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Trial Without Counsel: Dietrich v the Queen

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Trial Without Counsel: Dietrich v the Queen

Abstract
In Australia it has been customary to force a person who cannot afford legal representation to trial undefended, even in cases of serious crime. In Dietrich v The Queen (‘Dietrich’) the Full Bench of the High Court of Australia, in a majority decision, signalled that this practice should cease.

Keywords
Dietrich v the Queen, legal representation, trial without counsel
In Australia it has been customary to force a person who cannot afford legal representation to trial undefended, even in cases of serious crime.\(^1\) In *Dietrich v The Queen*\(^2\) ('Dietrich') the Full Bench of the High Court of Australia, in a majority decision, signalled that this practice should cease. The applicant was charged in the County Court of Victoria on four counts; the first three counts related to importation or, alternatively, possession of a trafﬁcable quantity of heroin. A fourth charge of possession was laid in relation to a separate quantity of heroin. The offences were punishable 'by life imprisonment or for such period as the Court thinks appropriate'.\(^3\) The applicant applied for legal aid, but the Legal Aid Commission indicated that aid would only be provided for a plea of guilty. An application for aid under s 69(3) of the *Judiciary Act 1903* (Cth) was dismissed as being out of time.

The trial duly proceeded without defence counsel, despite the applicant's strenuous and repeated requests for legal representation. The following exchange is typical:

> **HIS HONOUR:** I want you to understand this, Mr Dietrich - if you will listen to me that I have no power to give you legal representation.

> **ACCUSED:** You have the power to adjourn the matter, sir.

> **HIS HONOUR:** I don't propose to adjourn the matter. The matter is an alleged offence, which occurred the year before last, and it is desirable that the matter proceed to trial.

> **ACCUSED:** Desired by whose side?

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\(^*\) This is a modified version of a note appearing in the January 1993 edition of the *University of Western Australia Law Review*.

1. See *McInnis v The Queen* (1979) 143 CLR 575.
2. Unreported, 13 November 1992, Full Bench. In these proceedings the author appeared as junior counsel to Mr David Grace LLM, of Grace & Macgregor, Melbourne, for the applicant.
3. *Customs Act 1901* (Cth) s 235(2).
**HIS HONOUR:** Desirable to the community.

**ACCUSED:** The community has got no interest in it. If the community is aware that they're putting people in front of court without representation, the community would be aghast.

The applicant was convicted on the first count and acquitted on the fourth. An appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal was dismissed. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was sought on the basis that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in law:

(i) in holding that the applicant did not have a right to be provided with counsel at public expense; and/or

(ii) in not holding that by reason of the applicant being unrepresented, a miscarriage of justice had occurred in the circumstances of this case and of the applicant.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. Mason CJ and McHugh J summed up the majority’s view by saying that when a trial judge is faced with an application for an adjournment or a stay by an indigent accused charged with a serious offence who, through no fault on his or her part, is unable to obtain legal representation, then:

In that situation, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the trial in such a case should be adjourned, postponed or stayed until legal representation is available. If, in those circumstances, an application that the trial be delayed is refused and, by reason of the lack of representation of the accused, the resulting trial is not a fair one, any conviction of the accused must be quashed by an appellate court for the reason that there has been a miscarriage of justice in that the accused has been convicted without a fair trial.

The High Court confirmed that a person charged with a criminal offence is not entitled, as of right, to the appointment of state-funded counsel for the duration of the trial. However, the right not to be unfairly tried is a fundamental element of the criminal justice system. Thus, where an accused person appears before court on a serious offence without legal representation, and she or he wishes to be represented, proceedings should be adjourned, postponed or stayed to enable the accused to obtain legal representation, unless there are exceptional circumstances why the trial should proceed. Critical elements of this ruling are that (i) the offence charged is imprisonable or otherwise ‘serious’; (ii) the court is satisfied that the accused lacks the financial means to pay for legal representation; and (iii) the accused wishes to be represented. It is not possible to list exhaustively the ‘exceptional circumstances’ which will justify a refusal to adjourn

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4 Per Mason CJ and McHugh J, above n 1 at 19.
5 *Jago v District Court (NSW)* (1989) 168 CLR 23, per Mason CJ at 29; Deane J at 56; Toohey J at 72; Gaudron J at 75.
proceedings but it can be said that factors other than the interests of the accused may need to be considered. Toohey J. observed:

It is not possible to say that the trial judge must adjourn the trial for there are other considerations to be taken into account. Counsel for the applicant is not right in suggesting that only the interests of the accused are relevant. The situation of witnesses, particularly the victim, may need to be considered as well as the consequences of an adjournment for the presentation of the prosecution case and for the court's programme generally. But ordinarily the requirement of a fair trial will be the prevailing consideration. Therefore, in the absence of compelling circumstances, a trial should be adjourned where an indigent accused charged with a serious offence lacks legal representation, not due to any conduct on the accused's part. If the trial proceeds in those circumstances without defence counsel, and the accused is convicted, the conviction will almost certainly be quashed. Deane J noted: 'The conviction without a fair trial necessarily involves substantial miscarriage [of justice].' The notion that a trial judge (or the prosecutor) may be able to give a helping hand to the accused, so as to avoid an unfair trial, is illusory, and bound to cause problems in the course of the trial.

Brennan and Dawson JJ dissented. Brennan J was not prepared to accept an equation between unfairness arising from a lack of representation and a miscarriage of justice. He argued that because the court has no power to appoint counsel to represent the defence, the only remedy available to prevent unfairness would be a stay of proceedings. This would be tantamount to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction, and would bring the criminal law to a halt until public funds were made available. 'To grant an indefinite adjournment where there is no abuse of process of the courts is inconsistent with their constitutional duty.' Whilst a stay would be granted to prevent an abuse of process, not every case of unfairness amounted to an abuse of process, and the two concepts were distinct.

Dawson J also rejected the reasoning of the majority, saying that there 'cannot be a miscarriage of justice merely because an accused is unrepresented when he has no entitlement to representation.'

The *Dietrich* ruling will have a profound impact on the conduct of criminal trials and, hopefully, the provision of legal aid in Australia. Clearly, the decision marks a significant departure from previous practice. However, in terms of its juristic basis, it is not a radical decision. In particular, no member of the Court was prepared to fashion a constitutional

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6 Above n 2 at 63; and see Deane J at 41.
7 Ibid at 44.
8 Mason CJ and McHugh J, at 5; Toohey J at 60.
9 Ibid at 28.
10 Ibid at 49.
11 As Deane J noted, in forcing the accused to trial without counsel, the trial judge's view accords with past practice: ibid at 35.
right to state-funded counsel, despite the availability of various pegs upon which to base such a right. Thus, the 'due process' provisions of various imperial statutes incorporated into Victorian law were rejected as a basis for the right, despite the appeal of the American experience. Nor was the right to be found in s 397 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), although Canadian courts have opened a pathway in construing a similar provision of the Canadian Criminal Code. Nor was the Court prepared to rely upon article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('the Covenant') as a basis for a right to state funded counsel. This basis was developed at some length by counsel for the applicant. The Covenant enshrines the right to state funded counsel where the interests of justice require. The Covenant was ratified by the Commonwealth Government in 1980, but the relevant provisions of the Covenant have not been implemented by legislation. Australia has recently acceded to the Optional Protocol, which allows individual citizens to petition the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations in respect of alleged violations of the Covenant. It is conceded that none of these developments ipso facto create rights in municipal law. However, counsel for the applicant argued that the thrust of cases in the High Court of Australia and elsewhere is to recognise the importance of international agreements in developing and formulating the common law.

12 See 28 Edw III c 3 (1354) and 42 Edw III c 3 (1368). The question is whether the applicant was imprisoned 'without being brought in answer by due process of law' (1354) or 'put to answer before justices, or matter of record, or by due process and writ original' (1368): see Adler v District Court of New South Wales (1990) 48 A Crim R 420, at 430.

13 Section 397 provides: 'Every accused person shall be admitted after the close of the case for the prosecution to make full answer and defence thereto by counsel'.

14 Canadian Criminal Code, s 577(3) provides that the accused has the right 'to make full...defence personally or by his counsel': see Ewing and Kearney v The Queen (1974) 49 DLR (3d) 619, at 627 per Seaton JA; Deutsch v Law Society of Upper Canada Legal Aid Fund (1985) 48 CR (3d) 166; Reg v Rowbotham (1988) 41 DLR (3d) at 65 - 66; Barrette v The Queen (1976) 68 DLR (3d) 260 (SCC).

15 Article 14(3)(d) provides:

In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:

... (d) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does have sufficient means to pay for it'.


17 Brennan J noted that it was 'incongruous' that Australia should adhere to the Covenant containing that provision article 14(3)(d) unless Australian courts recognised the entitlement and Australian governments provided the resources to carry that entitlement into effect, at 25.

The Court disposed of this argument on the basis that there was no ambiguity or uncertainty in the common law which needed to be clarified by reference to international agreements. The right to legal representation was not developed at common law, but created by legislative reform. In short, the High Court was not prepared to create a new quasi-constitutional right to state-funded counsel.

An interesting question raised by the appeal relates to the relevance of American and Canadian decisions which turn on the scope and meaning of various constitutional instruments. The right to funded counsel is not expressly enshrined in the United States Constitution. The right, which was recognised in capital cases in *Powell v Alabama* and extended to both state and federal cases involving possible loss of liberty, in a series of landmark decisions, culminating in *Argersinger v Hamlin*, is the product of judicial reasoning and interpretation. Similarly, there is no unqualified right to funded counsel contained within the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* but a limited right has been distilled from a series of more general Charter rights, such as s 7 (not to be deprived of liberty except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice) and s 11(d) (right to a fair and public hearing). The logical process is one of defining the specific content of general rights. The Australian Constitution contains no express guarantees similar to the US Constitution's Sixth Amendment (right to counsel) or Fourteenth Amendment (due process). However, Deane J argued that the American cases cannot be dismissed as turning on constitutional provisions. They are in essence concerned with the concept of a fair trial:

> The reasoning in those United States judgments is, in my view, compelling in its analysis of the significance of lack of legal representation by reason of poverty to the law's fundamental requirement that a criminal trial be fair. Similar reasoning has prevailed in the highest courts in the common law jurisdictions of the Republics of Ireland and India. It should now be accepted and applied in this Court.

The relevance of these cases in the present context derives from a shared common law base, the essential similarity of the adversarial proceedings, and the identical nature of the disadvantages faced by unrepresented counsel. There is also a growing consensus within the world community, and

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19 For the present Australian position see *Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)*, s 78; *Crimes Act 1958* (Vic), s 397; *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW), s 402; *Criminal Code* (Qld), s 616; *Criminal Code* (WA), s 634; *Criminal Code* (Tas) s 368; *Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935*, s 288. The right to counsel was recognised in treason in 1606. Until 1836 an accused was entitled to be represented in misdemeanours and in civil proceedings and, on a charge of felony, on questions of law only. The *Trial for Felony Act 1836* (Imp) established the right to representation in relation to felony: see Chowdhary-Best, 'The History of the Right to Counsel' (1976) 40 Journal of Criminal Law 275.

20 287 US 45 (1937).


23 Above n 2 at 40.
certainly amongst the signatories to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as to the basic requirements of procedural justice.

Conclusion

The majority judgments in Dietrich may be summarised as follows. An accused has a right not to be tried unfairly. Trial courts possess the power to make appropriate orders, and where necessary, stay proceedings, in order to ensure that a person is not subject to an unfair trial. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, experience shows that the trial of an unrepresented accused on a serious charge will result in an unfair trial. Therefore, an adjournment should be granted to enable the accused to obtain representation. In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, the court should consider not only the interests of the accused, but also the interests of the community in the prosecution and punishment of offenders. If the trial proceeds, and the accused is convicted, the power of appeal courts to quash the conviction depends upon a finding that there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice. Justice has miscarried if the accused has lost a chance which was fairly open to him or her of being acquitted. On a serious charge, the loss of an opportunity for acquittal will almost invariably be found in the absence of legal representation.

Several aspects of the ruling in Dietrich remain to be worked out in practice. Trial judges may have to confront administrative issues relating to the assessment of means. Policy matters will need to be resolved. Deane J’s dictum24 that a person who chooses not to utilise personal assets to pay for legal representation has no ground for complaint will cause no joy for the middle classes, who of course gain little assistance from the present means tested system. Will the house, car and family silver have to go before the rule in Dietrich may be prayed in aid? Other issues abound. Those exercising prosecutorial discretion will not be able to ignore the question of legal representation. The position regarding summary offences and offences punishable only by way of fine will need to be clarified. New ways of providing legal aid must be found. Greater use of McKenzie friends25 and possibly even law students26 should be considered. This may not be enough if, after all, it is essential to the fairness of the adversarial system that the...

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24 Ibid at 42.
26 As to law students being used as paralegals: see Argersinger v Hamlin (1972) 407 US 25 at 40 per Brennan, Douglas and Stewart JJ. "Law students as well as practising attorneys may provide an important source of legal representation for the indigent...Given the huge increase in law school enrolments over the past few years...I think it plain that law students can be expected to make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in many areas, including cases reached by today's decision". Clearly, there are difficulties with this proposal in the Australian context, not the least of which would be persuading the accused to accept representation by a student. In superior courts, there would be practical hurdles associated with admission requirements. In summary proceedings, the problems may be less intractable: see U'Toole v Scott [1965] AC 939; Skales v Thompson (1984) 12 A Crim R 371.
facilities available to the opposing camps should be approximately equal. This ideal may not be attainable in practice, but Dietrich indicates that gross iniquities will no longer be tolerated. As Murphy J wrote in McInnis: 'Putting an accused to trial in a serious case without a lawyer is barbarous.' The High Court has indicated that if the practice is not barbarous, it must at least be recognised as unacceptable in the vast majority of cases.