Date of this Version

November 2006

Document Type

Journal Article

Publication Details

Pre-print:

Cox, Damian (2006) Agent-based Theories of Right Action is published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 9, Iss. 5, pp. 505-515.

Copyright © Springer Netherlands,2006.

2006 HERDC submission

Abstract

In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to satisfy this principle.

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