflict by taking strategic precautions.’ (*Asia Week*, 27 May 1983, p. 40.)


46. Ibid., p. 11.


52. Frisch, op. cit., p. 51.


54. During the period 1965–84, the area under irrigation increased from 33 to 45 million hectares, and chemical fertilizer usage increased from 2 to 18 million tons. (State Statistical Bureau, Chinese Government, cited in *New Internationalist*, April 1987, p. 17.)

55. Ibid., pp. 16–17.


60. Quoted in Robert Delfs, ‘Chen Yun: A Chilling Speech’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 October 1985, p. 40. Indeed, the importance of grain production was stressed again, by CPC General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, at the 13th Party Congress in October 1987 and at the meeting of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee soon after.


63. Ibid.

64. During the Second Indochina War, Hanoi had planned a combined Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian military command. This was formalised in 1970, but the concept had not been implemented until after the establishment of the SRV.

Notes and References

Studies, Singapore, 1984, p. 57


67. Ibid.


Sino–Vietnamese relations have traditionally been expressed in terms of vassalage. Only in recent years have the Chinese and Vietnamese begun to speak of their relationship in terms of theoretical equality. Making this new relationship effective will require a large adjustment in the viewpoint each nation has historically had of the other. Chinese pressure of any kind is instinctively felt by the Vietnamese as a threat to their national survival. On the other hand, the assertion by Vietnam of its national interests other than in deference to Chinese policies is instinctively felt by the Chinese as impertinence bordering on insubordination. Perhaps an inevitable result of the difference in size between the two countries, these feelings lie at the root of Sino–Vietnamese relations today as they did two thousand years ago.

(p. 297)


74. ‘The Trouble with Roubles’, Asiaweek, 19 October 1986, p. 10; and ‘Sweeping Change at the Top’, Asiaweek, 4 January 1987, p. 12, respectively.

75. At the time of writing, it is too early to tell the impact of Western trade sanctions against China in response to the Chinese Government’s violent suppression of the ‘pro-democracy movement’ in June 1989. Even if Western trading partners to not soften on the issue of sanctions, China has already explored alternative arrangements for the continuance of its economic progress: plans to expand considerably its economic relations with the USSR are underway. See Seth Faison, ‘China Wards off Western Chill with Soviet Trade’, The Australian, 18 July 1989, p. 12.

76. The number of infantry divisions increased from 25 in 1978 to 61 in 1986, and an armoured division was formed in 1980. Since 1978, the Soviet Union supplied Vietnam’s navy with 13 missile attack craft, two light frigates, three amphibious assault landing ships, two diesel-powered attack submarines, as well as other warships, while the air force received 60 bombers, 200 fighter aircraft comprising MiG-21s and MiG-23s, and helicopters capable of a variety of missions. (Douglas Pike, ‘The Armed Forces of Asia and the Pacific: No. 2 – Vietnam, a Modern Sparta’, Pacific Defence Reporter, April 1983, p. 35.)


78. For example, in Science News (Kexue Bao) magazine in July and the Guangming Daily on 21 December.


80. Ibid., p. 19.


85. The first high-level Soviet visit to Beijing since 1969 – that of First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov – had been scheduled to take place that month. In early May, Tass condemned ‘China’s military provocations’ against Vietnam and Pravda denounced China for ‘violating’ Vietnam’s sovereignty.


88. Yin Zhiping, ‘China’s Sovereignty Over the Nansha Islands Indisputable’, China Post, 1 August 1988, p. 7.

89. ‘New Ocean Survey Site Operating in Spratlys’, South China Morning Post, 1 August 1988, p. 7.


92. The figure was based on satellite-derived intelligence rather than the SRV claim of 200 000 (see Asiaweek, 8 June 1984, p. 17).


94. Segal, Defending China, op. cit., p. 219.


96. Mahony, loc. cit., p. 18.

102. Snyder, ibid., p. 4.
104. Ibid.
105. An interesting comparison may be found in the Falklands War of 1982. Argentina’s action to reclaim the Malvinas (Falklands) coincided with the approach of the 150th anniversary of Argentina’s claim, which was backed by strongly nationalist sentiment, to the British-held Islands. (The British had reasserted colonial control over the Falklands in 1833.)
106. The expression gained currency during the Sino–British negotiations over Hong Kong, when the Chinese referred to the colony’s status as a ‘question left over from history’. The Chinese have used the expression in other contexts, for example: ‘Border issues were left to us by history.’ (Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian speaking of the Sino–Indian border dispute, quoted in David Bonavia, ‘Troubled Frontiers’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 September 1986, p. 15.)
114. Ibid.
121. First August Radio, ‘USA Deceiving China over Taiwan’, in SWB, 8 February 1983.
124. Snyder, op. cit., p. 5.
128. Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian said that ‘reports from foreign agencies have exaggerated the event along the Sino–Indian border’. (‘Peaceful Border Solution Sought’, South China Morning Post, 22 May 1987, p. 7.)
131. India’s undeclared nuclear arsenal in 1988 is based on CIA estimates; the projection for 1990 comes from a report by the Carnegie Endowment Task Force on Non-Proliferation, released in 1988.


139. This dilemma was expressed, for instance, by John Hackett, The Third World War: The Untold Story, Macmillan, New York, 1982, p. 296; and 'A Walk on the Wild Side', Asiaweek, 23 March 1984, p. 5.


141. Quoted in Pollack, loc. cit.

142. The uncertainty of whether a North Korean attack would be 'a unilateral act or a prelude to Soviet military action in the Pacific' is noted in Larry A. Niksch (specialist in Asian affairs for the US Congressional Research Service), 'Korea - Democracy and Security: Can the Two Co-exist?', Pacific Defence Reporter, November 1987, p. 29.


145. Ibid., p. 355.


The Soviet Union has brought into these islands not only tanks, APCs, an assortment of artillery pieces, antiaircraft missiles and MI-24 Hind attack helicopters, but also 130 mm cannons which were usually not found in the equipment of an ordinary Soviet division.

The troops deployed in the Northern Territories have been actively engaged in various types of training.

The number of MiG-23, Flogger fighters deployed ... on Etorofu Island has been increased. About 40 such aircraft are currently deployed.


147. By service, the figure comprises 2400 army, 16 200 air force, 8100 navy, 38 000 marines. (The Military Balance 1988-1989, op.cit., p. 28.)

148. Adm. Ronald J. Hays, US Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, in an inter-

view with Denis Warner, 'View from the Top', Pacific Defence Reporter, August 1987, p. 11.

149. Ibid.


151. Ibid.

152. South China Morning Post, 8 October 1985, p. 6.


156. See The Japan Economic Journal, 18 October 1986, p. 6. Other defence dealings include unofficial Japanese arms exports to China. These include Oki Electric's sale of radars for the PLA Navy, according to the separate investigations of Reinhard Drifte and Kazuo Tomiyama, and there is speculation among defence analysts that some components for China's own export weapons may have come from Japan. (Reported in 'Meet the New Arms Exporters', The Economist, 6 August 1988, p. 61.)


158. The warning is attributed to the Korean king who had been defeated by Hideyoshi. It came as a response to the shogun ruler's expressed intention of conquering China as well.

159. Derived from his statement: 'All warfare is based on deception'. (Sun Tzu, op. cit., p. 66.)

Conclusion


4. Mao Zedong reportedly said in 1965: 'All I want are six atom bombs, with these bombs I know that neither side will attack me'.

Appendix 1 The Chinese Armed Forces

Notes and References

Appendix 2 Chinese Nuclear Forces

1. This writer agrees with Hahn that China's newly acquired MIRV capability (1985) may be presumed to have extended to existing launch systems. (Bradley Hahn, 'Beijing's Growing Global Missile Reach', Pacific Defence Reporter, February 1987, p. 13.)
12. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 146.

Selected Bibliography

1 CHINESE SOURCES

English-Language Publications

XIE, Xuan. 'PLA Assisting Socialist Construction.' Beijing Review, 6 August 1984, p. 23.
Xinhua. 'PLA Forms Missile Group.' China Daily, 13 June 1984, p. 3.