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China's Harmonious World (*Hexie Shijie*) Policy Perspective: How Confucian Values are Entering International Society

by Rosita Dellios¹

Abstract: Confucian values have been introduced into international society through China's adoption of a harmonious world (*hexie shijie*) foreign policy perspective this century. The paper opens with the observation that discord during transitional times awakens a certain existential quest for renewal. This was the case in both Confucius' time and the present era of globalization in which threats to survival are transnational. The flourishing of philosophical schools in ancient China is matched today by the development of different approaches to world governance. This paper considers four: (1) hegemonic governance; (2) the United Nations system; (3) the European Union model; and (4) cosmopolitan global governance – all of which cross-reference one another showing inclusive capacities. To these, Confucian governance may be added as the fifth and most recent, even if the least tested of the contemporary concepts of world governance. Working with cosmopolitan global governance, Confucian governance remains inclusive of a respect for the UN, the instructive value of the EU model and an acknowledgement of the continued utility of US leadership in the wider scheme of international life. Two processes that have been instrumental in the dissemination of Confucian values in international society are (1) the rise of China, and (2) the congruence of its harmonious world Confucian value system with the four world governance concepts examined. The paper concludes that a global governance with Confucian tutelage would recommend education and human development to be a fundamental right and responsibility.

Key Words: Confucianism, Harmonious World, Governance, China, United Nations, European Union, Hegemony.

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I INTRODUCTION: PARALLEL UNIVERSES

If China and the world were harmonious there would be no need for President Hu Jintao to call for the building of a harmonious society (*goujian hexie shehui*) and its counterpart of a harmonious world (*hexie shijie*) this century. Indeed, if the Chinese world was harmonious during the decline of the Zhou dynasty when rival warlords contended for power, there would have been no Confucius - only an able but historically unremarkable man by the name of Kong Qiu. Discord during transitional times awakens a certain existential quest for renewal. In this Confucius was the man of the moment. He may yet again serve “all under Heaven,” whose unity now extends beyond the Chinese orbit to global civilization.

While warfare today is not endemic as it was in Confucius’ time, the contemporary world, in President Hu’s words at the 17th National Congress in 2007, “remains far from tranquil.”² He went on to note that:

“Hegemonism and power politics still exist, local conflicts and hotspot issues keep emerging, imbalances in the world economy are worsening, the North-South gap is widening, and traditional and nontraditional threats to security are intertwined. All this poses difficulties and challenges to world peace and development.”³

By the end of 2008, the global financial crisis could also be added to the list. Correlatively, however, when one world order is being overturned another finds opportunity to be born. Like the *Contention of the Hundred Schools of Thought* (770-221 BC) which flourished with the passing of the status quo, so too the sudden end of bipolar strategic competition at the close of the 20th century had left the field open to alternative modes of relating as nations and peoples. In this, Hu Jintao acknowledged a trend for “peace and development,” maintaining that “the people of all countries should join hands and strive to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.”⁴

² Hu Jintao, Report, 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid

II THE SETTING: FOUR CONCEPTS OF WORLD GOVERNANCE – PLUS ONE

For the spirit of Confucian thinking to reappear today in the form of harmonious world it needs to be accommodated within the contemporary debates about different models of governance. This paper will not seek to identify one hundred contemporary schools of thought. Many are variations on a limited theme. Thus four of the most discussed will suffice. These are: (1) hegemonic governance; (2) the United Nations system; (3) the European Union model; and (4) a genuine global governance which is still embryonic. To these, Confucian governance may be added as the fifth and most recent, even if the least tested of the concepts of world governance.⁵ These concepts of world governance are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they tend to cross-reference one another showing their inclusive capacities. They do, however, follow discernible tendencies, values, or structural attributes that set them apart. They are as follows:

1. *Hegemonic governance*, whereby “one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing international relations, and willing to do so,”⁶ brings to mind the role of the United States in the post-imperial order. Successful hegemonic leadership needs asymmetric (hierarchical) cooperation. In this it shares an affinity with Confucian hierarchical relations, as long as they are reciprocal.

“The hegemon plays a distinctive role, providing its partners with leadership in return for deference; but, unlike an imperial power, it cannot make and enforce rules without a certain degree of consent from other sovereign states.”⁷

This is an unequal system in terms of power and authority even though there is sovereign equality among states. Hegemonic stability theorists can be critiqued by the questions: What if the benefits of the system are viewed as unacceptably unfair? What if international institutions like the UN are sidelined? Confucian governance would call forth the rectification of names (*zheng ming*). The 21st century hegemon would need to be harmonized (that is, rectified) in relation to his obligations.

⁵ These five concepts are studied in the International Relations Masters subject, “Concepts of World Governance,” taught by Rosita Dellios at Australia’s Bond University.

⁶ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, p. 44.

⁷ Robert O. Keohane, “Hegemony in the World Political Economy,” p. 293.

2. The *United Nations* system refers to the United Nations plus its various arms like UNESCO, activities, treaties and conventions. The UN was established after World War II (WWII) “to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations and promote social progress, better living standards and human rights.”⁸ It has a membership of 192 states whose rights and responsibilities as members of the international community are spelled out in an international treaty, the UN Charter. This makes it the premier intergovernmental organization though not necessarily the most receptive to reform or innovative.

Innovation is perhaps best found in the continent which brought the prevailing international relations system into existence. Europe, through the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648, has been credited with the introduction of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality and independence in the international system. Europe’s next political innovation was to come close to three-and-a-half centuries later.

3. The *European Union* model of governance, which evolved after WWII to the Treaty on European Union (ratified in 1993), refers to “the rules, processes and behavior that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.”⁹ Its 27 member states have agreed to share their sovereignty under a supranational authority. The Westphalian principle of state sovereignty is thereby overtaken by the notion of “the joint management of pooled sovereignty,”¹⁰ not federalism, as a form of integration. This notion does not undermine national sovereignty but it does make it more sensitive and responsive to trends in global politics which disadvantage nations acting on their own rather than in concordance – or harmony – within an institutional and legal framework.

The multidimensional character of this newer political arrangement may be represented as a process of *building up, down and across*:

⁸ “Image & Reality,” UN Website.

⁹ European Commission, *Governance in the EU*.

¹⁰ A. J. R. Groom, *The European Community in Context*, 1992, p.21.

“[The] state system no longer has the primordality of the past, and this is particularly noticeable in Europe where there is a process of 'building up' to larger units, 'building across' transnationally and 'building down' to smaller units . . .”¹¹

The inability of many Europeans to identify with the EU is evident in the low voter turnout for elections of the European Parliament – itself a governance innovation of exemplar proportions – as well as a reluctance by some Europeans to admit a Muslim nation, Turkey, to this “Christian club.” The identity issue is indicative of the evolutionary nature of such a vast socio-political project as the EU and the continued attractions of “the primordality of the past.” This helps explain, too, a certain mainstream apathy towards what the specialists have hailed as the latest and most exciting phenomenon in the political ordering of a tightly knit planet.

4. *Cosmopolitan global governance* is admittedly more a phenomenon than a philosophy or model of governance, though it does carry a value system which, unlike the above three, represents a non-state centered account of the political order. In this it deserves the status of “concept” of world governance. Even the EU, for all its pooling of sovereignty, remains a union of *states*, and it is states that accede to its membership – not non-state actors like humanitarian organizations or corporations.

Moreover, cosmopolitanism is a humanist counterpart to globalization. “Moral cosmopolitanism holds that all persons stand in certain moral relations with one another by virtue of the fact that they are members of a universal community,” explains Patrick Hayden. “All persons possess equal moral worth deserving our respect, and certain obligations of justice with regard to other persons place constraints on our conduct.”¹²

Cosmopolitan global governance may be the next evolutionary step in “world governance” but as long as it needs the countries and regions of the world to advance its development (wherever that may take it) it retains its “world governance” categorization.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 5.

¹² Patrick Hayden, “Cosmopolitanism and the Need for Transnational Criminal Justice.”

In defining global governance more broadly, Thomas G. Weiss points out it is an analytical tool or “heuristic” device “to understand what is happening in today’s world” and refers to

“collective efforts to identify, understand, or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacities of individual states to solve; it reflects the capacity of the international system at any moment in time to provide government-like services in the absence of world government.”¹³

Significantly, Weiss describes global governance as a “bridge between the old and as yet unborn.”¹⁴ While not saying that “a world state is inevitable,” as Alexander Wendt has,¹⁵ he does admit a “world federal government”¹⁶ is more *desirable* than global governance in that the latter lacks agency, accountability, prescriptive power, and above all, the power of enforcement. However, in true Constructivist fashion (and Alexander Wendt, whose writings have been translated into Chinese by Qin Yaqing, is the leading Social Constructivist theorist in International Relations), a changeover from global governance to global government would not entail revolution but evolution. Wendt sees a progression of political forms from “a system of states, a society of states, world society, collective security, and the world state,” as well as participatory or democratic capabilities: matching “the micro or bottom-up process of self-organization, and the macro or top-down process of structural constitution.”¹⁷ This is reminiscent of the EU’s process of building up, down and across. It also resonates with cosmopolitan global governance and the expanding circle of Confucian harmony - from the individual to the universe.

5. Because a world state is not as yet a serious contender for contemporary concepts of world governance, it is not included here. Instead, in its place a much less

¹³ Thomas G. Weiss, “What Happened to the Idea of World Government?” p. 257. Because global governance has a reputation for vagueness, it is worth quoting Weiss on the details: “Global governance encompasses an extremely wide variety of cooperative problem-solving arrangements that may be visible but informal (e.g., practices or guidelines) or result from temporary units (e.g. coalitions of the willing). Such arrangements may also be more formal, taking the shape of hard rules (laws and treaties) as well as constituted institutions with administrative structures and established practices to manage collective affairs by a variety of actors, including state authorities, intergovernmental organizations, private-sector entities, and other civil society actors” (p. 257).

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 246.

¹⁵ Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable.”

¹⁶ Weiss, “What Happened to the Idea of World Government?” p. 254.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 498.

confronting concept of *Confucian governance*, under the banner of harmonious world, is included.¹⁸ Its ultimate destination, like a river's journey to the sea, may be a cosmopolitan "*datong*" – translated as greater community or universal commonwealth – but at present it is still a river having only just emerged from its source in the upper reaches of Chinese cultural experience.

The introductory stage of the harmonious world concept in the first decade of the "far from tranquil" 21st century would render it as a Confucian nuance on cosmopolitan global governance – which, as previously stated, is itself a formative stage of something else, the "yet unborn." In strategic terms, cosmopolitan global governance (inclusive of recent Confucian layering) has demonstrated intent at transnational order but not adequate capability.

Expressed in the metaphor of the market, Qin Yaqing, Vice President of the China Foreign Affairs University, Professor of International Relations and the aforementioned translator of the Alexander Wendt's constructivism, has highlighted a problem between "supply and demand": "The major problem today is between demand for global governance and the conspicuous inadequacy of the global governance regime."¹⁹ How, he asks, can international actors work together to deal with the transnational threats we face? These include climate change, pandemics, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, financial instability, and migration. He offers the example of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 in drawing attention to the limitations of international financial regimes. "Reform is necessary," he concludes. "This reform is not to overthrow existing regimes, but we must cooperate to make them suitable for today's problems."²⁰

A harmonious world concept that locates itself in cosmopolitan global governance remains inclusive of a respect for the UN, the instructive value of the EU model and an acknowledgement of the continued utility of US leadership in the wider scheme of international life. It is here in the active context of cosmopolitan global governance that China injects the values of Confucius in accordance with the prevailing quest for

¹⁸ Confucian governance embraces *tian-ren-he-yi* (天人合一); *wai-sheng-nei-wang* (外聖內王); and *he-er-bu-tong* (和而不同).

¹⁹ Qin Yaqing, presentation, "Interdependence, Cooperation, and Global Governance."

²⁰ Ibid.

a stable, peaceful and cooperative system that privileges diplomacy over militarism, multilateral institutionalism over power politics, as well as a global ethic²¹ and intercivilizational dialogue over a clash of civilizations.

As noted by Jian Zhang, to many Chinese scholars, “the concept of a ‘harmonious world’ offers a more effective approach to deal with security challenges in an increasingly globalised world than the narrow-minded ‘democratic peace’ theory and the paranoia-driven ‘clash of civilization’ [sic] thesis, and should be the guiding principle of international relations in the 21st century.”²²

It is, however, still an eclectic concept in the minds of many outside the Confucian cultural area, identified with ritualistic classical China or seen as a perverse Communist ploy to lull the world into a false sense of security that the dragon still sleeps. The China threat thesis²³ has given dialectical impetus to the harmonious world concept, which favors the “peaceful development” (*heping fazhan*) thesis. All warfare might well be based on deception, in Sun Zi’s teaching,²⁴ but sustainable peace requires harmony, as emphasized in Confucian and Daoist thought.

That President Hu Jintao chose the UN’s 60th anniversary in 2005 to articulate the idea of constructing a harmonious world is indicative of an attempt to render this Confucian idea as more than merely Chinese, that harmonious world is, in effect, harmonious with the UN’s vision and global governance cooperation. This demystifies the concept but also steers clear of rendering “harmonious world” as yet another impossibly idealistic slogan bandied about in global discourse. Hu Jintao’s speech at the UN on 15 September 2005 is worth noting in its brick-by-brick approach to bring harmonious world values into the global system. He offers a four-point policy prescription:²⁵

²¹ See the Foundation for a Global Ethic (<http://www.weltethos.org/dat-english/index.htm>) and the writings of Hans Küng.

²² Jian Zhang, “Building ‘a Harmonious World?’” citing Wang Yiwei, ‘hexie shijie guan gaibian guoji guanxi shijiao (The Concept of a Harmonious World Changes Perceptions of International Politics), *Huanqiu shibao* (*Global Times*), 2 December 2005, p. 11.

²³ A recent work which examines the evidence (or lack thereof) of the China threat thesis is: Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, and Qin Yaqing, *China’s “New” Diplomacy*.

²⁴ *The Art of War*, 1:18.

²⁵ Xinhua, “President Hu Makes Four-Point Proposal for Building Harmonious World.”

i) Multilateralism - for the purpose of common security under UN auspices

“We must abandon the Cold War mentality, cultivate a new security concept featuring trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, and build a fair and effective collective security mechanism aimed at preventing war and conflict and safeguarding world peace and security . . . [The UN’s role] can only be strengthened and must not in any way be weakened.”

ii) Mutually beneficial cooperation (win-win) - for common prosperity

“We should work actively to establish and improve a multilateral trading system that is open, fair and non-discriminatory.” He also suggested worldwide energy dialogue and cooperation be stepped up to jointly maintain energy security and energy market stability.

iii) Inclusiveness - all civilizations coexist harmoniously

“In the course of human history, all civilizations have, in their own way, made positive contributions to the overall human progress. Uniformity, if imposed on them, can only take away their vitality and cause them to become rigid and decline. The world's civilizations may differ in age, but none is better or more superior more others . . . We should endeavor to preserve the diversity of civilizations in the spirit of equality and openness, make international relations more democratic and jointly build a harmonious world where all civilizations coexist and accommodate each other.”

iv) UN reform

The UN needs “rational and necessary reform” to maintain its authority, improve its efficacy and give a better scope to its role in meeting new threats and new challenges. The UN reform “may be conducted step by step,” focusing on easier tasks first and more difficult ones later in order to achieve maximized benefits, he said.

In line with the China threat thesis noted above, China’s emphasis on the United Nations and its broader multilateralism has commonly been depicted not as a sign of its cooperative internationalism but as a self-serving strategy for eroding US hegemony. From the global governance perspective, this criticism may already be out-of-date. As Weiss points out in regard to the US: “With power shifting, the United Nations is no longer a detour that delays but rather a destination that enriches U.S.

options and influence.”²⁶ But, equally, it is worth noting that power may be shifting not to institutions as transformational venues that address common threats but simply as the arena of choice for “soft balancing” in an interdependent world. Even hegemonic governance can find expression through “institutional realism,” a new term introduced by Georgia University (US) academic, Kai He. In his 2009 book, *Institutional Balancing in the Asia-Pacific*, he explains it as follows:

“Power politics is still the game states play under anarchy. The difference between institutional realism and existing realist theories is that the former broadens the means of power politics from exclusively military to include institutional balances. Institutional balancing is the new realist state behavior under anarchy and high interdependence, and institutional politics is a new form of power politics among states.”²⁷

To understand whether the harmonious world concept can retain its (sincere) Dao or Way in its river-like journey – or becomes diverted in power politics by other names - requires further investigation as to what it really is.

In using the term Dao, it is acknowledged that harmonious world derives from a Chinese conceptual base and while Confucianism is prominent, it is not without influence from the other schools of thought, especially as it winds its way through Chinese history to form Neo-Confucianism through the influence of Daoist and Buddhist thought, most notably in the Song (960-1279) and Ming (1368 to 1644) dynasties, down to the 20th century’s New Confucianism that expanded its scope beyond the traditional Chinese world order. In 1958 the latter issued “A Manifesto on Chinese Culture to the World” that argued for mutual learning between East and West for “a more all-encompassing wisdom”; and foresaw a critical moment in human development when what amounts to global interdependence occurs, at which point world harmony would benefit from Confucian philosophy.²⁸

Within New Confucianism there have been four generations. The first (1921-1949) emerged after the May Fourth Movement and sought to respond to Western learning, accepting its

²⁶ Weiss, “What Happened to the Idea of World Government?” p. 267.

²⁷ Kai He, *Institutional Balancing in the Asia-Pacific*, p. 12.

²⁸ Umberto Bresciani, *Reinventing Confucianism*, pp. 37-56; Jesús Solé-Farràs, “Harmony in Contemporary New Confucianism and in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” p. 17.

strengths but also asserting that Confucianism had distinctive “moral-metaphysical” dimensions not found in Western thought; by contrast, another branch focused on “practical and cultural values in the Chinese tradition as forms of life.”²⁹ The second generation of New Confucians came after the establishment of the PRC. They also reflected the moral-metaphysical and practical-cultural branches, but in addition had a group who included the influence of Marxism. By the 1980s, when the reform era had begun in China, the third generation of New Confucians were able to dispel the conventional ideas about Confucianism being antithetical to capitalist modernization or that it was only Chinese. In the United States a school of thought led by Robert C. Neville at Boston University and Tu Weiming from Harvard became “Boston Confucianism” demonstrating New Confucianism’s adaptation to Western thought and society. Indeed, Confucian scholars need not be bounded by nationality: Wm. Theodore de Bary represents a notable Western Confucian. The 1990s saw the emergence of a fourth generation that bifurcated into the old divide of morality (known as “apologetic New Confucianism”) and a “critical New Confucianism” that was more concerned with social justice issues.³⁰ In other words, the fourth generation still preserved the theory and practice distinctions in their concerns despite their resolution in the 1958 manifesto and the principle of correlativity (discussed below) that distinguishes Chinese epistemology.

III CONCEPTS OF HARMONY: PAST AND PRESENT

In classical Chinese philosophy, there are a number of fundamental concepts. According to Zhang Dainian’s *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, these “go through a process of emergence, development, diversification, and synthesis.”³¹ Such an observation accords with the dynamic nature of the four concepts of world governance. The addition of Confucian governance could be conceived as “development” after the recent “emergence” of cosmopolitan global governance. But as far as the historical journey of Confucian thought is concerned, “diversification” into global politics (Hu Jintao’s “harmonious world”) may be a discernible stage reached in the present age. “Synthesis” in Confucian thought had already occurred internally with Daoism and Buddhism. Externally it awaits, in cooperative endeavor, the latter stages of global governance: a “synthesis” into the potentiality of a cosmopolitan

²⁹ Solé-Farràs, *ibid.*, p. 15, drawing on Umberto Bresciani, *Reinventing Confucianism*.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Zhang Dainian, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, p. xx.

global “*datong*” that was foreseen in the manifesto of the New Confucianism of the 20th century. This would suggest that Confucian thought in the form of harmonious world is more mature than the embryonic system of cosmopolitan global governance to which it has been introduced. It may therefore encounter greater difficulties in being integrated but also offer more sophisticated assistance in addressing obstacles to enhanced governance.

Indeed, the harmonious world concept can claim an illustrious philosophical ancestry in that it comes from one of three “coordinating concepts” of classical Chinese metaphysics. These are: the whole (*ti ti*), unity (*he ti*), and harmony (*he, tai he*).³² Zhang Dainian explains that the conjunction “*he*” (meaning “and”) originally meant “harmony” in the context of one singer replying to the other, as occurred in traditional modes of song. From a musical response, *he* became a description of “the unity of any nonidentical objects”; and during antiquity it was seen as fulfilling “living things” which in their diversity allowed for “the possibility of new things arising.”³³

Today, harmonious world also occupies an important position in the PRC’s policy “cosmology.” Hu Jintao’s “theory of three harmonies” - *heping, hejie, hexie* – proclaimed in 2005 can be rendered as “seeking peace in the world, harmony in Asia and reconciliation with Taiwan, and harmony in Chinese society.” *Hexie* can be translated as “consensus” in accord with the traditional notion of distinguishing harmony from assent. Zhang Dainian quotes an ancient text on the “insufficiency of mere assent”:

“If you would try to give water a flavor with water, who would care to partake of the result? If lutes were to be confined to one note, who would be able to listen to them?”³⁴

This distinction between harmony and subservience directly relates to the “unity of any nonidentical objects.” Thus cooking with more ingredients than water and playing with a range of notes, provides the harmony-in-diversity alternative to the stifling uniformity that comes of mistaking harmony for assent. According to John Delury’s analysis of the employment of a classical vocabulary for today’s policy prescription, Hu Jintao is said to

³² See *ibid.*, pp. 266-276.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 270-1, citing Shi Bo, the grand historiographer of the late western Zhou.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 273, citing *Zuo’s Commentary* (10).

govern by way of “*consensus within limits*” and that “the government’s promise to build a society with more ‘consensus’ is lost in the translation of *hexie* as ‘harmony,’ but may explain why liberal elements in Chinese society like academics and activists see promise in the term.”³⁵

Consensus relates to another variant of harmony-in-diversity, that of “comprehensive harmony” which Fang Dongmei proclaimed in 1957 to be “a protest against the false ideology of fatal contradiction.”³⁶ Instead of a Hegelian-Marxist dialectics of struggle, “Harmony and strife are not opposites; strife is integrated into dynamic harmony. The world is a process of change and development.” Robert C. Neville also sees harmony as a dynamic balance of elements of which discord is one. Conflict occurs when an imbalance results in dynamic harmony breaking up into chaos or when diversity is overwhelmed by a totalizing force destroying its independent comprehensive nature.³⁷

Such is the logic of Chinese dialectics, also called the “dialectics of harmonization,” “yin-yang” cosmology, “correlative thinking” and “*bianzheng siwei*” (dialectical thinking).³⁸ It differs from the Marxist dialectics that was muted in Chinese Communist Party ideology when Deng Xiaoping’s leadership replaced “class struggle” with pragmatism (“seek truth from the facts”) that accompanied economic reforms and the open door policy.

Thus far harmony has been seen as flourishing in diversity, manifesting as consensus, and integrating conflict into a comprehensive dynamic that may be explained in terms of Chinese dialectics. Not only can harmony be comprehensive but also universal (*pubian hexie*). Universal harmony may be understood as operating within nature, as a relation between humans and nature, among humans themselves, and within the individual. Ultimately, it yields to the unity of the cosmic triad of Heaven-Human-Earth, and pursuit of the Middle Way which seeks harmonious balance. If one is to be both practical and theoretical, the question arises as to how a harmonious world policy can be realized.

³⁵ John Delury, “‘Harmonious’ in China,” p. 43, emphasis in the original.

³⁶ Fang, Tung-mei, *The Chinese View of Life: The Philosophy of Comprehensive Harmony*, The Union Press, Hong Kong, 1957, p. 3, quoted in Solé-Farràs, “Harmony in Contemporary New Confucianism and in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” p. 16.

³⁷ Robert C. Neville, “Between Chaos and Totalization”; Solé-Farràs, “Harmony in Contemporary New Confucianism and in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” p. 17.

³⁸ See Solé-Farràs, *ibid.*; Chenshan Tian, *Chinese Dialectics*, p. 21.

IV HOW IS HARMONIOUS WORLD DEPLOYED?

Chapter 5 of China's 2005 white paper on Peaceful Development states:

“Mankind has only one home - the Earth. Building a harmonious world of sustained peace and common prosperity is a common wish of the people throughout the world as well as the lofty goal of China in taking the road of peaceful development.” Moreover: “China holds that the harmonious world should be democratic, harmonious, just, and tolerant.”³⁹

Implementing such ideals cannot be easy. How is the harmonious world proposition being deployed even as it is being thought through? Clearly the desired objective is far away but the practice has surely begun. Of Hu Jintao's articulated four-point policy prescription for harmonious world - *multilateralism, mutually beneficial cooperation (win-win), inclusiveness and UN reform* – the first two are being systematically applied by China itself and in the process are advancing the third and, ultimately, the fourth. UN reform however was overtaken in 2008-2009 by economic reform as a result of the global recession, so the G20 emerged as the new preferred architecture to the traditional Western-centric G8.

The New Security Concept

Of all the expressions employed in the four-point prescription, the “new security concept” (*xin anquan guan*) noted within the first point, *multilateralism*, may be chosen as the orientating concept around which the others adhere in this age of non-traditional security threats that are as overarching as climate change and as randomly personalized as terrorism.

The new security concept was articulated in the PRC's first defense white paper of 1998, in a foreign policy speech by President Jiang Zemin in Geneva the following year, in the declaration of the 16th Party Congress in 2002, and in a PRC position paper to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the same year. The position paper defines the new security concept as follows:

³⁹ The State Council Information Office, *China's Peaceful Development Road (White Paper)*.

“. . . to rise above one-sided security and seek common security through mutually beneficial cooperation. It is a concept established on the basis of common interests and is conducive to social progress.”⁴⁰

With its emphasis on “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination,” as noted in Hu Jintao’s 2005 UN speech on harmonious world, it has retained China’s avowedly non-aggressive national defense policy.⁴¹ However, it has not languished in a purely defensive posture. A more expansive orientation toward international diplomacy was needed to match China’s economic power and the need to dispel fears that a rising China would become dangerous. Herein correlative thinking or *bianzheng siwei* fosters understanding of the mutuality of *win-win cooperation* (the second point in Hu’s UN speech) as a serious philosophical proposition rather than a simplistic slogan borrowed from game theory. Africa is commonly cited as an example of win-win cooperation whereby China is engaged in huge infrastructure construction in return for access to resources. In this regard, the Chinese ambassador to Democratic Republic of Congo, Wu Zexian, was quoted as saying: “China needs many things. In this world China cannot live closed off which is why we have adopted a politics of openness towards the outside world. We must come to a co-operation that benefits everyone.”⁴²

Beyond the bilateral (especially in the plethora of “strategic partnerships,” as they are called), or even the continent-wide (Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Middle East), relations within multilateral institutions are the leitmotiv of harmonious world politics. It will be through institutions that harmonious world will play itself out, de-Sinicizing in the process; but at this early stage it is being enacted through China’s own foreign policy narrative. China itself needs to be understood as both the conduit and catalyst for harmonious world. As noted above, this is a result of the PRC’s “rise” which has led to “great power diplomacy with responsibilities” (*fu zeren de daguo waijiao*), a term first associated with China’s decision

⁴⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, “China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept.”

⁴¹ The evolutionary context the new security concept be seen as the post-1978 “Reform and Opening Up” (*gaige kaifang*) in which conditions of globalization made interdependence more of a necessity than a choice. But even when the world was still bifurcated into ideological camps, the newly established People’s Republic undertook a foreign policy posture of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: 1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 2) mutual non-aggression, 3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 4) equality and mutual benefit, and 5) peaceful coexistence. First articulated by the then Premier Zhou Enlai during Sino-Indian negotiations over Tibet in 1953, they were included in the Chinese Constitution in 1982.

⁴² Tim Whewell, “China’s Win-Win in Africa”; see also Garth Shelton and Farhana Paruk, “China’s Foreign Policy Framework: China’s Peaceful Development.”

not to devalue the renminbi during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and later during its hosting of the Six Party Talks on the North Korean Nuclear issue.⁴³ By 2005, the US added “responsible stakeholder” to the vocabulary associated with China’s rise.⁴⁴ The impact of these developments was an embrace of multilateral institutions and a departure from the old rhetoric of multipolarity,⁴⁵ with its undesirable implication of zero-sum competition in realist “distribution of power” discourse.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

A prime example of an organization which fulfils the post-Cold War, multilateral, new security concept is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO was originally formed in 1996 as the “Shanghai Five” - comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan - to demilitarize the old Sino-Soviet border and resolve border demarcation disputes. The “Shanghai Five” became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in July 2001 with the addition of Uzbekistan. In 1999 “Islamic fundamentalism” was seen as the most pressing danger for Central Asian governments; fighting “terrorism, separatism and extremism” came to dominate the agenda. This certainly addresses China’s own separatist threats but the SCO has evolved to specialize in “multifaceted political, economic and cultural cooperation.”⁴⁶ For example, cross-border narcotics crime is also targeted by SCO and a development fund is being established. This takes it beyond a straightforward counter-terrorism function and brings it into multilateral regionalism of the type that could represent a distinctive Eurasian international order – but “under the auspices of the UN”, as SCO Secretary-General Bolat Nurgaliev insists.⁴⁷ The UN’s role was emphasized at the 2007 SCO

⁴³ See Bates Gill, *Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy*, p. 6; Chung Jae Ho, “The ‘Rise’ of China and Its Impact on South Korea’s Strategic Soul-Searching,” p. 2; and Shelton and Paruk, “China’s Foreign Policy Framework.”

⁴⁴ The term has its origins in a speech by US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick to the National Committee on US-China Relations in 2005. “We now need to inspire China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system,” he said, often repeating the term.

⁴⁵ According to Leif-Eric Easley, “Multilateralism, Not Multipolarity Should be Goal”: “A search in Chinese reveals that ‘multipolarity’ (duojihua) is still featured on the Chinese Foreign Ministry Web site, but references to ‘multilateralism’ (duobian zhuyi) are increasing in official papers and speeches. Meanwhile, a full text search of Chinese academic and policy journals from 2000 to 2007 shows a gradual decline in discussion of multipolarity and a dramatic increase for multilateralism.”

⁴⁶ SCO website.

⁴⁷ Bolat Nurgaliev, “Interview of SCO Secretary-General Bolat Nurgaliev with Emerging Markets News Agency.”

Bishkek summit in “laying out the member states’ vision for a new international security architecture.”⁴⁸

SCO’s departure from the “Cold War mentality” can be seen in its charter which is open and does not require member states to support one another in time of war. This was demonstrated in 2008 when SCO members did not rally behind Russia in its war with Georgia. Rather, there is “considerable space for individual members to pursue their own policies for their own interests.”⁴⁹ The SCO’s Dushanbe summit declaration exemplifies the new approach to security when it states: “Attempts to strengthen one’s own security to the prejudice of security of others do not assist the maintenance of global security and stability.”⁵⁰ This sentiment is strongly imbedded in China’s new security thinking and may be contrasted to both NATO as a “hard-power” focused military alliance and to Russia’s (though not SCO’s) own inclination to treat the United States/NATO as the strategic opponent.

Just as Mao Zedong’s military thought was distinguished by a refusal to engage the opponent by its own concepts of direct hard-power warfare, but employed people’s war instead, so too the new security concept demonstrated through SCO refuses to be defined by Cold War standards or be forced into an anti-NATO bloc. This does not mean that “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination” have been equally realized or realized to the fullest degree. Sino-Russian relations are often characterized in terms of strategic mistrust; but their so-called “axis of convenience”⁵¹ operates within the wider framework of an organization whose normative institutional power has grown greater than any bilateral limitations. This cushions the effects of competition via “soft balancing” while also socializing states into a multilateral mode of “thinking.” The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with their consensus politics and the European Union with its more formal institutionalization are further examples of regional organizations with normative power.

The Group of Twenty

Turning to the global level, an economic crisis in 2008 triggered a cooperative reaction that made the “G20” a household name. It first emerged in 1999 as the Group of Twenty (G20)

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Yu Bin, “China Still On-side with Russia.” See Charter of SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

⁵⁰ Dushanbe Declaration 2008, SCO.

⁵¹ Bobo Lo, *Axis of Convenience*.

Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors as a response largely to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the emergence of large developing nations that needed representation in global economic governance institutions. G20, therefore, sought to “bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies to discuss key issues in the global economy.”⁵² Its members are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, UK, USA, and the EU.

The G20 is therefore distinguished by a diverse membership drawn from all regions, with the IMF and World Bank included as observer members. Former US President George Bush convened a meeting of the G20 at heads of government level to deal with the global crisis because, unlike the G8 of developed nations, it included the large developing nations of China, India and Brazil. Although the G20 may emerge to be the premier international forum even beyond the global recession, it is not meant to compete with the established UN and Bretton Woods systems, but as the G20 website notes, “add political momentum to decision-making in other bodies.” Australia’s Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, has argued in an unpublished article that the G20 is the driver of global governance and should extend its mission to other issues such as UN reform and non-traditional security threats.⁵³

The inclusion of advice from non-state actors within the emergent global governance paradigm, which is also used by the UN, is apparent in the G20. It invites “experts from private-sector institutions and non-government organisations” to participate in meetings “on an ad hoc basis in order to exploit synergies in analyzing selected topics and avoid overlap.”⁵⁴

The G20 was the venue at which China tried to bring developing countries into high-level economic decision-making, bring greater responsibility to the global financial structure, improve bilateral relations with Washington, and even replace the US dollar with a new international currency. While the last was not taken up and China had not abandoned the

⁵² According to G20 website.

⁵³ Greg Sheridan, “Rudd’s New Vision for Asia-Pacific.” The Australian PM’s article was submitted to the US journal *Foreign Affairs* but rejected because, according to Sheridan, it was “too long and diffuse.”

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* The G20 has no permanent staff, only a temporary secretariat created by the incumbent chair, which rotates annually to a different regional grouping. Continuity is maintained through a Troika of management that comprises the past, present and future chairs. The 2008, 2009 and 2010 Troika are Brazil, the UK and South Korea.

idea, the first three items met with a measure of success. China, Russia and Brazil convinced the G20 to increase the influence of developing countries in global financial institutions: future presidents of the IMF and World Bank could be drawn from outside the US and Europe. On financial responsibility, the G20 agreed to strengthen financial supervision and regulation. As Willy Lam remarked, the establishment of “a supra-national regulatory authority to monitor the operations of multinational financial companies such as hedge funds . . . reflects Beijing’s criticism that it was Washington’s failure to oversee its bankers and fund managers that precipitated the global financial tsunami in the first place.”⁵⁵

This relates to the third success for China. Although it implicitly criticized the United States for unleashing the “financial tsunami,” Beijing nonetheless managed to improve the channels of communication with Washington, agreeing on the establishment of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) which replaced a Strategic Economic Dialogue started in 2006 by the Bush administration. Scheduled to meet once a year in alternate capitals, the first round of the S&ED took place in Washington in July 2009. Although not a great deal can be expected from the first round, its symbolism as a G2 within the G20 cannot be dismissed. Cooperation between the two has not only reduced the chance of war between major powers but also increased the probability of tackling transnational threats. As the US hosts of S&ED put it, few global problems could be solved by the two nations alone, but few could be solved without them.⁵⁶ More specifically, as C. Fred Bergsten pointed out in a letter to the editor of *Foreign Affairs* in 2009, the US is “the world’s largest deficit/debtor country” and China is “the world’s largest surplus/creditor country”; this means that “there will be no resolution of the global imbalances that helped bring on the currency crisis, nor lasting reform of the international financial architecture, without their concurrence.”⁵⁷

V CONFUCIAN VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

From the foregoing it is possible to understand two processes that have been instrumental in the dissemination of Confucian values in international society. One is the rise of China; the other is the congruence of its harmonious world Confucian value system with the four world governance concepts examined earlier on this paper.

⁵⁵ Willy Lam, “Beijing’s ‘Quasi-Superpower Diplomacy’ at G20”; see also G20, Communiqués.

⁵⁶ Hillary Rodham Clinton and Timothy Geithner, “A New Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China.” The idea of a G2 was initiated by C. Fred Bergsten, *The United States and the World Economy*.

⁵⁷ C. Fred Bergsten, “Two’s Company,” p. 169.

1. The Rise of China

China is the transmitter of a harmonious world in international society because it is powerful in a material sense and increasingly respected as a “responsible stakeholder.” As the world’s largest creditor nation and being bracketed with the United States in the idea of a G2 (admittedly within the wider G20), Beijing is already viewed as a global power. In simply being a global power it carries with it Confucian values as enacted in its harmonious world foreign policy perspective.

This foreign policy is being introduced to international society through China’s constructive activism within its multilateral organizations. The term “international society” better reflects the Confucian values of harmonious world than “international system” as it humanizes international relations and promotes the idea of the socialization of state power through regimes and institutions. Thus states not only pursue interests and material power (self-serving *xiaoren*). They also engage in normative power allowing for the Confucian notion of *junzi* by which states – like people – can be “self-cultivating” (in other words, “self-civilizing”) within international society. The proverbial “struggle for power” thus converts to “partnerships of power.” In global civilization with its equally global threats it has become more profitable, in a win-win sense, to cooperate than to clash.

2. Coordination of Concepts of World Governance – Four Plus One

The way in which global threats have focused the global mind on cooperation with purpose suggests that this era’s conditions are ripe for Confucius – once again. Viewed in conjunction with the aforementioned models of world governance (hegemonic, UN, EU, and cosmopolitan global governance), Confucian values under the harmonious world concept find common ground with all four concepts, which in turn display clear compatibilities between them.

Hegemonic governance when employed in pursuit of power politics recalls the zero-sum Cold War mentality. It is therefore not the version sought or relevant today. On the other hand, when it is in the service of world governance, where one state possesses the will and

capability “to maintain the essential rules governing international relations,”⁵⁸ then it provides a valuable public goods service. This is the only viable option for a 21st century hegemon. Instead of sidelining institutions like the UN, as Weiss states above, the UN is “a destination that enriches U.S. options and influence.”⁵⁹ Even when interests diverge between the hegemon and less powerful nations, when the system is seen to be manipulated in favour of the powerful, then the battlefield must remain institutional and hence multilaterally conditioned. Unilateralism increasing lacks the support structure it once enjoyed.

As to Beijing, the powerful transmitter of the harmonious world concept, it no longer expresses opposition to the US which, after all, acts as guarantor to the very international system which has enabled China to rise. The use of the term “hegemonism” within the discourse of “multilateralism” is nowadays not directed to the US but against power politics – a genre of state behavior ill-suited to today’s globally amplified threats. When “multipolarity” was in vogue after the end of the Cold War, the referent for hegemonism was more clearly identifiable as the United States.

Having China coupled with the US in aggregate financial terms (developing/developed, creditor/debtor) precludes an easy divorce. The idea is too compelling to set aside but it is also not possible to view it in isolation, just as bipolar conflictual relations cannot be conceived without taking into account the wider Western world that China would have to face;⁶⁰ or, for that matter, the “new security concept” organizations that China could continue to forge. Hence a recognition of dual power in G2 is an idea that deploys well within a wider G20, itself exciting expectations as the North-South institution of the global era. It may be concluded that having a stabilizing hegemon, at present in the form of the United States, is as necessary in terms of dynamic harmony as having an energizing emerging economy from a non-Western background, currently the PRC.

It is true that at the Asian regional level the US is not performing a direct stabilizing role. It is not a member of the “new security concept” organization of Central Asia, the SCO, or a member of Southeast Asia’s ASEAN and its elaboration of “Plus” countries, nor even of its latest evolutionary branch, the East Asia Summit (EAS), comprising ASEAN Plus Three

⁵⁸ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, p. 44.

⁵⁹ Weiss, “What Happened to the Idea of World Government?” p. 267.

⁶⁰ See G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West.”

(China, Japan, South Korea), plus India, Australia and New Zealand. It is, however, part of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which is concerned with security. This would act as a stepping stone to a larger security institution in Asia. Certainly the US would be a member of the proposed Asia-Pacific Community (APC) if it becomes the next evolutionary stage of Asian regionalism. APC's proponent, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, thinks that such an organization would fill the strategic void: "Currently there is no single institution in the Asia Pacific with the membership and the mandate to address both economic and strategic challenges."⁶¹

Taking strategic responsibility away from old-style power configurations in Asia (namely the US alliance system) and transferring it to the new institutional architecture of rules and regimes does not equate with the demise of the dominant West. Such is the conventional threat scenario when problems still had passports.⁶² Rather, it reflects the realities of the times. US institutional membership would be needed in Asia but it would occur in a relationship reversal of the G2 idea in the global system. Instead of China being the biggest developing country it would be the biggest normative one as the principle purveyor of Confucian values; the US would not be distinguished by its industrial might but by its attitude to Confucian governance as a public good that should be defended – along with allied concepts of global civilization. Broadly, these concepts are enshrined in the UN Charter; in the EU's peaceful integration model that establishes unity-in-diversity, and subsidiarity in supranational governance; as well as the overarching cosmopolitan global governance project which depends on the others. The US as guarantor, the UN as the world body, and the EU as the integrator, offer their strengths to cosmopolitan global governance but it is still not developed sufficiently to be effective. With the addition of Confucian governance, via China's championing of harmonious world, cosmopolitan global governance takes on a stronger cross-civilizational normative quality.

VI CONCLUSION: INTROSPECTION

However, what if China's credentials as transmitter of the harmonious world concept fail to inspire international society? What if China – despite its breathtaking "rise" - is the weak link?

⁶¹ Quoted in Sheridan, "Rudd's New Vision for Asia-Pacific."

⁶² This is a metaphor employed by the former UN secretary-general. See Kofi A. Annan, "What is the International Community? Problems without Passports."

When devolving down from world harmony to that of the Chinese state, one is reminded of harmonious world's counterpart, that of harmonious society (*goujian hexie shehui*). The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, amended and adopted at the 17th National Congress in October 2007, states: "The basic line of the Communist Party of China in the primary stage of socialism is to lead the people of all ethnic groups in a concerted, self-reliant and pioneering effort to turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country . . ." This was the first time "harmonious" was added.⁶³

Yet like the world which Hu Jintao described as "far from tranquil," China itself has much to do to attain its own tranquillity: from diminishing the wealth gap to ensuring the environmental costs of economic growth do not outweigh the benefits. Moreover, a harmonious relationship between a rising China and a "far from tranquil" world must be assured. Not only does China need a stable international environment within which to develop, as we are repeatedly told, but the world needs a stable and "harmonious" China for its own security.

If the harmonious society project fails, it does not necessarily mean that the harmonious world endeavour will fail also. It is more likely that China will not remain the advocate for, or exemplar of, harmonious world. That role may go to another member of the Confucian cultural area - Japan, Taiwan, or perhaps South Korea. It may cross civilizational lines and find itself embodied in a Western Confucian values country. If China loses this role it will lose more than can be quantified in terms of an economic crisis. This is another reason for China to maintain its momentum at regional cooperation and the deepening of institutional integration. Northeast Asia, where the other possible contenders for the advocate/exemplar role reside, is the least developed institutionally compared with ASEAN and SCO. When performed under the auspices of the UN, the presence of the US, the advice of the EU and the attitude of the new security concept, China would have a stronger chance of regionalizing its cultural cousins in Northeast Asia.

Finally, in viewing the presence or absence of harmony through the circles of state, region and world, it is inevitable that the source of harmony - Heaven in the human heart - must be

⁶³ "Full Text of Constitution of Communist Party of China," *Xinhuanet*.

considered. Just as the preamble of UNESCO's Constitution states: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed," so too under Confucian governance there would need to be an educational emphasis on the cultivation of the harmonious person. Without self-cultivation, all subsequent relations – family, society, international and ecological - are imperiled. This means that a global governance with Confucian tutelage would recommend education and human development to be a fundamental right and responsibility. Such education needs to be attuned to individual abilities and cultures. Western education should not be the dominant or singular form, nor should education and development cease or be regarded as most influential at a youthful age.

"At fifteen I set my mind on learning, at thirty I became firm in my purpose; at forty I was free from doubts; at fifty I came to know fate; at sixty I could tell truth from falsehood by listening to other people; at seventy I followed my heart's desire without trespassing the norm of conduct."⁶⁴

This quote from the *Analects* of Confucius may also serve to describe how his values are entering international society. The cosmopolitan "*datong*" that will follow the world's desire "without trespassing the norm of conduct" is still far off. However the journey has begun, as the global community acquires a firmness of purpose. China's harmonious world policy perspective will help to teach the importance of telling "truth from falsehood by listening to other people." It is more advanced than the current level of cosmopolitan global governance but it is positioned in the same direction. It may therefore encounter greater difficulties in being integrated than more familiar Western epistemological concepts, and it may excite suspicion about the motives of its transmitter, the Chinese state. However, as time goes on and the troubles of the world still persist, it will become obvious that the harmonious world concept is no "Communist plot." It is a concept well grounded in Chinese philosophical tradition that finds a willing advocate in the very country that survived the warring states period to remember Confucius once again, when most needed.

⁶⁴ *Analects* 2:4

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