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East Asia Security Centre
东亚安全中心

Peer-reviewed Conference Paper
2014 East Asia Security Symposium and Conference
同行互评会议论文
2014 东亚安全座谈会

Published Version April 2015

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Troubled Waters in the East China Sea - China’s ADIZ

Abstract: In November 2013 China declared an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). Within the already changeable East Asian region China’s neighbours reacted with alarm. Despite increasing apprehension and speculation about China’s assertiveness, this paper argues China’s ADIZ is not a challenge to the status quo. China’s domestic politics and the specific Sino-Japanese tension over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands account for the creation, timing and method of establishing the ADIZ. A comparative case study of China’s ADIZ and Japan’s own ADIZ demonstrates that misperceptions about China’s ADIZ rather than the ADIZ itself are more likely to further destabilise the region.

Key Words: status quo, ADIZ, Sino-Japanese relations, Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.

中国防空识别区—中国东海的汹涌暗流

摘要：2013年11月，中国宣布建立东海防空识别区（ADIZ），东亚这个动荡的地区再次变得风声鹤唳。针对越来越多的对中国强硬态度的各种推测，本文认为，从中国国内形势以及具体的中日关系的角度来看，中国设立防空识别区并不是为了挑战现状。对中国和日本自身防空识别区的比较案例研究有助于理解这个观点，即我们需要更确切的证据才能得出结论，而不是制造误解，使该区域变得更加不稳定。

关键词：现状，ADIZ，中日关系，钓鱼岛/尖阁列岛。
TROUBLED WATERS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA - CHINA'S ADIZ

Introduction

In 2010 and 2012 Chinese citizens held mass demonstrations. These were the largest in a decade and protested Japan’s arrest of Chinese fisherman operating in the disputed waters of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, and the subsequent nationalisation of the islands by Japan. In response the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) government denounced Tokyo’s actions proclaiming them illegitimate, and yet called for cooperation and dialogue. Notwithstanding the restraint envisioned by the PRC government 2013 was characterised by increasing military activities in the East China Sea which culminated in China’s declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). An ADIZ is the regulated airspace over coastal waters that countries commonly establish in the interest of their national security. China’s ADIZ is contentious as it covers disputed territories, in particular the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. This group of isolated islets with a surface area of only seven square kilometres has been a subject of discords between China and Japan for decades and yet it has been become a prominent issue in contemporary Sino-Japanese relations.

Thus questions that arise are: what did China try to achieve through the declaration of an ADIZ? Why did it declare the ADIZ at this time? What are the implications? More pointedly, does China’s ADIZ signal a change in status quo? Is the ADIZ proof that China is a revisionist great power as realists’ theorise? This paper argues that the establishment of an ADIZ is not evidence that China seeks to change the status quo. The first part discusses the rationale for China to establish an ADIZ and argues that it should be understood primarily in the context of the ongoing dispute with Japan. A substantiating comparative case study of China’s ADIZ and Japan’s ADIZ forms the second part of this paper. The fact that Japan’s ADIZ is less ubiquitously discussed in journalistic and academic publications indicates that preconceptions of fear dictate understanding of East Asian international relations. The last section discusses the implications of China’s ADIZ for regional powers in the context of China’s wider development strategy.

Why did China establish an ADIZ?

China’s ADIZ serves both its East China Sea regional strategic interests and responds to domestic politics which are fuelled by historical and contemporary animosity towards Japan. An ADIZ is rational in the context of this animosity and the ongoing Sino-Japanese relationship difficulties. In China, Japan is perceived as dishonouring a barbaric and recent history. This common Chinese understanding is sustained by Japanese officials’ actions such

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1 This research was supported and funded by the School of Politics and International Relations, Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies and the Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism, all based at University of Nottingham, UK. For her support and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank my supervisor Miwa Hirono. I would like to extend my gratitude to Jonathan Ping for his valuable edits which greatly improved the quality of this manuscript.
as visits to the Yasukuni shrine, controversial statements about the Nanking massacre\textsuperscript{2} and similar dismissive attitudes towards the suffering of comfort women.\textsuperscript{3}

Thus a utility of establishing an ADIZ was to bolster the credentials of the Chinese government within domestic politics. Historically, the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy rests upon territorial sovereignty as it prides itself for being the custodian of the nation. The tumultuous anti-Japanese protests in 2010 and 2012 urged the Chinese government to stand firm against the Japanese.\textsuperscript{4} President Xi Jinping may have only wanted to gain a concession from Japan that the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands exists\textsuperscript{5} in order to save face or to gain domestic support from an increasingly nationalist public and the Hawks in the elite.

Chinese animosity towards the Japanese is also fuelled by contemporary events and policies proffered by Japan, such as the nationalisation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in September 2012; threats of shooting down drones in their airspace in September 2013;\textsuperscript{6} the 2013 Japanese Defence Paper presents plans to increase the Self-Defence Forces to be capable of defending against China’s rise (a plan confirmed in July 2014 through the overturn of its pacifist Constitution).\textsuperscript{7}

Paradoxically, Japan’s main concerns as reflected by policy and actions are thus similar to China’s – it worries about China’s increasing military budget and activities such as the deployment of maritime and air patrols around the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and analogous territorial claims in the South China Sea. History has entangled these two countries in a complex realist narrative; differing perceptions; action-reaction; symbiotic escalating nationalist politics between state and people; difficult to halt and ever threatening to intensify in the present.

Thus, after Japan’s nationalisation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, China strengthened its military presence in the area, and by declaring an ADIZ it reinforced its sovereignty over the islands. The PRC government initially declared that the ADIZ was not aimed at any particular country,\textsuperscript{8} but when it criticised by Japan, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman “reiterated China’s stance on the Diaoyu Islands and slammed Japan’s unilateral actions to provoke

\textsuperscript{3} David McNeill and Matsumoto Masayoshi, “If we don’t face our past, we’re bound to repeat the same mistakes. Japanese wartime medical orderly reports on army’s role in maintaining ‘comfort women’ system”, \textit{The Asia-Pacific Journal} 12, Issue 42, no. 1 (2014).
\textsuperscript{4} Lian Degui, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, interview, July 18, 2014.
disputes”. For many Chinese it seemed natural and rational that “[i]f Japan nationalised the islands’ territory, China ‘nationalised’ the airspace above them.”

Indicative of the Chinese domestic politics and regional Sino-Japanese relations context of establishing the ADIZ is the timing. An ADIZ had actually been “prepared by the Chinese for years, as many complained about Japan’s [long established] ADIZ and during [later] direct confrontations it was [a] predictable move”. Many Chinese scholars such as Tan Qinfang and Chinese activist groups argue that the timing of China’s ADIZ declaration is a reaction to Japan’s actions, but that the ADIZ itself is a long held and planned policy to restore ADIZ equilibrium between the two powers in the region. Thus in many ways, China’s ADIZ may be understood as a reinforcement rather than revision or challenge to the status quo of the use of ADIZs by the states’ system in East Asia.

Bilateral Sino-Japanese relations are however further strained by the presence of the United States of America’s (US) military in the East China Sea. In response to Washington’s reinforced support of Japan in case of conflict, China accused it of double standards in not maintaining neutrality. In addition, historically China blames the US’s misappropriation of the administration of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands from China to Japan post WWII as seeding the present regional territorial dispute. Correspondingly, (complicating the region further, plus linking it to global international relations) within the bilateral action-reaction synergy many Chinese argue that the US’s pivot to Asia is an encirclement strategy. A cited example of this speculated scenario was the announcement made in October 2013 that the first US North-East Asian long-range Global Hawk drone base would be created in Japan. Given these circumstances, the PRC government’s self-defence rationale for establishing an ADIZ is valid. Liu Xiushi from the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, for example, argued that an ADIZ was established for China’s protection as the ADIZ could deter and potentially counter any provocative or aggressive US-Japanese behaviour.

A comparative study of ADIZs

China’s ADIZ is not unique in the region. There are over twenty, and Japan’s ADIZ, for example, is as problematic as China’s in establishment, revision and coverage. A comparison of the two leads to the conclusion that the perception of China’s declaration of an ADIZ as being aggressive, unwarranted and revisionist is primarily the result of both the timing of the

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10 Interview with academic researcher, July 28, 2014.
11 Interview with academic researcher, July 28, 2014.
announcement and the rising China threat thesis as most strongly attended to in Australia, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the US.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus when ADIZs are the foremost subject, China is simply joining a long list of countries, including Japan, that have already established their own ADIZ. Japan initially inherited its ADIZ from the US, which drew demarcation lines after WWII. In 1969, 1972 and most recently in 2010 Japan expanded its ADIZ.\textsuperscript{16} The latter expansion infringed on Taiwan’s sovereignty, as further explained below, and hence attracted criticism from Taipei’s government at the time, but received minimal attention from international pundits and scholars. There are five considerations to be made before reaching a conclusion on China’s assertiveness and these are discussed below by drawing a parallel with Japan’s own ADIZ.

Firstly, China’s aim for establishing an ADIZ was no different than those invoked by other countries. The PRC government insists that establishing an ADIZ is in compliance with international norms and national laws, and therefore legitimate for defensive purposes. When Japan expanded its ADIZ for the second time westwards to Yonaguni, “the western-most island of Japan and lies 180 kilometers from the Taiwanese east coast”, it also invoked self-defence reasons. More importantly Japan even considered “the possibility of deploying Ground Self-Defense Force troops” and establishing a base on Yonaguni Island due to its key location for national defense purposes.\textsuperscript{18} The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs explained the move in light of allowing residents to have a life free of anxiety.\textsuperscript{19} In short, states often make self-defence claims.

A second issue raised is that China required all aircraft crossing the newly demarcated airspace to report their flight plans and identity in advance and maintain radio contact. All flights crossing its territory, and not only those en route to its national airspace, have to identify themselves in advance. This request was received with outcry by many states, especially the US\textsuperscript{20} which “immediately militarized the situation by sending B-52 bombers into China’s zone”.\textsuperscript{21} However, as Michael Swaine explains, China has not set a new

\textsuperscript{18} Russell Hsiao, “Taiwan-Japan Rift over ADIZ”, \textit{China Brief} 10, no. 12 (2010), \url{http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36474&no_cache=1#.U_-PDfk7svM} (accessed May 8, 2014).
precedent. For instance “the published rules for ADIZs of Australia, the Philippines, Myanmar, and Taiwan require the filing of flight plans for foreign aircraft operating in their ADIZ without any reference to the destination of the aircraft”. 22

Thirdly, it is generally claimed that no consultations with neighbouring countries took place prior to the announcement, hence China acted unilaterally. Yet, Mainichi Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper, reported that the Chinese officials informed Japan about its plans to set up an ADIZ as early as 2010.23 This report however seems to have been swept under the carpet and remains officially unconfirmed. In comparison, Japan’s expansion in 1972 and 2010, was a unilateral move too, the same as in China’s case. The latter expansion was announced on the website of the Japanese Ministry of Defense and a Japanese official stated:

Tokyo had no intention of communicating with Taipei on the matter either before the decision was made… nor after... [and] given international norms that ADIZ demarcation is at the discretion of each country, it was natural for Japan not to seek prior approval from Taiwan. However, when there is another country adjacent to the line, consulting with the country in advance is a courtesy.24

Consequently, Taiwan repeatedly complained about Japan’s actions and its lack of courtesy.

Fourth, and certainly the most worrying concern raised was the inclusion of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the ADIZ.25 This primarily begs the question of how Japan declared its ADIZ in the first place if it encompassed a disputed territory. Thus once again, China’s declaration of an ADIZ over disputed territories did not set a precedent in the region. On June 26, 2010 Japan expanded its ADIZ line 22km westward of the initial demarcation line as drawn by the US after WWII in 1950.26 Taiwan disapproved as it infringed on Taiwan’s ADIZ by “defining two-thirds of Yonaguni’s airspace as being Taiwanese and one third as Japanese”.

Thus the concern with China’s declared ADIZ stem primarily from the lack of regulations in international law on how a country can draw its ADIZ. States often make use of international law whenever it suits them and hide their agendas behind the vague notion of core national interests. An illustrative case is the US Department of State’s response to China’s declaration of ADIZ: “Freedom of overflight and other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace are essential to prosperity, stability and security in the Pacific”. As the New York Times notes:

> These lawful uses, which include commercial air traffic, are protected by the Law of the Sea Treaty — an accord that has been ratified by 166 out of 193 member states in the United Nations, [but not by the US as] Congress is not yet convinced that it is in America’s interest to create multilateral rules, preferring to reserve the right to act unilaterally.

Finally, China is engaged in maritime disputes with several countries, especially in the South China Sea. These neighbouring countries worry that the establishment of an ADIZ in the East China Sea might be just the beginning of an expansionary China whose grand strategy encompasses hegemonic control over both the East and South China Seas. However, Japan has also been involved in maritime territorial disputes with Russia over the Northern Territories/Kuril islands and with South Korea over Takeshima/Dokdo islands. Also, similar to Chinese domestic politics Japan’s current LDP leaders rely on conservative voters who set sovereignty as the core of their national interest. Thus the legitimacy of both the Japanese and Chinese governments rely on public perception of whether the government has stood up to foreign encroachment and protected national territory.

The five points above, simplified as – aims, specific requirements, unilateral action, overlapping territory and maritime disputes – illustrate that China’s ADIZ is not unique. This comparative case study may also easily and simplistically be expressed as; “they can do it, so can we”, however this view is rarely published in the media, or in the scholarly literature leading to the biased presentation and interpretation of events. This paper thus merely aims to demonstrate that there are plausible alternative narratives which explain China’s ADIZ. Thus the analysis above establishes that an ADIZ alone does not demonstrate that China is a revisionist power or that its foreign policy is assertive.

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Implications of China’s ADIZ

Far more relevant therefore is the task of placing China’s ADIZ in the context of its wider national strategy and development. Scholars, pundits and politicians alike have rushed in declaring China’s ADIZ, linked with broader East and South China Seas’ disputes, as yet another example of its assertiveness. However, beyond the ADIZ is China’s behaviour revisionist or reactive by virtue of its rising power?

Within the confines of this short conference paper and its arguments, the implications of China’s ADIZ cannot be discussed at length and should be researched further. Thus within this context a number of issues may be canvased. The first direct implication of China’s ADIZ is in relation to Japan and an increase in the risk of incidents in the East China Sea. Accusations of unnecessarily and dangerously scrambling jets run on both sides. Despite arguably reaching the same level of air interception as in the midst of the Cold War, there is insufficient information available on the exact coordinates of these scrambles to judge whether China and Japan are acting defensively or are over-reacting. Also to be noted is that these jets have not intruded on each other’s airspace and the number of scrambled jets between Russia and Japan outnumbers those between China and Japan. Nevertheless, ADIZs offer more subjectivity in the use of force in response to what one may perceive “abnormal” flights in the area.

A secondary consideration is also needed to explore the wider thesis that China’s East China Sea ADIZ provides a precedent for a China “nine dash line” South China Sea ADIZ. States such as Vietnam and the Philippines would be concerned by the prospect of a South China Sea ADIZ enforced by their more powerful Chinese neighbour, especially after the latest spats over the Parcels and Spratly islands and the present Chinese dredging grains-of-sand.

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expansion of islands. In response a Vietnam-Philippines strategic partnership is taking shape, which may lead to a multilateral effort of balancing against China. The US also has many interests at stake in the South China Sea, including ensuring the freedom of navigation, the use of resources, and protecting its allies. Arguably, Chinese and US military planners are already engaged in a conceptual arms race to produce frameworks for controlling access to the Near Seas, commonly known as “Air-Sea Battle”. In this context, evidence could be put forward in support of China consolidating its power while undermining the US’s influence in the region, as well as for China reacting to US containment. For now, a Chinese ADIZ directly replicated in the South China Sea seems unlikely, as anti-Japanese domestic politics and unique East China Sea region interests alone provide sufficient rationale to explain China’s declaration of an ADIZ in the East China Sea.

Conclusion

This paper argued that China’s ADIZ alone does not clearly signal the rise of a revisionist Chinese state. Rather, a case has been made that China is reacting to changes in its external environment and this is particularly relevant in relation to Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. It has also been shown that there are more similarities between China’s ADIZ and other countries’ own ADIZ than commonly understood. ADIZ kindled debates among politicians and military strategists concerned about the stability of the East and South China Seas are alike in their use of the rising China threat thesis to interpret events.

Overall, this paper does not claim to have discerned China’s future strategic behaviour in the East China Sea nor in the wider region. The limitations and ability of making such predictions particularly in the case of non-democratic states’ intentions remain a challenge in the field of politics and international relations. Instead, this paper merely indicates that alternatives to mainstream Western oriented narratives are plausible in the case of the establishment of China’s ADIZ. The comparative case study of China and Japan is not meant to justify China’s actions, but to highlight the need to take into account a variety of facts and perspectives which may enhance understanding, trust and ultimately diversity in research and policymaking. Engaging with broader narratives prior to immediately labelling China’s behaviour as solely revisionist or even war-prone could avoid an unnecessary chain of offensive reactions on both sides and would also paint a comprehensive picture of the current state of affairs in the East and Southeast Asian regions.

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40 Harry Kazianis, “AirSea Battle and ADIZ: A Reaction to a Reaction”, China Brief 13, no. 24 (2013), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41720&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=730e43928bd2bd8cc7a8bf49cc1b5bd6#.VACXh_k7svN (accessed January 22, 2014).