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Abe Isô (1865-1949) and His Views on the Population Crisis and Anti-Japanese Sentiment

After the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), over-population and unemployment became a serious social problem in Japan. Many intellectuals were concerned about the social and economic hardships caused by the "new" problem, and endeavoured to remedy them through emigration. Abe Isô (1865-1949) was one of the intellectuals who supported emigration although for a little while as a solution to the over population at the turn of the twentieth century. He, then instead, began to advocate birth control by the time the anti-Japanese sentiment climaxed in 1924.[1] This paper focuses on Abe's views on the population crisis as expressed in his recommendations for easing the population crisis and for culminating the rejection of Japanese overseas.

Abe was one of the few eminent thinkers who lived over the Meiji (1868-1912), Taishô (1912-1926) and Shôwa (1926-1989) eras and his thoughts are significant for the understanding of a pivotal time in Japanese modern history. His intellectual output spans vast and diverse territories such as education, social movements, politics, religion, urbanisation, and sports. This diversity and a shift in his beliefs in the light of social changes have presented difficulties in assimilating a comprehensive perspective of his thoughts. Only a few studies, in both Japanese and English, shed light on his role as an early socialist, a Christian pacifist and a politician. Among these is a list of Abe's publications, *Abe Isô sono chosaku to shôgai* (Abe Isô: His Life and Works)(1964), by the Waseda University Press, which offers a clearer picture of the sheer size of his intellectual output.

The general neglect of Abe’s study is compounded by the fact that his extensive writings have not been compiled into a comprehensive collection but only exist as a few selected works. In fact, many of his works are now housed in “rare collections” at such institutions as Waseda and Doshisha universities. As such they are not available on inter-library loans, which makes it exceedingly difficult for overseas researchers to access them.

In his article “Abe Isô the Utility Man” (1978), Cyril Powles maintains that Abe’s view of socialism needs to be evaluated in the light of its long-term influence on social reform as well as its immediate effect on the society of the day (1978, 164-165).

Mamiya Kunio illustrates Powles's claim when referring to Abe's concern regarding the population crisis. In "Abe Isô to imin jinkô mondai" (Abe Isô's View on Emigration and the Population Crisis)(1993), Mamiya maintains that Abe's views on the population crisis are divided into three stages: Abe advocated emigration as a solution to the population crisis at the turn of the [twentieth] century in the 1910s [from about 1897 to 1905]; birth control when the anti-Japanese sentiment intensified in the 1920s; then to the extreme contrary, he came to support a population increase as national policy in the 1930s (Mamiya 1993, 29-30).

Mamiya also claims that when anti-Japanese sentiment intensified in Hawai'i and California, Abe argued that the problem lay in cultural, religious, and racial discrepancies which the U.S. government would not criticise publicly. Hence,

the crucial issue was avoided and the more “practical reasons” of “antagonism” given such as the labour issue and immigrants’ high birth rate (Mamiya 1993, 34).

Mamiya examines both problems of labour and high birthrate but does not dwell on Abe’s thoughts regarding the education of immigrants which was also regarded as a cause of the rejection of overseas Japanese. This paper further elaborates Mamiya’s work by expounding on this. Abe reached the conclusion that domestic problems such as the over-population and unemployment had to be tackled at home at a government level and not by emigration. By examining Abe’s recommendations, this paper attempts to present a more comprehensive outlook on his intellectual activity concerning the population crisis and the rejection of Japanese overseas. It leaves room for further exploration of Abe’s subsequent recommendations for increasing

the birth rate in the light of social changes.

Firstly, it studies the social and historical background of emigration at the turn of the twentieth century. Secondly, it briefly outlines views of Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927), Abe's contemporary and advocate of emigration, before focusing on those of Abe's as expressed in writings such as *Hokubei no shin Nihon* (A New Japan in the USA)(1905) and articles in *Rikugô zasshi* (The Universe) and *Kakusei* (The Purity). By comparing his thought with that of Shiga, this paper also attempts to present another perspective to an understanding of the complex issues involved with the culmination of anti-Japanese sentiment.

Emigration to Hawai'i and California

A significant outcome of Japanese industrialisation was the

overpopulation of the country's urban centers. During the feudal period, with abortion and infanticide being commonly practiced, the population had remained relatively low. However, it began to rapidly increase after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), when the national economy became increasingly industrialised. A large population was considered as an economic asset, particularly by those with a militaristic and imperialistic turn of mind (Ishii 1937, 39). One of solutions to this problem was sought through emigration.

Hawai'i and California became popular destinations for Japanese emigrants, both being on the Pacific rim with their warm climates and good job opportunities. As early as 1868, the Hawai'i government encouraged Japanese immigration in order to provide labour for the country's sugar plantations (Ozawa 1972, 3).[2]

Abe's contemporary, Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927), was one of a few intellectuals who had already been to Hawai'i by the time. In *Nan'yô jiji* (Current Affairs in the South Seas)(1887), Shiga maintained that Hawai'i was an ideal destination and the lower class of Japanese society, those who were unemployed and impoverished, should emigrate there. Since then, he supported throughout his life emigration as one solution to the population crisis.

While the Japanese government was unable to support calls for greater emigration, so-called, Meiji shakaishugisha (socialists of the Meiji period) advocated migration to the United States. [3] *Dekasegi* (leaving home for a limited period of agricultural work) was one temporary solution to the social and economic problems that accompanied the rapid development

of Japanese capitalism in the 1900s. Organisations were established to assist people going abroad.[4] Magazines such as *Tobei zasshi* (Going to the United States) and *Tobei shimpô* (News from the United Sates) provided information about transportation, employment, and current affairs in the United States (Mamiya 1993, 28). Abe Isô (1865-1949) also came to support emigration.[5]

Abe is regarded as a pioneer of socialism in Japan and a Christian socialist. Perhaps he is best remembered today in Japan as the father of "university baseball". During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Abe gathered together a group of students to practice baseball at Waseda University and took them to the United States to play against American students. It was since then that he became enthusiastic about emigration to the United States, and even asserted in *Hokubei no shin Nihon* (A New Japan

in the USA)(1905) that a “new Japan” could be established there. Mamiya maintains that this work is most representative of Abe’s enthusiasm for emigration and such assertion remains only a suggestion – irrespective of his belief in socialism (Mamiya, 31-33). The U.S. - Japan Gentlemen’s Agreement of November 1908 terminated the emigration of Japanese workers to the United States, except for emigrants who were to be engaged as permanent farmers. The most prosperous time for Japanese immigration was between 1900 to 1924, after which the U.S. Immigration Bill outlawed Japanese entry (Mamiya 1993, 28).

Abe’s View on Emigration

Abe initially regarded emigration as a temporary makeshift solution for the problem of over-population, which he believed was the root cause of Japan’s social and economic hardship. Given the fact that only a small number of people (about 1,000)

could go abroad at any one time, it had a little effect on the total population (Abe 1888, 32).[6] However, as unemployment worsened, he gradually came to support emigration and became critical of the government's failure to promote it. In "Seifu wa nazeni kaigai tokôsha o bôshisen to suru ka" (Why the Government Discourages People Going Abroad?)(1904), he asserted that the government should provide passports and encourage overseas emigration even if only for skilled workers such as carpenters, plasterers, masons and those who had completed high school - the so-called, "gold and silver coins", who were able to earn a living anywhere in the world (Abe 1904, 3).

Abe became convinced of emigration as one solution to the population crisis when he visited California in 1905. In *Hokubei no shin Nihon* (A New Japan in the United States), he maintained

that the Pacific coast of the U.S. mainland would be the best destination for Japanese emigrants because plenty of jobs were available and there was an abundance of natural resources such as rich soil, forests and fish (Abe 1905b, 37).

Of all the countries he had visited, Abe was convinced that Hawai'i offered the best opportunities to prospective immigrants. In "Hawai ni okeru Nihonjin" (Japanese in Hawai'i)(1910), he claimed that while people were struggling to earn a living in Japan, those in Hawai'i were able to think about how to augment their income. Jobs were plentiful, basic commodities were inexpensive, and the climate was good (Abe 1910, 281-284). Thus, it was much easier to survive there than it was in Japan.

Abe was aware of the fact that many emigrants wished to retire

in Japan as soon as they had saved enough money. He warned them to stay on:

> It is rather unfortunate for the immigrants to think of returning home because they can end up worse than before as illustrated in the fairy tale of Urashima Tarô … Longing for home is perhaps characteristic of Japanese but one must realise that it remains only as a source of inspiration (Abe 1910, 288).[7]

The economic reality in Japan remained harsh and it would be even harder for them to start anew back home. The lesson learnt from the return of Urashima Tarô might be that once one leaves home, one should stay away. Abe likened emigration to a daughter leaving home to marry the son of another family. Once she has left home, she has to follow the customs of her husband's

family.[8]

Anti-Japanese Sentiment

Japan's emergence in the area of international relations after two victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) was perceived as "threat". As Japan transformed into a militaristic nation, anti-Japanese sentiment prevailed overseas. At home constant tax increases and worsening general poverty created deep social tensions and fostered the rise of grass roots anti-government theories and social movements such as socialism and anarchism.

In order to pacify the political and social unrest, the government initiated *kokumin dôtoku undô* (the National Morality Campaign) and in 1910 appointed Inoue Tetsujirô, a professor of philosophy at the Imperial University as its leader. In

Kokumin dôtoku gairon (Outline of the National Morality) (1912), Inoue argued Japan's unique *kokutai* (national essence), which derived from a continuous imperial lineage and the worship, was the essential moral foundation (Inoue 1912, 272-273). In essence, the teachings of the twenty-year old Imperial Rescript on Education were re-emphasised and remained the guiding principle of Japanese education until the end of World War II.

As more Japanese immigrants settled overseas and remained longer permanently, education of their children became a serious and immediate concern. While earlier immigrants on temporary “contracts”, often returned home once they had saved money, others stayed on or moved to the U.S. mainland. While *issei* (the first generation of the Japanese immigrants) remained Japanese citizens, *nisei* (the second generation), who were born in Hawai’i (or the US mainland), became American

citizens at birth. Their education still followed the principle of imperial education set in Japan and Japanese teachers taught using textbooks sent from Japan.

A willingness to work diligently for lower wages and the high birth rate of the Japanese immigrants were perceived as threats by the local community. The education of immigrants and the *nisei* was also considered as one cause of the anti-Japanese sentiment. The so-called Japanese Exclusion Clause in the Bill of 1924 was the culmination of a prolonged campaign of antagonism against Japanese immigrants. It had been its first legal expression since the Alien Land Law of California in 1920 (Ishii 1937, 41).

Emigrants - "True Patriots" or "Imperial Coins "

It might be of interest to point out that Abe's article "Hainichi

mondai to rôdô mondai" (Anti-Japanese sentiment and labour issues) came to print at the same time as/together with an article, "Igi aru hainichi mondai kanwahô" (Effective ways to pacify anti-Japanese sentiment) in *Rikugô zasshi* (1915), by his contemporary Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927). Both Abe and Shiga were professors at the Tokyo Senmon Gakkô (present Waseda University) and had opportunities to visit Hawai'i and the U.S. mainland in the early twentieth century.

In Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927): The Forgotten Enlightener (2001), I pointed out that, when anti-Japanese sentiment surfaced in Hawai'i and on the U.S. mainland early in the twentieth century, Shiga became concerned about the rejection of the immigrants. He identified the cause of a misunderstanding of this as being their conduct, which, in reflecting the narrowly interpreted moral principle of the imperial education,

isolated them from people in the local community (Gavin 2001,). Having been taught to be unquestionably obedient to one's family and the emperor, he asserted, they did not know how to adapt the moral principles to those of the countries in which they were then living. They were not aware of themselves as individual members of a community, which sometimes engendered itself as anti-Japanese sentiment.

At a conference held in Honolulu by the Hawai kyôikukai (Education Committee for Japanese in Hawai'i) in 1914, Shiga advised that the immigrants change the perspective of the education principles in accordance with those of the United States where they were living, "when in Rome do as the Romans do": revise the textbooks in Hawai'i and California in accordance with the current universal view on education which reflected the resolution of the first world conference held in

London in 1913. He stressed the cultural coalescence required of people living in a culturally diverse society. Thus, he encouraged immigrants to assimilate themselves into local community and to educate their children accordingly.

It is worthwhile noting that when the anti-Japanese sentiment later intensified in Hawai’i and the U.S. mainland, Shiga continued to encourage emigration, but to other destinations, countries such as Brazil and Cuba (Shiga 1928h, 432-433). He believed the population crisis in Japan demanded it despite the risk of further anti-Japanese sentiment. He even visited General Jan Smuts (1870-1950) in South Africa to which he referred as "the source of racial prejudice". Unless anti-coloured sentiment was eradicated, Shiga was convinced, anti-Japanese sentiment would never cease.

Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Theory: Cultural Assimilation

Abe's championing of skilled emigrants contrasted with Shiga's view that it was people from the lower classes of Japanese society who should emigrate in order to find work and to prosper. Abe believed it was in nobody's interest for Japan to send ignorant, or ill-mannered people who were not respected in Japan to [advanced] countries such as the United States (Abe 1914, 95-96):

> As we should refrain from shipping inferior goods, it is contrary to the international ethic and etiquette to send less educated people of a lower living standard overseas (Abe 1924c, 57).[9]

Abe's criteria for emigrants were that they should at least be

self-supporting and not cause hardship in their new land.

Like Shiga, Abe was concerned about educating the Japanese Hawai'ian and maintained that as children born in Hawai'i obtained American citizenship at birth, it was more beneficial for the Japanese immigrants raise their children as U.S. citizens (Abe 1910, 291: 1912, 43-45):[10]

> They should sing the U.S. national anthem rather than *Kimi ga yo*, the Japanese one, and celebrate Independence Day on 4 July instead of Japan's Culture Day on 3 November (1912, 44-45).[11]

Abe's view was clear that while remaining of Japanese race, children born in the United States were American citizens. The Japanese language might be taught in Romanised and/or syllabic

scripts, but he stressed, “unnecessary to teach the *kanji* characters” (Abe 1910, 291). If students were interested in subjects such as Japanese history and geography, then be instructed by using textbooks in English.

Despite this, Abe maintained that the first generation immigrants should remain loyal subjects of Japan:

> It is needless to remind one that any Japanese born in Japan remains a loyal subject of the Emperor. Therefore those living abroad should still sing *Kimi ga yo* and celebrate the Culture Day on 3 November. I hope my remarks are not misunderstood.[12]

Abe believed that Japnese should be loyal to the Emperor at home and abroad. Clearly, he made a distinction between *nisei*, who

were U.S. citizens, and *issei,* the original immigrants, who should retain their fidelity to Japan and remain imperial "coins".

Quite contrary to Shiga's belief in the "when in Rome, do as the Romans do" dictum, Abe did not attribute the cause of the rejection of Japanese immigrants to their retention of a Japan-centered morality. Rather, he thought the immigrants had assimilated themselves to the local community well in comparison with Chinese immigrants who maintained their way of living; they still wore Chinese clothes and kept to a Chinese standard of living. The Japanese adjusted to a western style of living for instance, sleeping on beds instead of *tatami* (straw mats) and wearing western style clothes. They could further socialise by playing baseball with the people and enjoying entertainment such as plays and music concerts.

At any rate Abe did not consider that cultural and racial discrepancies would be a direct cause for rejection of Japanese immigrants no matter how strongly such bias was felt and to attack “practical causes” of the anti-Japanese backlash. These he saw to be, the labour issue and population crisis.

Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Practice: Conflict Over Labour and Population

Abe analysed the anti-Japanese sentiment in California and Hawai’i from two viewpoints – labour and population. In “Hainichi mondai to rôdô mondai” (Anti-Japanese Backlash and Labour Issue)(1915), he pointed out the two policies relating to labour and population control on which the prosperity that their hosts then enjoyed was based. If the Japanese understood these, he argued, it would make them less dismayed about the

American rejection.

On the one hand, the U.S. government limited the number of foreign workers entering the country, thereby maintaining high wages for existing employees. And, on the other, local people, regardless of class, were anxious about an uncontrolled increase in population and so practiced birth control (Abe 1915, 12/1929, 2). After all, it was accepted wisdom that over-population begets poverty not only in Japan but also in the United States and elsewhere.

Abe claimed that the labour issue was at the core of anti-Japanese sentiment on the U.S. mainland. When Hawai'ian Japanese moved to California, their cheap labour threatened the wages and conditions of local workers, which resulted in a lowering of wages. At that time there were already labour unions

in existence which played an important role in the national politics in the United States. For instance, the American Federation of Labour (AFL) had about a million members and their votes were vital to the election of President Woodrow Wilson (1856—1924). Abe regretted that as yet there were no unions of any significance in Japan. He believed that unless Japan dispatched delegates equivalent to “workers’ representatives” rather than foreign diplomats to communicate with the executives of U.S. unions, the fundamental labour problem would not be solved (Abe 1915, 14). Mamiya maintains that from a socialist viewpoint, Abe believed the tension could be eased through an appeal to their common class interests; through the development of solidarity between international workers (Mamiya 1993, 34-35).[13]

Mamiya claims that Abe’s thinking on this point was influenced

by Sidney Lewis Gulic (1860—1945), an American missionary and professor at Doshisha University, Kyoto.[14] Gulic claimed that the U.S. government should not limit the quota of Japanese immigrants, while tolerant to others, and also permit first generation Japanese immigrants, *issei,* to become naturalised citizens of the United States (Mamiya, 34).

Upon his return to Japan, Gulic announced that the U.S. labour union officials hoped to start negotiating with the Japanese workers in the near future:

> There will be two union conferences held in California this year. One by Californian members in in October, the other by the Federation, in November. Japanese representatives can attend both … However, we have heard that the Japanese government has not

allowed workers to form unions (Abe 1915, 16). .[15]

Abe was critical of the government's attempts to ease the tension. Both governments repeatedly held conferences and dispatched both private and official emissaries - scholars and diplomats to each other. For instance, intellectuals such as Nitobe Inazô (1862—1933), Shimada Saburô (1852—1922) and Soeda Juichi (1864—1929) were sent to the United States to exchange views.[16] Given, though, that the U.S. representatives they met with were pro-Japanese to begin with and had opposed anti-Japanese sentiments from the start, there was little point in Japanese delegates traveling all that way to negotiate with them (Abe 1915, 13).

Abe pointed out another cause of anti-Japanese sentiment as being the high birthrate of the Japanese. Censuses in 1890, 1900

and 1910, revealed the number of Japanese residing on the Pacific coast to be 1559, 18269, and 57628 respectively. The Japanese birth rate in Hawai'i was twice as high as the rate in other modern industrialised countries. This rapid population growth concerned U.S. citizens. Given that there were already some 200,000 Japanese living there, Abe considered it very unwise to send more emigrants and risk causing further conflict. He warned that if 800,000 Japanese were to emigrate annually, it could have serious consequences for international relations (Abe 1922, 142-144).

The Menace of Over Population: From Emigration to Birth Control

At the first Pan-Pacific Educational Conference, held in Honolulu from 11 to 24 August 1921, Abe asserted that over-population was a great menace to world peace and that each nation needed to take responsibility for its own population

growth (Abe 1921, 77):

> Unfortunately, an increased population has traditionally been considered an index of a nation's strength, which has led growing nations to consider the colonisation of other territories as a way of coping with the expansion. But as almost every acre of land on the earth is now mapped and claimed by one nation or another, no immigrants can enter a new dominion without encountering resistance. As long as the right of ownership is established, any nation can refuse immigrants entry… no matter how much uninhabited land it may possess, just as a wealthy man in [a] large city may close the gates of his estate against the slumdwellers (Abe 1921, 77).[17]

Thus, Abe was no longer convinced that emigration offered a solution to the problem posed by overpopulation in capitalist societies.

Abe criticised the government's emigration policy for having failed its intended-purpose. Over the past twenty-five years, only about 700, 000 people had moved to live in Japanese colonies such as in Taiwan, Manchuria and Korea and a mere 100,000 had emigrated to the United States (Abe 1922, 4). In his view the benefits gained from relocating such a small proportion of the population were not great enough to warrant the amount of conflict and hostility it had caused (Abe 1924d, 7-9).[18] He concluded that Japanese should go abroad only for purposes of travel, study and/or business, but not for temporary or permanent work (Abe 1924c, 57).

Abe drew a parallel between a nation that cannot support itself and individuals who bear more children than they are capable of caring for and turning to relatives for assistance. This, he claimed, was the same as a state sending its surplus population overseas as emigrants. “It is immoral and shameful”, Abe stressed, “if a nation increases its population to the extent that it cannot feed them within its own land” (Abe 1922, 146). Both situations, he thought, would be justly criticised. A nation needed to resolve the problem on its own without relying on emigration.

Thus, Abe no longer supported emigration by the time the US Immigration Bill outlawed Japanese entry in 1924. In “Ijinshu no kyôdô seikatsu wa kekkyoku son” (Disadvantages of Mixed Residence)(1924b), he reversed his previous advocacy:

> In short, we should send Chinese back home and recall Japanese from the United States rather than receive more Chinese and send further Japanese to the States (Abe 1924b, 94).

This, though, left the vital problem of over-population unresolved.

Abe pointed out that the uneasy tension that prevailed between the United States and Japan had its roots in Japan's population crisis. While he didn't think Japan would ever directly declare a war on the United States, he could envisage a clash of the two nations over Manchuria or China. In order to prepare for this contingency, Japan spent a disproportionate amount of its budget on arms and carried a financial burden as a result (Abe 1922, 161-163). This, combined with Japan's rampant

overpopulation, might have provoked U.S. suspicion regarding Japan's military aspiration and thereby triggered an arms build-up. Referring to a discussion that took place at the first conference on birth control, held in the United States, Abe echoed the sentiment that birth control would play an important role in maintaining world peace. In fact he went so far as to declare that international conflict could only be avoided if all the nations restricted the rate of their population growth.

Abe now believed in birth control. He claimed that the theory of a nation needing a large population in anticipation of the losses sustained in wars was both impracticable and unproven.[19] To this end, he referred to Sweden as an ideal society. He claimed that the Swedish were a genuine and kind people and their caring nature was attributable to its socialist-type political and social structures. These, Abe believed, were underpinned by the

lowest birth rate in the world (Abe 1922, 155-156). Everyone once admired Switzerland as a utopia, but Sweden currently demonstrated the best qualities from many viewpoints.[20] Its population was so restricted that citizens could live in comfort and peace and avoid international tensions caused by emigrating. It is noteworthy to point out that despite the government's resistance, Abe with other intellectuals supported a visit by Margaret Sanger (1883-1966) to Japan in 1922 to present a seminar on birth control.[21]

Conclusion

As we have seen, emigration played a significant role in relieving the crises of over-population and unemployment in Japan in the early twentieth century. Intellectuals such as Abe and Shiga addressed these "new" problems, which the government seemed reluctant to tackle in a more comprehensive way. As

Japan’s international status rose after its two victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, both intellectuals were convinced that people should be prepared, both at home and abroad, for acceptance in a global society.

Shiga believed in emigration even after the rejection of Japanese intensified overseas and recommended alternative destinations. Unlike Shiga, Abe eventually came to believe that when emigration was sought as a solution to the domestic problems of unemployment and over-population, it effectively only perpetuated these social shortcomings in new lands. With labour conditions in Japan unchanged, he became convinced that the only immediate solution was birth control. Extrapolating from Japan’s experience, he concluded that each country should regulate its population in accordance with its production capacity and that this should be achieved by educating people

about the urgency of birth control. Unlike Shiga, his concerns were not focused so much on immigrants, as on the people back home. His main purpose was to urge the Japanese government to tackle the problems on a national scale.

Again contrary to Shiga, Abe expected the first generation of immigrants to maintain their identity as “imperial coins”, spiritually belonging to Japan both at home and abroad. Such a “nationalistic” viewpoint may present a perspective to the understanding of his eventual support of a campaign for an increase of population as state policy: a significant change from formerly advocating birth control.

By examining Abe’s thought on emigration as a solution to the population crisis in the early twentieth century, this paper has demonstrated a more comprehensive view to the social problem

which Abe attempted to alleviate. Also in comparison with Shiga's recommendations for easing the rejection of the Japanese overseas, this paper has supplemented the perspective to an understanding of the difficulties which many Japanese intellectuals of that time faced during this crucial time in Japanese modern intellectual history.

NOTES

[1] However, in the 1930s Abe reversed his belief and came to support a population increase as a national policy.

[2] The unofficial emigrants of the first year in the Meiji era (1868—1912) are referred to as *gan'nen mono*.

The first settlers who arrived in January that year numbered 945, the second arrived in June, and numbered 989, and another 926 immigrants arrived in 1889 (Shiga 1887 compiled in 1927,

97).

[3] Partly because the government was aware of Chinese coolies and earlier Japanese emigrants being treated miserably overseas.

Other socialists are such as Katayama Sen (1859-1933) and Katô Tokijirô (1858-1930)(Mamiya 1933, 29).

[4] For example, Shiga founded *Kaigai tokô muhiyô hojokikan*, a non-profit organisation for assisting people who were interested in going overseas, with basic information regarding traveling and living abroad.

[5]

[6] Abe maintained that if a social and liberal education was well penetrated, people would not long for a better place to live, such as luxury buildings in cities in the United States; if educated well, they would keep spirit high and be satisfied with their surroundings. Also, people should be informed of a domestic frontier land, for example, Hokkaido which offered job potential (Abe 1888, 32-35).

[7] In this popular Japanese fairy tale the protagonist ended finding himself ancient and unwanted upon his return home from an underwater palace.

[8] Abe, “Imin to kyôiku”, 46. Abe asserted that women should also be encouraged to emigrate in order to raise the moral standard

of Japanese men, both those in the lower classes and the young men of promise. About 95% of Japanese men were addicted to gambling. He believed women would help change this habit and encourage the men to save their wages for the home and/or business (Abe 1905a, 59).

[9]Shiga was convinced that in order to eradicate the racial prejudice it was necessary to oppose the very source of such discrimination – eg., South Africa where apartheid was prevalent. In 19 , he visited General Jan Smuts (1870—1950) and submitted a letter pleading for Japanese migrants there not be considered as "coloured" in the every day relations of social, commercial and industrial life in the country (Shiga 1928h, 432-433). (*Sirarezaru kuniguni,* in *SSZ* 6, 432-433.)

Abe later pointed out that permanent Japanese residents in the United States had not yet decided how they should educate their children. Gambling still remained their everyday pastime. Abe (1945), Jidai no kakusei, 63.

[10]Abe, "Imin to kyôiku", 43-45.

[11] Abe, "Imin to kyôiku", 44-45.

[12] Abe, "Imin to kyôiku", 45.

[13]

[14] Gulic was known as …

[15] Abe was aware that these discussions were taking place and

that his colleagues were representing Japanese workers at union conferences in the United States. Upon their return they reported that the U.S. workers opposed the Japanese immigrants for economic reasons rather than out of racial prejudice. If the Japanese worked for the same wages and lived as Americans did, they claimed they would not have rejected them (Abe, April 1916). "Ikanishite dantai seikatsu o nasu beki ka" (How Shouls We Maintain a Cooperative Lifestyle?), *Chûgaku sekai*, 24-29. Mamiya points out that Abe further claimed that a "labour" issue was a camouflage as it did not exist - given that the most Japanese were employed in work the "while" locals did not want to perform (Mamiya, 32).

[16] Nitobe was an educationalist and a pioneer in advocating a liberal education in Japan. He dedicated his life to introducing Japan to the West and to bridging the cultures of the United States and Japan. Soeda was a bureaucrat and scholar of finance and economics. Shimada was a politician and journalist.

[17] The quote was rephrased for easier reading. The original in Abe's words is as follows: Unfortunately, increase of population has been considered as an index of the national strength, and consequently a colonial policy is looked upon

as an important for a growing nation. But as almost every acre of land on the earth is now mapped out for each nation, no immigrants can enter into dominion without much difficulty. As long as the right of ownership is established, any nation can refuse immigrants … however large a stretch of uninhabited land she may possess, just as a wealthy man in large city may close the gates of his large estate against the slum people (Abe 1921, 77).

[18] Abe Isô (1924d) (November 1924), "Sekai heiwa o kitasu tame ni gaikoku boueki o seigen seyo", *Kokusai chishiki*, 4 (11): 7-9. Abe was concerned how the government would deal with the situation if thousands of Chinese and Korean workers were allowed to come to Japan and how long the Japanese would tolerate them (Abe 1923, 58-60). Abe pointed out that Japan refused not only Chinese immigrants but also those from Korea. "According to a bureau of statistics, unemployment in Japan numbered 480,000. If 500,000 Koreans had not already come, there would be no unemployment problem today in Japan" (Abe 1934, 2).

[19] Mamiya maintains that Abe's this view changed to the other

extreme in supporting as a national policy of free birth, *umeyo fuyaseyo* (bear and have more babies) when Japan marched towards the war. Mamiya 1993, 28.

[20] Abe (1945), *Jidai no kakusei* (Refinement of Our Society) Okakura shobo: 39. Later, Abe noted that the United States had already solved the population problem and had established a fundamental policy regarding foreign trade.

[21]Mamiya, 38. Abe introduced the Malthusian theory in his "Shin Marusasu shugi no shuchô"(The New Malthusian Theory), *Taikan*, vol. 3: 10, 1920.

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Unless otherwise noted, all Japanese references were printed in Tokyo and all Japanese names appear with the family name first. Throughout this paper, circumflexes are placed over long vowels of Japanese words, except for places and publishers, which are already known in their English spelling without them. For ease of reference, English translations are provided for the titles of most works.

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