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'How May the World be at Peace?': Idealism as Realism in Chinese Strategic Culture

by

Rosita Dellios

There is a famous orientalism which declares: "Let the Chinese dragon sleep for when she awakes she will astonish the world."[1] In this decade of China's self-strengthening, Western Realists seem to be seeing dragons again. Not so their geoeconomic counterparts. They see only markets. Neither the threat nor opportunity analysts, however, quite see China in the "round"; a mandala of security in which certain principles have long held sway over matters of survival and, indeed, benefit. An appreciation of China's cultural-philosophical tradition provides a corrective to these blinkered visions. More than that, it suggests a way forward in a world once again questioning the basis for peace in the aftermath of great power contention.

Far from becoming a dragon defying the West, China will be a stabilizing force in the world as she remakes the international system according to the logic of her own strategic culture. Power Politics would be replaced by *Wen* Politics (see below), the politics of Confucian civility. *Wen* Politics would lead to a less dysfunctional international system than the one we now have, which is based on Western Realism. Thus Idealism becomes Realism in the truest sense.

STRATEGIC CULTURE AS A CONCEPT

Strategic culture pertains to a people's distinctive style of dealing with and thinking about the problems of national security. This definition does not preclude crosscultural and enduring approaches to strategy. For example, Chinese strategic culture displays characteristics such as deterrence and psychological warfare that are applicable across time and across cultures. The Chinese do not have a monopoly on these, but they have moulded them into a distinctive Chinese approach, just as 19th century European strategic culture - as advanced by Clausewitz and Jomini - is distinguished by the skilful application of physical force. Without disputing the presence of foreign or universal elements in Chinese strategy, it is still possible to argue that there is a uniquely Chinese *approach* to strategy and that it remains even in an age when China has become a powerful nuclear-armed state.

The relationship between "strategic culture" and "culture" is a derivative one. It derives from "culture" its mentalities, then focuses these on issues of peace and war, social order and disorder. The relationship between "strategic culture" and Foreign Policy Analysis is advisory and, if need be, remonstrative. Its predictive value lies in identifying tendencies. As with all predictions in the psycho-social world there can be no certainties. Gray (1986, p. 35) expressed the matter well when he observed: "As with sound geopolitical analysis, with strategic-cultural analysis, one is discerning tendencies, not rigid determinants."

Strategic culture's primary strength is awareness and (hopefully) avoidance of ethnocentricity - of American Strategic Man (Booth, 1990, p. 122) being the measure of all things strategic in the contemporary world order. Strategic culture attempts to peel away the prejudice of the universality of one's views and values. While not all layers can realistically be removed - just as

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[1] Attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte

one's own upbringing cannot be entirely deleted as a source of conditioning - it is nevertheless a worthwhile exercise for it sufficiently opens those portals of perception that allow for enhanced understanding of others *plus* oneself. Once other ways of conceiving of the world are introduced, it is impossible not to draw renewed conclusions about one's own. Hence we have arrived at a point at the end of the 20th century where the hitherto self-referential West is in a position to specialise in interrelationships (to paraphrase Ulrich Beck's thoughts on a new modernity, 1994, p. 24), or for the rich to learn from the poor, the West from those it once colonized (Giddens, 1994).

As a specialist term, though not as an idea, strategic culture is relatively new. The employment of the idea is not difficult to detect. Historians are accustomed to enquiring into the variety of influences - from the cultural and philosophical to the geographical and historical - that help explain a people's proclivities for dealing with the threats and opportunities of the world around them. An impressive example of this has been the ways-of-warfare literature dealing with China and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam (see Stetler, 1970; Kierman & Fairbank, 1974; Rand, 1979; Boylan, 1982; Lin, 1988; and Ball, 1993). It was only during the Cold War, however, that the need for the conceptualization of "strategic culture" as an instrument of analysis arose.

Recourse to an alternative schema for comprehending nuclear weapons doctrine was deemed necessary when it became apparent that Soviet strategic thinkers did not share their American counterparts' notions of deterrence. This came from the Soviet insistence on preparing to survive and fight a nuclear war instead of accepting the inevitability of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and, hence, the preferred logic of deterrence. Later, in the early 1960s, the Soviets also rejected a refinement in American nuclear philosophy - the euphemistically termed, Controlled Flexible Response. This, of course, was a doctrine of limited nuclear war, and the Soviet leaders argued that it was irresponsible of American decision-makers to even contemplate such a policy. How could they control the risk of escalation to full-scale nuclear war? In this way the Soviets were becoming a cause of major frustration to Washington in their refusal to cooperate conceptually. After all, what was the point of nuclear deterrence when the other side actively prepared for nuclear survival?

Given the two superpowers' inability to communicate - let alone empathise - over the equivocal nature of their nuclear security, it is not surprising that someone should diagnose the problem and give it a name. Had she been Hindu, she might have called it the destructive dance of Shiva, a consequence of the lamentable international condition in which ultimate power was defined in terms of ultimate destruction. A Chinese would have similarly seen the symptoms of impending *luan* or chaos, and called for moral rectitude everywhere (Confucianism), fortification at home (Mohism) and a defusing strategy of *wu-wei* or non-action (Daoism)[2] to help restore *Heaven* (the moral universe). But this was neither an Indian nor a Chinese world, a situation which called for their own testing of atomic bombs during the period of contention - 1964 for China (when Assured Destruction reined supreme) and 1974 for India (just as Limited Nuclear War made its debut as the new American doctrine).

By the time of the Carter Administration in the second half of the 1970s, nuclear targeting underwent a policy review. This included an investigation of views other than American on nuclear war and weapons; specifically, Soviet and Chinese views (Ball, 1990). At the same time, American strategic "ethnocentrism created a backlash among many commentators on Soviet military strategy" (Snyder, 1990, p. 3). In 1977, through a paper from the influential RAND Corporation, Jack Snyder wrote (p. v):

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[2] Chinese words are rendered in China's official pinyin transliteration system of the Chinese written characters. The exceptions are source citations using the older systems and certain historically familiar names which do not commonly appear in the pinyin version. To avoid confusion, on occasion the older renditions are placed in brackets after their pinyin equivalents.

It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique 'strategic culture'. Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semipermanence that places them on the level of 'culture' rather than mere 'policy'.

Snyder expressed himself in these terms out of a concern "that the United States, under the Schlesinger Doctrine, would count on the feasibility of fighting limited nuclear war in a way that the Soviets' distinctive approach to nuclear strategy rejected" (1990, p. 3). Interestingly, having introduced the term, Snyder dropped it from subsequent publications and admitted (1990) that he never intended it as a serious contender for explanatory power. He saw it as a "blunt instrument," an explanation of last resort.

Others were not so dismissive (see Pipes, 1977; Ermath, 1978; Gray, 1979; and especially Booth, 1979). They warned against ethnocentrism and urged strategists to widen their repertoire of concerns. "One cannot know one's enemy by stereotyping him," advised Norman Dixon (1976, p. 266). "Man cannot live by the Military Balance alone," Ken Booth cautioned (1979, p. 110). His advice to strategists was to "be as familiar with value systems as weapons systems" (ibid.). By 1986, Colin S. Gray's persuasive and well-developed application of strategic culture to understanding superpower nuclear strategy bolstered the literature considerably, as did a United States-Soviet Union comparative study edited by Carl G. Jacobsen (1990).

With the end of the Cold War came the end - at least in that particular milieu - of strategic culture's conceptual incubation. Was it ready to take its place among other approaches to analysis of strategic and security issues? For some the answer was an unequivocal "yes." To again quote Booth (1990, p. 126): "Strategic theory without strategic anthropology consigns the study of the threat and use of force to capabilities analysis, the crudities of old-style political realism and the flaws of the rational actor approach." Snyder, on the other hand, did not have the anthropological perspective in mind when he employed the term "culture". He was not invoking the reputed zero-sum attitude of Russian peasants or the defensive strategies of the Bolsheviks, but the more immediate and, what he called, "concrete aspects" of the domestic and international scene (1990, p. 7). In short, he was interested in the so-called empirical realities of today's world. To take the Chinese example, it is like talking about the limitations and opportunities of Maoist China in a bipolar world or of reformist China in a global economy.

Booth and Snyder represent the *comprehensive* and the *particularistic* views of strategic culture, respectively. These two versions are worth noting for they have implications as to the limitations of strategic-cultural analysis. Snyder's version places strategic culture as "an explanation to be used when all else fails" (1990, p. 4) because he can find seemingly more obvious reasons for strategic differences. "For example, militarily inferior states tend to adopt defensive strategies, whereas superior states tend to adopt offensive ones" (p. 5). The assumption about the strategy of "superior states" is reminiscent of the Realist argument that "states with dominant power dominate" (Roy, 1995) irrespective of their value systems. Snyder also raises national endowment characteristics as a source of explanation for choice of strategies. Thus the USA's comparative advantage in high technology could well have encouraged the pursuit of the Star Wars program (Strategic Defence Initiative), compared to a technologically less well-endowed USSR, which had to rely on "cheaper offensive countermeasures" (1990, p. 5). Snyder, moreover, points to the impact of change in blunting the instrument of strategic culture; of rational choice having a crosscultural validity - "Schelling's generic rational man under conditions of MAD" (p. 4); and of the pragmatic and often expedient pursuit of interests, in line with the Realist penchant for explaining the world in terms of "plain old politics" (p. 8).

Booth's more overarching approach to strategic culture allows for Snyder's particularism, but within the former's own organising terms. Thus sensitivity to change is part of any discussion of culture, strategic or otherwise, and not a cause for fault-finding in those who adopt the approach. "If there is any lack of sensitivity to change, it is the result of over-cautious or static analysis, not an automatic by-product of strategic cultural analysis" (1990, p. 127; see also Pye

1988, pp. 25-26, for a supporting view on culture and change). To Snyder's Realism-based observations, Booth reminds us that (1990, p. 124): "'Realities' in human behaviour are in the eye of the beholder. In the strategic domain, as in others, we live in a 'created' world. Strategic realities are therefore in part culturally constructed as well as culturally perpetuated." Culture, in other words, cannot be something that can be placed in a separate node of existence. It shapes everything, including that which we call *the real world.* The world *out there* might be a predatory place for a Realist, but it is presumptuous to assume everyone is socialized to live and think within these terms of reference.

Booth, in fact, finds the answer to Snyder's cautionary tales in a narrative of inclusion (1990, p. 124):

> . . . it should be stressed that cultural explanations do not exclude other 'useful' explanations and that those other explanations may well themselves contain a cultural dimension. Thus, for example, what happens in the Soviet Union (and elsewhere) is not some game of politics divorced from the history, geography and political culture of that particular state . . .

From Strategic Man to Symbolic Universe: The Security Mandala
At this point a further refinement can be made to the concept of strategic culture using the simple device of the mandala as metaphor. Because it is an especially Eastern metaphor, with spiritual rather than instrumental connotations, it is a fitting choice for conceiving of Chinese and other Asian security systems which tend towards holism. The mandala metaphor also helps to release strategic culture from the space-time capsule of Cold War scholarship.

Defined in its *comprehensive* mode, strategic culture seeks to identify a people's Security Mandala through patterns of preference, styles of response, persistent worldviews and accompanying value systems. *Mandala* comes from the Sanskrit word for circle and in its generic meaning pertains to a system of spatial relationships around a center. China as the Middle Kingdom is a mandala concept. So is Christendom. They were spatial as well as conceptual circles of power with a moral center. The classical Indian strategist, Kautilya (4th century BC), modelled international relations in terms of a mandala system.[3] The adage that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" had a particularly Kautilyan flavor which was enhanced by the viewing of immediate neighbors as enemies. Kautilya's mandala with its situational calculations has some affinities to the Snyder perspective above and to the transitoriness implicit in Buddhist mandalas made of coloured sand. The religious mandalas, which are rendered not only in sand but in painting, sculpture, dance and even in mental practices, are diagrams symbolizing the spiritual universe. Comprising a center, symmetry, and cardinal points, the mandala's role is to create harmony from the polarities, order from chaos. Not surprisingly, its appeal as a metaphor for the idea of security is compelling.

When the mandala acts as the object of contemplation, for both Hindus and Buddhists, its becomes a *yantra.* It acts as a facilitator to contemplation. The mandala's fullest ritualistic development may be found in Tibetan Buddhism. This is ironic given that China has colonized Tibet. China habitually has regarded Tibet as part of the Chinese world.[4] Perhaps this is just as

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[3] O. W. Wolters (1968) adopted it for identifying pre-European international relations in Southeast Asia and later used it to mean a single polity or state (see Wolters, 1982; and Mackerras 1992). The concept of mandala in international relations is being developed in contemporary contexts by the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies at Bond University, Australia. (See *The Culture Mandala,* 1994) The author is a founding member of this Centre which was established in 1993.

[4] The People's Republic of China absorbed Tibet in 1950, explaining that the Tibetans were being "liberated" from the "feudalism" of religious rule. China had long regarded Tibet as a "barbarian" frontier within her empire. This was not the Tibetan view, nor is there any compelling evidence to suggest that the Tibetans desired "liberation". After Tibet's forcible incorporation, its highest authority - the Dalai Lama - fled his country and set up a government-

well for without Tibet Chinese security would be literally and symbolically depleted: literally because it provides China with her Western mountain buffer; symbolically because the Tibetan cause is a cardinal point in pressuring change in China. Without self-transformative powers, no state is secure. Complacency squanders security, as imperial China found to her detriment in the 19th century. Tibet and China are perhaps productive for one another. By helping China transform herself, Tibet affects herself as well as Sino-global relations - an activity fitting of a Buddhist polity. The symbolic universe is full of ironies. Strategic Man of the Western Realist school has shown a distinct preference for blocks, balances, and certainties. Believing himself to interpret the "laws" of nature better than most, he is wary of vacuums and resents ambiguities. There are no ambiguities in *his* "jungle". His Security Mandala is consequently far more brittle (Fig. 4), for reasons developed below.

While the basic design concept of the mandala is common to all mandalas, sacred and secular, so too are the basic properties of security common to all peoples (essentially, cultivation of confidence and avoidance of harm). A Security Mandala, in turn, represents a sense of security - a square - achieved in the universe - a circle (see Fig. 1). There are, of course, mandalas of many variations, each distinctive and complete in its own right. Similarly, different people's orientations vary. Piecing the parts together, defining the links, constitutes an art more than a science. For example, it is possible that the quest for security inverts the relationship between square and circle so that the square as the security domain contains the circle in hegemonic fashion (see Fig. 2). This is the Chinese Legalist position, a strategic sub-culture, which made possible the unification of China in 221 BC. The perpetuation of China as a unified entity after this event, however, required an additional circle around the hegemonic square (see Fig. 3) in order to restore the "proper" hierarchical moral order which should contain, and not be contained by, the security domain. In this way, the previously contained circle becomes the *stabilized world*, the *world at peace*, or the *harmonized world*. Its design is the *yin-yang* symbol (depicted at the heart of Fig. 3). The traditional mandala of square-in-circle (Fig. 1) was evident in classical India. Like Confucianized China her cultural domain was bigger than her strategic domain, but without the intervening hegemonic complication of the three-layered Chinese model (Fig. 3). The Concert of Europe, by comparison, could not achieve either of these (Fig. 1 or 3), so it partitioned its security domain into a balance-of-power (See Fig. 4). Its *stabilized world* was more mechanical than the Chinese version because it had not been transformed into a moral center. To do so would have endorsed the hegemonic project (morality as the means to hegemonic power).

The perfect strategic system would define its own mandala (see Fig. 5). It would need to address an aspect of security at every point of the circle (for example, military, economic, social, ecological) but would never arrive at 360 degrees because of permeability. In this ideal Security Mandala survival (the square of security) and value (the circle of the universe) become the same in every aspect. Permeability is the open system of change which maintains a Security Mandala as a living system. Therefore, it is better to have the permeable *real* Security Mandala which acknowledges the *ideal* than to grasp for that which is beyond reach (Fig. 5), or to deny its desirability (Fig. 4). The permeable *real* is the Daoist *ideal* (Fig. 3). This is one window on Idealism as Realism. To put it another way, it is more "realistic" to become well-adjusted to a living, interacting, changing world where one lives by one's "ideals" through a code of conduct, than to be disappointed in not achieving a perfect world, or becoming cynical - and thus acting cynically - about its "imperfections." Cynicism is not Realism, for it has no worthwhile creative function beyond self-preservation, often at the implied expense of others. A more logical Realism is one which acknowledges the mutuality of not only survival but of improvement on existing conditions. These ideas will be re-examined in later contexts.

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in-exile in India. Tibet has remained a long-standing source of rebellion against Chinese rule. The PLA maintains Tibet as a virtual garrison state. Hundreds of thousands Tibetans have been killed during sporadic rebellions against Chinese rule. Independence is not a realistic option in the foreseeable future. Rather, the way forward lies in autonomy in deed as well as name (Tibet is classified as an Autonomous Region of the PRC) and demilitarization of this devout Buddhist country.

Returning to what I have referred to as Snyder's *particularistic* idea of strategic culture, this may be located in the permeable feature of the Security Mandala where change is the operative element (or deity in the sacred rendition of mandala). The temporal aspect of a mandala relates to time, to this-worldliness, to change, to the unchanging "laws" of change, thence to the *dao* (the way) - be it a Buddhist *dao* (*dharma*), a Confucian *dao* or a Daoist *dao* - or all three in Chinese Neo-Confucian fashion. A spiritual tradition thereby becomes discernible and enduring. At the start it is a collection of events, personalities, institutions, preoccupations. It is *particularistic.* Later it becomes more *comprehensive;* patterns form; *shi* - which combines "power, circumstance and natural tendencies" (Chan, 1963, p. 252) develops.

If we then know where strategic culture comes from, we can better understand apparent contradictions as, for example, how a visibly militaristic society can emerge from a syncretic base. A country comparable to China in this respect is Indonesia. They both developed "people's armies" in the role of *yantra* to focus their respective strategic cultures on national development. It may be postulated that Indonesia's Security Mandala of unity-in-diversity has produced a civil-military "glue" called HANKAMRATA to "seal" its permeability. HANKAMRATA is an acronym from pertaHANan KeAManan RAkyat TerpAdu, or defence security pertaining to united people (who in Indonesia are diverse). Indonesian permeability happens to be largely internally induced because of the Javanese syncretic base. The HANKAMRATA defence system of unified civilian and military power seeks its security by the cultivation of internal power or *resilience,* an alternative to the derivative strength of interstate alliances, as well as a method to avoid ever needing them (Ismail, 1995). Thus, unlike the ill-fated South Vietnam, Indonesia's own anti-Communist campaign in 1965 was not conducted with the assistance of massive foreign military force. It was conducted at the cost of a traumatic bloodbath. (This was a high cost, but in state terms not as high as South Vietnam's.) Similarly, Indonesia paid a high price in terms of international reputation for its absorption of an unstable East Timor into its *rakyat tempadu* (united people) a decade later.

In superficial ways, Indonesia's Security Mandala resembles China's. The difference between the Chinese and Indonesian military manifestations concerns the values domain (mandala circle) to which survival (square) relates. In China's case the circle is too strong; the military will never be anything more than a servant. Indonesia's circle is too diffuse; its moral and material center never quite clear. This allows for the military to be strong in illusion. As in Java's venerable *wayang kulit* shadow play, it is ultimately ephemeral. Indonesia's - that is to say, Java's - Security Mandala requires a powerful *dalang* (puppeteer) at the center. Without the *dalang,* who can speak many tongues and interpret diverse situations meaningfully to the assembled publics, there is not enough unity and an overbearing diversity.

Like the impermanent Buddhist mandalas of sand, or the militaristic focus of Indonesia and sometimes China, the *particularistic* side of strategic culture is without permanence but *with* significance. It describes the contemporary scene of institutions and circumstance. It may change with the times but its significance is important in deciding on the tactical features of how security is nurtured or maintained - once the substantial features are apprehended. It is open to change, active in constructing new facades of impermanence, and sometimes strong enough in *shi* (power-circumstance-tendencies) to alter the course of the original mandala design.

It is now possible to be more specific about the role of a Security Mandala. It serves strategic culture in much the same way as model-building serves science. In turn, in its minimum capacity, strategic culture provides the context for analysis of foreign policy behavior in such a way as to reduce the risk of miscalculation. If it serves this modest peripheral role it will affect the tone of discussion but not necessarily the power of the other approaches - be they the familiar rational actor analysis, the more sophisticated hypergame analysis, or the intriguing theory of drama and irrational choice (Bennett and Nicholson, 1994). Because it provides a

contextual briefing which could have grave implications for one's findings, strategic culture is ignored to the detriment of Foreign Policy Analysis. It should be the explanation of first resort, the fabric to which other prominent factors are stitched as needed. The limitations of strategic culture are ultimately the limitations of its "model-building" - a Security Mandala like any other "model" can be built badly or well. To those who object that there is nothing to show that it exists, the same can be said of all social science models. The test is not so much in predicting events (how many people predicted the collapse of the USSR or the Beijing Massacre or the latest Gulf War?) but recognizing the milieu in which they unfold. Only then can tendencies be suggested. Again, I do not think that other methodologies, for all their social scientific rigor, can hope to deliver more.

Having outlined the minimal application of strategic-cultural analysis, what of the maximum application? Maximized, strategic culture offers alternative schema for comprehending and maintaining international relations. The competing schools of International Relations in the West are like the various denominations of Christianity. They differ but they come from the same religious cosmology based on a common understanding of God. So it is with belief in global "reality". It has a Eurocentric character and, to quote world order theorist Samuel Kim (1991, p. 12), is organized according to a "multipolar horizontal conception of world order based on the coexistence and coordination of sovereign states." Thus like Edward Said's (1978) orientalism, whereby the West explained the East, the prevailing interpretation of global "reality" is essentially a Western-tutored one. Its "denominations" fall into traditional preferences of conflict versus cooperation, of pessimists pitted against optimists. In world order terms (Kim, 1991, p. 19), there are "statist system-maintaining instincts" on the one hand, and "globalist system-transforming possibilities" on the other, with the United Nations managing to straddle both. More specifically in the post-Cold War era, the cultural divergence message of "Clash of Civilisations" (Huntington, 1993) has disputed the cultural convergence lesson in "The End of History" (Fukuyama, 1989). Realists, who constitute the dominant stream (or school), argue in terms of the continuation of self-interested struggle in a world attempting to re-establish a viable "power balance" or, perhaps more to the point in this Hobbesian rendition of self-seeking behaviour, a *preponderance* of power (see Layne and Schwarz, 1993). The drive for preponderance rather than balance is clearly captured by Forde (1995, p. 158) who states:

> The "law" that power rules the relations of states - a principle that lies at the heart of all realism, classical, modern, and contemporary - points to expansion constrained only by the limits of one's own power, or by countervailing outside power. It certainly absolves such expansion of any moral taint.

By comparison, those who have an affinity to the global interdependence argument see a greater harmony of interests. Cooperation is as much a behaviour conducive to survival as is competition; and competition can be made acceptable when positioned within mutually agreed rules (or institutions) in global life. If there is any morality in this perspective, it is one which promotes the hitherto "low politics" idea of global welfare, as distinct from the traditionally "high politics" concern with state power.

The Chinese worldview of *datong* (greater community, universal commonwealth), while sympathetic to the interdependence school, would still sit uneasily with the Western tradition. This is because as an international relations system the Chinese is (at least initially) hierarchical; it is metaphysical, even within its realist subculture of Legalism (because of Daoist tactics); it elevates "rites" of conduct above law; and, to return to the complementarity with the interdependence school, it has universalist tendencies in its *datong*. Each one of these characteristics is counter-Western Realist and therefore globally counter-cultural if it were to be expressed in contemporary guise. It also poses an affront to Western interdependence formulations because of an ethic which does not take seriously Western individualism.

CHINA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE

(a) Foundational Principles

At this point it is appropriate to identify more systematically the foundational principles of China's strategic culture in order to explore how China in transforming herself might transform the international system according to the logic of her own strategic culture. It is necessary to explore these concepts before one can begin to understand their application.

Jen (human-heartedness)

Expressions of Chinese world order could be therapeutic to the current system untutored in *jen* (human-heartedness, benevolence, or humanity). Instead of swinging between the polarities of the all-consuming state and the all-demanding individual, *jen* provides an ethic for the proper provision of both.

Jen is the key concept of Confucianism, the dominant tradition in Chinese philosophy. A combination of the written characters for "man" and "two", *jen* pertains to human relations. In the *Analects,* Confucius explains *jen* thus:

> When Fan Ch'ih asked about *jen,* the Master said: 'Love people.'
> When Yen Yüan asked about *jen,* the Master said: 'If you can control your selfish desires and subject them to rules of propriety and if you can do this for a single day, it is the beginning of *jen* for the entire world. *Jen* is self-sufficient and comes from your inner self; it requires no outside help.'[5]

"Briefly defined," explains Fung Yu-Lan (1973, Vol. 1, p. 68), "[*jen*] is the manifestation of the genuine nature, acting in accordance with propriety (*li*), and based upon sympathy for others." To the Chinese, self-cultivation is more meaningful than individualism. In this way it is not a question of subsuming one's entire identity for the greater good of the group, but of cultivating oneself in order to be the building block of *jen.* In this way, state, society, family *and* self are well served. Indeed, thinking more broadly, the world itself is well served, for there is a natural progression to the level beyond state. If the state, through moral leadership, has *jen,* so does its foreign relations because such relations would be based on the external expression of *jen,* called *li* (or propriety in behavior). The *jen-li* mindset renders "power politics" (*jen*-deficient relations) the province of the ignorant and therefore barbarous. Therefore, the tactical details of dealing with barbarians - through such methods of "using barbarians to contain barbarians" - were subsumed within the grander strategy of tributary relations. Foreign affairs were thus transformed into internal affairs. This arrangement yielded security and economic benefits without the costs of militarism or isolationism. The challenge was how to disarm the barbarians at the gates by encouraging them to partake of the Chinese world through tribute relations. While tribute meant a symbolic submission to civilisation (China), it also entailed attractive rewards, both in terms of trade opportunities and the conditions of peace in which they could be pursued. This was an externalization of the internal Confucian social order, which was itself a reflection of self-cultivation. "*Jen* is self-sufficient and comes from your inner self."

Li (rules of proper conduct)

Li, as noted above, is the outer expression of *jen* or human-heartedness. If *jen* is absent then pretentions of *li* are worthless. Worse still, they diminish the person and situation. "The Master said, 'Unless a man has the spirit of the rites, in becoming respectful he will wear himself out, in being careful he will become timid, in having courage he will become unruly, and in being forthright he will become ignorant" (Confucius, VIII:2).

In the affairs of government, *li* is considered superior to law, but does not exclude law from its proper place in society. "To impress restraint before the fact, is *li*," wrote Sima Qian in his *Historical Records,* "to impose restraint after the fact is law" (quoted in Wu, 1982, p. 407). As expressed by a 17th century official: "When the people are at peace, they are governed and live

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[5] This is Dun J. Lee's translation (1971, p. 74) of the passage. It is more explicit - for example, "selfish desires" instead of "self" as found in D. C. Lau's (1988, XII:1) translation.

according to the rules of conduct (*li*), but when troubles arise, punishments must be used" (quoted in Pye, 1985, p. 42). Confucius (II:3) put the matter of *li* over law in the following terms:

> The master said, 'Guide then by edicts, keep them in line with punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. Guide them by virtue, keep them in line with the rites [*li*], and they will, besides having a sense of shame, reform themselves.

In explaining the attitude of Confucius, K. C. Wu points out:

> What he aspired after was not merely effective government, but better society. Law at best can be conducive but to the former; only *li* may lead men to the attainment of the latter. Hence, in his mind it is not law before *li,* but *li* before law; and whatever legal institutions there may be, they should all be so constituted as to further the ends of *li.*

Traditional Chinese international law was, in fact, *li.* It included since ancient times practices familiar to modern diplomacy, such as diplomatic inviolability, and repatriation or extradition of persons. In regulating their international relations the Chinese established a board of rites instead of a ministry of foreign affairs. This highlights the importance attached to correct behavior as distinct from boundary setting. The "foreign" is transformed to the "known" through rites of propriety based on a recognition of the moral universe. Since "all under Heaven are one", relations should proceed in an orderly fashion in accordance with *li.*

Tien (Heaven; nature; the moral universe; the way of nature and man as one)

Tien in Chinese philosophy has come to mean both the moral universe and the natural universe. There is an assumed interaction of both so that creation is not mechanical but spiritual and purposeful. The concept of *tien* has been used to "denote the power that governed all creation" (de Bary, 1960, p. 5). It is more impersonal than the Christian idea of God, and not as anthropomorphic as a somewhat similar concept to *tien,* that of *shang-ti* (lord-on-high). Expressed more precisely (ibid., p. 6): ". . . Heaven was a more universalized conception. It represented a cosmic moral order . . . The authority of Heaven might therefore be appealed to in situations where the sanctions of a clan or nation did not extend." *Tien's* authority leads to the related concept of *tien-ming* or Mandate of Heaven: that whoever rules must do so virtuously in accordance with *tien-dao* (Way of Heaven). Otherwise, *tien* will withdraw its mandate and pass it onto another monarch or nation worthy of leadership. Hence the importance of the proper observance of *li* and the cultivation of *jen.* While this describes the dominant Confucian philosophy of traditional China, its aim of harmony is shared by the other influential indigenous Chinese philosophy, Daoism. In their concern with harmony as a social and spiritual value, both incorporate the *yin-yang* school of thought. Indeed, the *I Jing* or *Book of Changes,* which employs Daoist and *yin-yang* thinking, carries Confucian interpretive commentary.

Yin-Yang (Earth-Heaven, female-male; waning-waxing; negative-positive; receptive-proactive; hidden-open; defensive-expansive)

The negative (or defensive) and the positive (or expansive) attributes of Chinese strategic philosophy relate directly to the *yin-yang* concept. The concept may be explained as follows (Huang, 1987, p. 8):

> Yin and Yang are at the root of all things, and together in alternation they are the moving force of our world and all its manifestations. Yin is seen as passive, yielding, and nurturing, while Yang is active, dominating, and creative. Any circumstance, however intricate, can be described by a string of Yins and Yangs.

In the words of one ancient philosopher (Chou Tun-yi, quoted in Fung, 1966, pp. 269-70): "Movement and Quiescence, in alternation, become each the source of the other." The West's idea of positive and negative provides a rather poor approximation of *yang* and *yin.* Opposition is commonly (but not always) emphasised rather than complementarity. Hegel's "everything involves its own negation" is a Western philosophical approximation (Fung, 1966). This requires further comment as to how the two differ. Hegel's thinking emphasises both opposition and

complementarity. Opposition entails or presupposes complementarity, and vice-versa. Both operate simultaneously rather than in alternation.

Yin-yang's alternation is likened to waxing and waning. This marks dynamic change of succession, like the seasons, though in human affairs it is possible to adapt and strive for balance and hence ride the wave of change rather than be beached or drowned by it. In this sense *yin-yang* is not deterministic, nor is it "struggle", as the Chinese Communists found in 1978 when they decided to replace "class struggle" with pragmatism ("seek truth from the facts") in the desire to advance China materially. The philosophy of *yin-yang* is to "flow" in the direction of restoring balance, as distinct from "struggling" to achieve some superior dialectical resolution, with the latter's implication of a teleological state of affairs. The *qi* (life force) of *yin-yang* is understood to harbor transformative power, and may be tapped into by individuals and whole societies. The survival (transformative) capacities of *yin-yang* mean that it is possible to emerge secure even in the most trying of conditions.

For a *yin-yang* perspective on Chinese strategic thought, see Fig. 7. Its spatial consideration is Security Mandala Fig. 3. This perspective shows that China's strategic philosophy, past and present, may be interpreted to address two essential needs. One is *inviolability* and the other is the attainment of China's *rightful place under Heaven* - the closest approximation in Western understanding being "destiny" or "proper place". The first, inviolability, has a defensive orientation and the second, "rightful place," an expansive one. They are not opposed but interrelated. Without inviolability, "rightful place" is difficult to attain. Without the "rightful place", inviolability is not assured - as far as one can be assured of the complete security to which inviolability aspires. Such an aspiration, incidentally, should be viewed within the Chinese perspective of not courting disappointment but *purpose,* a moral strength encouraged by Chinese philosophers, especially Confucius.

The notion of progress to a state of ideal convergence of humanity is Idealism beyond reach, just like the perfect Security Mandala (Fig. 5) is ideal. The *qi* of *yin-yang* cannot be grasped either but that is its reality; consequently one learns not to struggle or to grasp but to conform. What does one conform to? Idealism as Realism - following the *tien-dao* (the way of the moral universe), while being mindful in order to be masterful of transformative relations. These, as noted above, are derived from the *yin-yang* "law" of change (as set out in the *I Jing,* or *Book of Changes*).

Wen-Wu (civility-martiality)

Traditionally, China recognizes the superiority of *wen* (civility) over *wu* (martiality). *Wu* was only to be resorted to if *wen* failed and, indeed, *wu* was believed to be most effective or "potent" (see Rand, 1979, pp. 116-7) when it was not dominant over *wen.* This meant that: (a) "War is not easy to glorify because ideally it should never have occurred" (Fairbank, 1974, p. 7); and (b) when war *is* used, its effectiveness or potency is dependent on how it relates to moral order (is it a just war?) and whether it is sparingly used as a means for effecting policy. Here the basic framework of *yin-yang* thinking becomes apparent: "the way" or moral order needs to be pursued and the method of doing so should be subtle and well-timed rather than brazen.

On the question of "just war," this should not be taken as an excuse for a martial attitude. "Just war" is not a centerpiece in Chinese strategic thought. This is because war in itself is regarded as a phenomenon of failure, be it failure of political virtuosity in the Realist sense (Machiavelli's *virtu*) or of moral leadership in the Confucian sense. The discarding of war as a tool of statecraft marks an important intersection in China's strategic cultures. At this juncture, Sun Zi's ideal general who "breaks the enemy's resistance without fighting" (Sun Tzu [Zi], III.2), finds himself in the company of Mohism's great teacher, Mo Zi, of whom it was said: "Teaching that social well-being derives from universal love, Mozi described warfare as mass murder and ridiculed the states of his time for punishing individual thefts and murders while rewarding pillage and massacre" (Zhuge and Liu, 1989, p. 6); and Mencius who instructed that peace could only come through unity. When asked who could unify the world, Mencius replied: "One who is not fond of killing can unite it" (Mencius, 1988, 1a.6, p. 53). With the exception of the Legalists, who *did* accept the instrument of force as a legitimate tool for forging unity and thence peace, Chinese

strategic culture converged on an attitude of anti-militarism. Complementing this was the suggestion of inclusive *global* security in the *yin-yang* conception of "incorporating the other," and as suggested by the Chinese Security Mandalas of Fig. 3 and Fig. 6. China's own history taught that periods of horrific boodshed and disorder occurred in contexts of rivalry and disunity; while periods of stability came when there was unity in China and Confucian suzerainty in the region.

Having made the point about Chinese anti-militarism in principle there are obvious examples of aggression in practice. The moral-cum-political use of *wu*, not surprisingly, leaves it open to abuse. For example, there is nothing in Confucian philosophy which sanctions the shooting of students; yet the ease with which the army could be used to do so in June 1989, under the justification of restoring political and social order, attests to the double-edged sword of *wu* moral power. In practice it means that China's rulers - past and present, virtuous or not - had to control the power of *wu* if they wished to be assured of their own. Hence Mao Zedong spoke of power - the party's power - growing out of "the barrel of a gun". Similarly, Deng Xiaoping was also able to retain supreme power through the backing of the army.

Dao (the way) and *Wu-Wei* (non-action; spontaneous action, non-interference, metapower)
Dao simply means "the way". For Confucianists, *tien* bestows "human nature" and in following our human nature we are in fact following the *dao*; by cultivating the *dao* we educate or civilize ourselves (from *Doctrine of the Mean,* in Chan, 1963, p. 98). The Daoist school of Chinese philosophy has adopted it as its central concern and its principal proponent, Lao Zi - whose ideas are set forth in the *Dao De Jing (Book of the Way and Its Power)* - speaks of the *dao* as eternal and nameless. To interpreters of the *dao*, it is "the way of man's cooperation with the course or trend of the natural world" (Watts, 1992, p. xiv). The Chinese Chan school of Buddhism (pronounced Zen in Japanese) has more akin with Daoism's spontaneous action of *wu-wei*, than the way of the Confucian sage.

According to the *Dao De Jing* (Lao Tzu [Zi], 1988, Ch. 37) "Tao [dao] invariably does nothing (*wu-wei*) and yet there is nothing that is not done." Moreover: "To make complete without acting *(wu wei),* and to obtain without seeking: this is what is meant by the activities of Heaven" (Hsun Tzu quoted in Fung, 1952, Vol. 1, p. 285). From these quotations it is possible to appreciate lack of action in a positive light. It is not "inaction" but avoidance of unnatural action (Chan, 1963, p. 791). *Wu-wei* represents an alignment with the *tien-dao,* or the Way of Heaven. (As to *wu-wei's* expression as metapower, see entry for metapower below.)

The key international relations application of Daoism is the endeavour to excel through strength of character rather than force of arms. Right is might, and not the other way round. Fulfilling one's potential comes not from actively seeking it at the expense of the other (person, society or the environment), like a zero-sum-game ("I win, you lose"). It comes from incorporating the other, working with the other, in line with the complementary principles of polarity, *yin* and *yang.* Even if that other is an opponent, one uses the strength of the opponent to achieve one's own safety. This, of course, is a basic principle of the martial arts. The force of an attacking opponent is not met frontally but allowed to continue under its own momentum until it reaches its opposite condition of self-defeat. That Buddhist monks used this martial method indicates its ethical acceptability, in addition to its Daoist insight into the "laws of nature", of which *wu-wei* or non-doing is a central concept. Indeed, it was a Chinese strategist, Mingjiao of the 11th century, who wrote: "A lost country wars with weapons; a dictatorship wars with cunning; a kingdom wars with humanitarian justice; an empire wars with virtue; a utopia wars with nondoing" (quoted in Zhuge and Liu, 1989, p. 8).

Datong (greater community; grand unity; universal commonwealth; utopia)
This is the global practice of *dao* which Confucius said he never saw but about which he speculated as having existed during the Three Dynasties prior to the imperial age. "When the great Tao was in practice, the world was common to all" (quoted in Fung, Vol. 1, p. 378); he called it the period of *datong* or the Great Unity. It is said to derive from the Daoist concept of a Grand Harmony (ibid.; de Bary, 1960, p. 175). Confucius regarded the society for which he strived through the implementation of *li* as only a Small Tranquillity. "Now that the great *Tao*

has fallen into obscurity, the world has become (divided into) families" (quoted in Fung, Vol. 1, p.378). The government of Great Unity represented a higher ideal. So *datong* was not imperialism, it came before this era of Chinese history. Imperial China was a devolution from *datong*. However the sentiment of *datong* could be said to have been kept alive through the belief that "all under Heaven are one".

This one-world philosophy of *datong* is an important point for Chinese strategic culture for it found practical, even if imperfect, expression in the tributary mode of international relations.[6] As noted above, this system of suzerainty was inclusive of others. Essentially, the Chinese international project has been one of seeking order (harmony) through unity. In times of disunity, like the Warring States period (450-221 BC), the drive was for unity under one victorious state. It was not a push for independence, the path pursued by the European states and, eventually, the present international system of sovereign states. Applied to today's problems, it is in this light that the desire for political reunification across the Taiwan Strait is better understood.

The psychological indivisibility of Chinese sovereignty was severely shaken at the time of the European treaty system overtaking the Chinese tribute system. The Opium War of 1839-1843 not only represents the watershed between the Chinese and Western world orders, it also established a primary reference point for Chinese national humiliation. This has fuelled strategic culture to a remarkable degree. It has meant that while practising gradualism (such as over the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea or the introduction of market reforms), Chinese sovereignty is never compromised - not just with independence-prone Taiwan, but also with regard to human rights, and particularly democracy-prone Hong Kong with its Opium War connections. "Certain questions left over from history" have been a familiar refrain from the Chinese foreign ministry.

De (power)

This is the word for "power" as it is used in the *Dao De Jing - Book of the Way and Its Power*. It is not coercive or forceful power but the power of virtue and character. *De* can mean both "power" and "virtue." In Daoism it has the sense of latent power, mystical power, potency. It has more in common with power as understood in traditional Asian societies where power is status and has mystical connotations - as distinct from being a utilitarian matter, a means for achieving purposeful ends (see Pye, 1985).

Metapower (*wu-wei, de*, indirect power)

A nation which exhibits a preponderance of Western Realist *wu*-backed power is popularly termed a *superpower*. This term describes capability and a willingness to flaunt it (status-wise) or mobilize it (for punitive measures) in the interests of system maintenance. In doing so a superpower exercises hegemonic leadership by (a) setting the standard of international norms and rules of behaviour, and (b) acting as the guarantor of international stability. Such

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[6] Traditional China modelled her foreign relations on the Confucian values associated with filial piety. With the Chinese emperor at the head, lesser kingdoms were expected to show submission in return for Chinese protection. Thus "foreign relations" came under the family metaphor, rendering them familial relations; the Chinese emperor was recognized as the symbolic head of the international household - a rather more literal "family of nations." The tributary system, also known as the tribute-trade system, derives its name from the tribute rendering activity. Representatives from neighbouring countries would bring "tribute" (or gifts) to the emperor in the Chinese capital in exchange for the right to trade with China. Often the envoys returned with more gifts than they brought, but that they "kowtowed" (from *ketou*, "knock the head") to the emperor indicated their recognition of China as the "elder." In this way China controlled both trade and the unruly potential of her neighbours. Above all, she acted out her sense of civilizational superiority, which is linked to the Mandate of Heaven concept. The Chinese did not try to convert the "barbarians" through missionaries but to set them an example. It was expected that by coming with tribute to the capital they would be transformed.

hegemony may have imperial implications, depending on the prevailing international political fashion. Given all these characteristics of superpower capability, international will and hegemonic implications, how does it register in terms of *de*? Does the superpower have *tien-ming* (the Mandate of Heaven) by following *tien-dao* (the Way of Heaven)? Is its hegemony morally sanctioned? Without a moral center in its Security Mandala, it cannot be described as a *de*-superpower.[7]

A *de*-superpower is better expressed as metapower. It is more comfortable with the power of *wu-wei* (non-doing) than the power of *wu* diplomacy. This understanding distinguishes the secular Western Realist superpower and its implied hegemony, from the Daoist-Confucian superpower with *its* implied hegemony - that is, by the pursuit of international *li* for the purpose of international peace (Small Tranquillity) through the spiritual aspiration for international unity (*datong*). Like *yin* and *yang*, the Western Realist's superpower is shadowed by the Daoist-Confucian metapower. The latter (*yin*) force must contain elements of the former (essentially *yang*) force if it is to survive. Hence in the exercise of *wen* politics, *wu* power is held in reserve. When its use is called upon, then it acts decisively. To use once again the analogy of the Chinese martial arts, fighting is avoided; but if it must be engaged in then the blow has to be decisive. The current international system of secular "balanced" power is dysfunctional in that it does not address the question of how the world may be at peace, but how it may preserve itself. This individualism is characteristic of the Western philosophical tradition, but represents its corruption in the absence of moral cultivation. Within the Chinese humanism of *jen,* however, how one can relate harmoniously to others is the appropriate consideration. Contemporary China is now faced with restoring its own *jen* after flirting with extremist groupism and materialism.

In accordance with *jen's* consensual approach, metapower can further be explained as pervasive, indirect influence - which represents the attributes of *li* rather than law. Metapower's historical approximation may be identified as suzerainty. Legally, this refers to the political control of one state over another, but historically, as Adam Watson explains (1992, p. 15), "it means a shadowy overlordship that amounts to very little in practice." More specifically, in Small Tranquillity terms, it amounts to an international system's tacit acceptance of suzerain authority. "Tacit acceptance is the same as acquiescence, and is necessary for any effective hegemony, whether *de jure* or *de facto*" (ibid.). Metapower shares with suzerainty the concept of indirect control but adds to it the post-superpower notion of indirect power.

(b) Foundational Principles Within the Chinese Security Mandala

The Neo-Confucianist Yen Yüan's diagram of cosmology may be adapted as a classic Security Mandala for China. There is a square within a circle, and a number of intersecting lines (Fig. 6). According to Yen Yüan (quoted in Fung, 1952, Vol II, p. 636) "The large circle represents the Way of Heaven in its entirety. . . . The operations of the *yin* and *yang* result in the creation of the four powers [*de*]: *yüan* (originating growth), *heng* (prosperous development), *li* (advantageous gain), and *cheng* (correct firmness)." The four *de* (powers) are rendered as dynamic, not static, forces. The principle of permeability is acknowledged: "Thus there is nothing that does not interpenetrate everything else" (p. 637). Potentiality rather than actuality is stressed: "Once one understands that the two forces of the Way of Heaven, the four powers of the four forces, and the production of all things by the four powers, all constitute this original potentiality . . ., then one can examine this diagram (with proper understanding)" (pp. 637-8). The difference between Yen Yüan's diagram and Fig. 6 is that the former is less definitive of center (empty to accommodate the unportrayable *shang-ti* or lord-on-high) and *yin-yang* (diffused and borderless throughout the diagram), but more complicated in its transformations of the *de* (powers). However, as the commentator Fung Yu-lan explains, "Nothing further is said

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[7] Notice a coincidental meaningfulness in English of the Chinese-English compound word which emerges. The process of *de*-superpowering any superpower would represent a more Daoist world system.

about "God" or *Shang Ti* . . . the process of cosmic evolution begins with the *yin* and *yang* forces . . ." (p. 638). So the essential meaning is retained in Fig. 6.

Its interest as a metaphor for a Security Mandala is the depiction of the four cycles of (1) self-establishment (system transformation, to use the world order language of Kim, 1991), (2) enrichment (system maintenance), (3) empowerment (system exploitation) and (4) virtue (or metapower). China seems to be entering the stage of (3) advantageous gain (system exploitation). Samuel Kim has identified this as a possibility in interpreting China's outlook on the world in the 1980s. A "radical *system-transforming* approach" under Maoist China before membership of the United Nations, was followed by a "*system-reforming* approach" upon admittance to the UN; this, in turn, was transformed in the 1980s to "*system-maintaining* and *system-exploiting*" approaches "as Beijing became more interested in what the UN system could do for China's modernization and less interested in what it could do to reform the [UN] Charter system" (Kim, 1991, pp. 21-22).

The stage of (3) advantageous gain (system exploitation) may, however, be seen as a prelude to (4) indirect global power or metapower, which in turn occasions a new cycle of (1) system transformation. This is assuming a breakdown through excessive *yin* or *yang* practices at any one stage is guarded against. An example of excessive *yin* is the "police state" mentality in internal affairs; while exacessive *yang* may be exemplified by "imperial over-reach" in foreign policy. For China this has meant, on the one hand, avoidance of the burning-of-the-books attitude which is said to have brought about the early demise of the first dynasty, the Qin; and on the other, avoidance of extravagant displays of state power far from one's center (such as the Ming imperial naval expeditions of the 15th century). It was better for the world to come to China and be transformed than for China to go out to the world. Interestingly, in the process, the Chinese world expands to be more inclusive and, therefore, transformative of that which it includes. This may be viewed as system transformation. Simultaneously, China in its diffusion undergoes its own transformation towards cosmopolitanism, as exemplified by the Tang dynasty (AD 618-906). If history is any guide, China is entering this (neo-Tang) phase of metapower and thence to system transformation. The relevant cycles of history are well identified by Edmund Capon (1989, p. 7):

> Indeed, it is with the historically symbolic Han dynasty that the story of the founding of the Tang begins. Apart from the short-lived Qin dynasty (221-06 BC) the Han was the only precedent for an enduring and unified Chinese empire. The preface to the founding of the Han Empire was also repeated as the founding of the Tang; for as the Han dynasty was preceded by a brief but immensely determined Qin dynasty, so the Sui dynasty (AD 581-618), some eight centuries later, established the foundations of the Tang.

Twentieth century Communist China (including its latter-day "open-door" variant of system exploitation) could be another example of what Capon (ibid., p. 9) describes as "a brief but dogmatic reunifying dynasty laying the foundations for another long period of stability."

A SINICIZED GLOBAL SYSTEM? AN INTERNATIONALIZED CHINESE SYSTEM?

Are we heading for a sinicized global system? Is China approaching a Tang Renaissance? How do *Wen* Politics overtake Western Realism? Because China is a highly *strategic* culture, she is likely to *plan* carefully her foreign policy performance. She will plan it in relation to both her own and international circumstance. By flowing with the *dao* of the international system, she is thereby cultivating her own; she acquires her individual *de*, her potency. Specific issues that are likely to be played out in the politics of system transformation are global military power, the power of ideas (liberalism in the presence of "Asian values"), and East Asian economic power in internationalizing a new sinitic culture. Hence the traditional formula of military, political and economic power considerations in foreign policy analysis is retained as the particularistic entry-point into a comprehensive strategic-cultural analysis for Chinese foreign policy behavior.

(a) Military Power

In matters military, Chinese esteem of *wen* warfare in a Western-tutored world of *wu* diplomacy poses a fundamental difficulty for China. It is a difficulty not dissimilar to the one faced by the

Celestial Empire in relation to the European colonial powers in the 19th century. In other words, today's Western deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, is backed by *wu* capability and this, in turn, poses the problem of *wu* credibility for China.

It is a problem with which China had to deal during the age of nuclear hegemony in world politics, from 1947 to 1989. By nuclear hegemony is meant both the dominance of nuclear politics over other "low politics" and the dominance of the two superpowers (the USA and the USSR) over world affairs because of their ownership and near monopoly of the means of mass destruction.

With nuclear hegemony's end there emerged an incipient nuclear democracy among the Non-Western aspirants of Western power. In other words, those who were not in the exclusive "nuclear club" could not see why they should not try. After all, none of the original members has chosen to leave the club by giving up nuclear weapons. This latest episode of the phenomenon of "anti-Western Westernization" (Ojha, 1969) has been named "nuclear proliferation" by the international establishment. For China, however, post-1989 nuclear politics - like so much else - are being sinicized. The Chinese authorities cushioned the West's diplomatic blows against a nuclearizing ally (North Korea) in the early 1990s. The 1995 missile tests off Taiwan were clear reminders of China's rights in a Chinese world.

As to proliferation, this is consistent with the protective-cum-empowerment relationship of the old tributary system. To kowtow to the emperor is to kowtow to civilization; and thereby to be transformed. Today the Chinese world will not be interfered with; nor will the world of its extended relations. By being the country most visibly undermining the West's nuclear hegemony (through its own nuclear weapons modernization as well as suspected proliferation) the Chinese are not persuaded by the "grandiose rationalizations" (to use Ojha's term, 1969, p. 56) of Western Realism.

Obviously, during the nuclear hegemony period, the Chinese nuclear force fell far short of either superpower's forces in size and sophistication. Accounting for only three per cent of the world's total warheads and holding only a tenth the number of launchers of either superpower, the Chinese had no intention of competing with the mega arsenals of the Soviets and Americans. They were filling the gaps in the People's War deterrent caused by changes in modern warfare. Until the 1980s, China's nuclear weapons were confined to land and air delivery systems. With the addition of ballistic and cruise missile submarines, they were fulfilling the contemporary demands of their total, unified, deterrence concept. This reveals a strategic culture which, like its political culture, refers to internal guidance for changing external conditions. The aim is not to imitate that which is new or foreign, and thereby attempt to become it, but to incorporate-"civilize"-sinicize it into an existing system (Security Mandala Fig. 3). This is what happened to the Mongol and Manchu conquerors of China, and to concepts of communism and capitalism.

How has China's nuclear weapons power been sinicized? Its rationale derives from the *yin* desire for inviolability. Never again would China be at the mercy of technologically superior powers, as she had been at the end of her dynastic life. At the same time China has not developed a mega arsenal of weapons like that of the Cold War nuclear hegemons. Nuclear weapons power has been rendered more psychologically potent by the absence of declared nuclear policy. We are not told how China intends to "use" her nuclear power if she had to. But she does pledge never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. What does this mean? It probably means a well thought out deterrence based on sound Daoist principles. There is an interesting parallel here with the Daoist "use of uselessness." In this concept one has to balance usefulness with uselessness. This is illustrated by adapting a dialogue of the Daoist master, Zhuang Zi (Chuang-Tzu), to explain nuclear *wu* power:[8]

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[8] Elsewhere, in more military-oriented writing, I have particularized nuclear *wu* power in the form of *guerilla nuclear warfare*. (See Dellios, 1989, 1994a)

"If nuclear *wu* power's intention is to be useless, why does it serve on the altar for the defence of this land?"

"Be still and do not declare a doctrine. It just pretends to be on the altar. By so doing it can protect us from the injury of those who do not know it is useless. If it were not on the altar, we would be still in danger from the arrogance of those with nuclear teeth. Moreover, what this doctrine maintains is different from what ordinary military doctrines do. Therefore, to judge it with conventional morality is far from the point."

"All know the usefulness of the useful, but not that of the useless" (adapted from Chuang-Tzu, 1989, pp. 74-75, 77).

Needless to say, "the usefulness of the useful" has also received strategic consideration in China. Traditionally a land power, China has been expanding and modernizing her naval power since the 1980s. From a strategic-cultural perspective, there can be little doubt that the growth in Chinese naval capability will soon empower her "will" to reclaim her maritime tribute region in the South China Sea and the near Indian Ocean (bearing in mind that Southeast Asia is a two-ocean region, between the Chinese and Indian oceans). By "will" is meant *rightful place under Heaven* - in China's case, this will mean earning her *tien-ming*. Because the Mandate of Heaven is not achieved by *wu* power, it will be necessary for China to demonstrate her *wen* credentials. *Wu* seapower then becomes the handmaiden of *wen* strategy by adding a forward deployment capacity to the existing heartland power. This amounts to *wu* credibility in international perceptions.

(b) The Power of Ideas
Turning to the power of ideas, China's presumed desire to create a situation in which she is unassailable now refers less to physical invasion and more to the invasion of undesirable influences, or "spiritual pollution" (to use the Chinese Communist term). Examples of corruption among those holding responsible positions are legion. The authorities have blamed "money worship" for these ills. Modernizing China is taking on the appearance of economic animal in the form of the three-clawed dragon, as distinct from the more noble five-clawed variety which emerged symbolically at the height of Chinese civilization.

Analysts in the West blame the absence of institutional control in a society which emphasises rule-by-man rather than rule-by-law. Where, one might ask of economically-driven China, are the self-effacing ideals of Confucius and Communist soldier-hero, Lei Feng,[9] the attitudinal requirements for maintaining the "correct" relationship between ruler and ruled? Without these *li*, according to the perception of history which informs Chinese strategic culture, *luan* or chaos befalls the nation.

Like most other countries, China regards internal cohesion as a vital element of security. How to maintain internal cohesion is often determined by political culture. From ancient times, China practised a mixture of Idealism and classical Realism, represented by Confucianism on the one hand and the Legalism on the other.[10] Similarly, her history has been punctuated by periods of unity and disunity. The commonly held fear that loss of central control will lead to warlordism is to a large extent based on this pattern of experience. Here is where the resurrection of *li* is of more import than the use of punishments or simply succumbing to Western liberalism. The latter would entail China's loss of the (cultural) initiative over the

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[9] "Lei Feng" was put forward in the 1960s, and again in the 1980s, as the paragon of patriotic service and Communist virtue.

[10] Legalism was based on the power of punishment through law and force in international relations, rather than the power of virtue. Legalism was short-lived but its incorporation of Daoist thinking on the use of deception meant a greater measure of longevity for its "power politics" perspective.

present (political) international system dominated by the West. Additionally, it would most certainly mean the loss of Communist Party authority.

Signs that various *li* are being reintroduced include the rehabilitation of Confucius as "a great thinker and statesman" (*Beijing Review*, 1993, p. 11), the publication of inexpensive and well-produced literature for parents teaching their children morality (Fung, A., 1995), the emphasis on patriotism in schools and, in the foreign policy sector, China's continuing emphasis on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence[11] as well as the need for a "new international political and economic order" (see Kim, 1991; and quote from Li, 1991, below). How successful China's center will be in reinforcing *li* and, in the process, its own authority when so much of China is under the spell of "economics first" remains to be seen. It is also difficult to assess how post-Tiananmen China can convince a human rights-conscious world of her morality. Moreover, the continuation of nuclear testing had done nothing to endear China to international public opinion.

It is true that the moral view of power does not always guide practice or appear to do so. Nonetheless, failure to transform oneself does not negate the project. Even Confucius is said not to have achieved his ideals of self-cultivation (see Tu, Hejtming & Wachman, 1992, p. 108). Despite China appearing to the West as unscrupulous in selling missiles to the Middle East and in absenting herself from nuclear arms reduction agreements, immoral in her human rights record, and perhaps provocative in her military build-up in the region - points which the Chinese authorities have counter-argued[12] - China's time honoured pronouncements still indicate the quest for moral power. One might argue that the two Cold War superpowers, the USA and the USSR, did engage in a moral contention via their competing ideologies of "liberating the world's oppressed classes" versus "making the world safe for democracy." China's view, as illustrated by her condemnatory statements, is more sceptical. She did not approve of the way in which the rest of the world was "manipulated" in the contest between the two strongest nations. The profession of ideals on the one hand, and the pursuit of "power politics" on the other, could be viewed not only as hypocritical but also irresponsible. Why? Because of the high nuclear force levels and the disregard for "justice," an ideal at the forefront of China's foreign policy rhetoric and posture. China was the only "third world" country strong enough to challenge the post-1945 world order of superpower dominance. She acquired an independent nuclear deterrent and polished her role of international critic, even unto the present time. The new post-Cold War order is not only seen as potentially dangerous because of an interfering West (led by the US), but also because of economic inequalities. This pertains to the "third world" which China has been championing for years as part of her anti-hegemony campaign. In 1991, for example, the call for justice continued (Li, 1991, p. 10):

> As is known to all, poverty of third world countries has many causes, of which the old international economic order and the economic relationship based on exchange of unequal values between the North and the South, which long placed the developing countries in an unequal and unfair position, is the main one. It will get nowhere to impose a particular Western model of development on the developing countries instead of reforming the old economic order. Nor is armed control a fundamental remedy for regional turbulence and conflict.

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[11]   These are: (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) mutual nonaggression; (3) mutual noninterference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit and; (5) peaceful coexistence.

[12] There are many examples of Chinese rebuttals, often in the form of long-standing policy statements with regard to China's non-aggressive posture, but sometimes with specific reference to current problems. *Beijing Review* is a dependable source of such statements. See, for example, "Qian on World Situation and China's Foreign Policy" (11-17 October 1993) *Beijing Review*, pp. 8-11

This type of rhetoric has remained strong in the post-Cold War (and post-Tiananmen) era when China needs to defend her rights to non-interference in her sovereign affairs. Beijing's commitment to anti-hegemony conforms to the defensive phase of People's War strategy. The "weak" side seeks to erode the capability and will of the stronger invader (the would-be hegemon) until such a time as the final phase of strategic counter-offensive may be launched. Upon accomplishing this task, the victorious defender presumably would not claim the mantle of hegemon for herself. Even if she had built up the capability to do so, she could not act in this way without forfeiting the real prize of her anti-hegemonic war: the demonstrated victory of her own value system. China, paradoxically, must pursue her anti-hegemonic interests if she wishes to prevail. In this respect, Chih-Yu Shih has written a revealing book on Chinese foreign policy called *China's Just World* (1993). Shih contends that "the Chinese not only promote their interests but also embody a worldview that explains why those interests are worth pursuing" (p. 13).

China's anti-hegemonic posture accords with her Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and her experience - like other East Asian societies - of the hegemonic practices of the West. The "unequal treaties" are an especially painful reminder of the consequences of inequality among nations. Ironically, the Chinese world order which has so little regard for individualism is more particular about realizing the theoretical equality of nation-states. In reviewing Chinese national boundary issues in the early days of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Ojha (1969) notes the importance Beijing attached to "not so much a change of boundary lines for their own sake as their renegotiation on a free and equal basis" (p. 65), of being "motivated not by territorial expansionism but by this fanatical obsession with sovereign consent" (p. 65), and of wishing to "neither take advantage of nor yield advantage to any country" (153). Ojha also notes (p. 172) that when China did go to war over boundary issues it was only after deeper antagonisms or complications presented themselves. Certainly this proved correct even as late as the post-Mao period. The Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979 had less to do with disputed boundary demarcation than "punishing" Vietnam for invading Cambodia after signing an alliance treaty with China's enemy, the Soviet Union. The war was meant to teach the Vietnamese a lesson so "they could not run about as much as they desired" (Deng Xiaoing, quoted in Segal, 1985, p. 211). This doctrine of "punitive expeditions" was known in ancient Chinese thought.[13] Its continuance into the future can be expected, especially under conditions of perceived moral assault - such as *de jure* independence for Taiwan or foreign peacekeeping forces in the areas of disputation in China's claimed southern sea.

There are two forms of punitive expedition which might eventuate. The first belongs to the time of transition between Western Realism and *Wen* Politics. The above examples of moral provocation (perceived interference in Chinese internal affairs) belong to this phase. The transitional nature of the times means that China does not feel confident at having acquired a state of *cheng* (correct firmness, or *rightful place under Heaven*). It is when *heng* (prosperous development) and *li* (advantageous gain) vie for attention with possible plans for punitive action. There are distractions and uncertainties. A victorious outcome is not assured. Nonetheless, if pressed, China would act; even if the victory is more symbolic than real.

Should China reach a position of *cheng* (correct firmness, *rightful place under Heaven*) which makes possible *yüan* (originating growth) and thus the beginning of a new cycle, punitive expeditions are of a different order. They are then administered within the sinicized system

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[13] For example, in Li Ch'uan's *Secret Classic of T'ai-po*, the term is used in the context of moral order:
"If [the employment] of soldiers does not accord with [the Way of] Heaven, one cannot move [them to victory]; if [the employment] of an army is not modeled on [the Way of] Earth, one cannot carry out punitive expeditions; if [the employment of] attack methods does not match [the Way of] man, one cannot be successful" (2.3a). - Quoted in Rand, 1979, pp. 115-6.
Also, it was a minor theme in Mohist thought. See Mo Tzu [Mo Zi], 1973, pp. 93, 111-113.

rather than against a dominant non-Chinese system. At this point speculation arises as to how the sinicized world system would function. Again, judging from the dominant strands of Chinese strategic culture, China will have more confidence in the efficacy of *li.* Should this fail, and should "intimidating, cajoling, or subsidizing" others prove fruitless (terms used to describe China's traditional methods, Reischauer and Fairbank, 1960, p. 317), punishment is likely to be of the decisive variety.

Because the Chinese world order will not only contain China, there is likely to operate a kind of "Confucian family of nations" punitive expedition force - with "claws", to use the dragon metaphor. More specifically, branches of "regional family" forces would prevail, whereby each of the regions enforces its own order. China has never been comfortable psychologically with projecting Chinese force far from her East Asian neighbourhood. She could oversee world security but she could not allow herself to administer it personally. In a sinicized world, such is the task of the international mandarin classes, specialists from around the world who are proficient in the Chinese classics (and thus moral philosophy) as well as having a strong background in comparative world philosophies. They, in turn, are advised as required by a scientific and technological "class" on the one hand, and an economic and merchant "class" on the other. They operate not as a static bureaucracy but as a fluid system of combinations; shifting, coalescing and distributing themselves in accordance with regional peace management requirements. The prevailing peace management paradigm of this hypothetical sinitic world is that of restoring the balance between *yin* and *yang.*

The above describes the international system of a sinicized world. What are the transition markers? How does one arrive from "here" to "there"? Reflection on the nature of the present decade is in order. Spurred by an international climate more sensitive to the conduct of *li*, China will be in a better position to occupy her *rightful place.* Though ironic in view of China's reputation of human rights violations, the judgement is still valid in that the human rights campaign against China affords her an opportunity to elaborate her own worldview. This, in turn, should widen China's scope to include her more Confucian-literate brethren in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and in the domains of "Cultural China" that include the Chinese diaspora as well as the contributions of non-Chinese participants of Chinese affairs - be they intellectual, journalistic or commercial (see Tu, 1991).

"Cultural China" as a term has become even more significant than "Greater China," which is largely an economic description. The concept of Cultural China has been developed in the discourse on China by a number of commentors. Among its initiators is a Taiwanese American academic, Charles Wei-hsun Fu, who used the term at a public lecture in Taiwan in 1987 (Fu, 1993) as a means of escaping the deadlock of political China (between Taiwan and the PRC). As Lu (1995) explains: "There is also the connotation that there is something unique and desirable about cultural China, which is lacking in political and economic China." He points out that "cultural China is more fundamental than political or economic China," and that "the former is fundamental to understanding the latter two." Cultural China provides not only a *way out* from the political impasse which has trapped the contemporary concept of China, but also a *way into* the world "through a 'discourse community', which transcends geographical areas, ethnic groupings, languages and religions" (ibid.) Yu Ying-shih, a (Mainland) Chinese American scholar, also wrote on Cultural China (1993), saying that it was ideal for the non-political unification of China. In this way the vibrant and diverse cultures of the Chinese regions (the *little traditions*) are not overwhelmed by an imposing *great tradition*.

It is true that in the Chinese periphery the more traditional Chinese mores as well as diverse *little traditions* have survived. They have acted as the cultural engines of modernization and commercial success. In this sense, like the latest deities on the alter of Chinese culturalism, Lee Kuan Yew with his "Asian values" message emanating from tiny Singapore, sits alongside Deng Xiaoping with his pragmatism from China proper.

(c) Economic Power
This raises the role of East Asian economic power in "publicizing" a value system which is not European in inspiration. The renewed "unity of all under Heaven" has already begun

economically in the region. It might again resemble a tribute-trade system in which doing business with China and her Confucian (including Japanese) cultural kin would be a major attraction to foreigners who might otherwise become obsessed with preparing to deal with "the China threat." Tribute would be made materially and symbolically to civilisation, a civilisation which nourishes the environment in which such economic and cultural transactions can occur. Such a civilisation would now be called not China, but East Asia - a geographic and cultural expression spanning Northeast and Southeast Asia. Beijing would be only one of a number of "capitals" (see Harding, 1993, p. 674) acting as the centers of the East-Asian tribute-trade system, with APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) or even the proposed EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus) a forerunner and facilitator. The West's position would be a complementary one, in true *yin-yang* fashion. Once the center, it now becomes the periphery, but a periphery which is not exploited in the neo-Marxist sense. Rather, the periphery that the West represents is a sustaining one, allowing for the (mutual) pursuit of a middle path between polarities of the group and the individual, duties and responsibilities, the religious-magical universe and the secular-scientific one (or tradition and modernity), economics and politics, ambiguity and distinction.

The United States finds a more sustainable niche in this system, for it is not faced with a confrontational situation as occurred through needless misunderstanding with the Soviet Union. This was due largely to inadequate strategic-cultural analysis on the part of advisers to both governments. The spiralling of threat perceptions during the frostier years of the Cold War, followed by a "steady state" of animosity which allowed for a working relationship under detente, illustrated how well adjusted the world could become to its nuclear neurosis. That it was a dysfunctional condition became amply evident when the Cold War ended and much of the international community could not fathom, and certainly not condone, Western Realism in the form of invasions (Iraq-Kuwait), nuclear testing (especially by France in 1995), and sacrifices of various kinds from the environment to human rights.

Predictable Encounters
As the current system struggles to find its post-Cold War identity, as Western Realism subsides and Cultural China strengthens, there are a number of predictable encounters that can be envisioned. At the military level, there will be a flurry of high-tech arms acquisition programs among China's Asian neighbours, including India. Interestingly, the implied excuse to the West and to each other will be concern to balance the Chinese. Privately, however, these states will be emulating China. Weapons will be almost exclusively employed as national status symbols. The rhetoric of national resilience, comprehensive security and total defence in conjunction with a calibration of "Asian values" to political management styles will reveal the sinicization of modernity. This is already well underway through the conjunction of traditional Chinese values in the East Asian region (comprising both Northeast and Southeast Asia, marking China's periphery) and indigenous ones (for example, Javanese, Balinese, Malay, Thai, and others).

War is likely to remain last on the list of regional interests. In any case, entrenched consensus politics will slow any developments which could lead to war. Complicated rituals of manoeuvre within regional forums will also diminish any such possibility. By contrast, "efficiency" (as distinct from pragmatism) in relationships will be deemed callous and instrumental; insults considered worse than war. As Pye once put it (1990): "Sticks and stones may break my bones, words can totally shatter me." The diplomatic environment would be controlled by a mastery of *li.* The US, having emerged from the formidable learning process of the Cold War and disinclined to be drawn into a new but equally risk-prone role of global policeman, will be inclined towards supporting this system. The key confrontations will occur, as usual, within the US herself: between the containment-of-China and engagement-of-China advocates. However, because the United States is unlikely to be assertive in a region which least appreciates (and, from the American perspective, least needs) assertive behavior, Washington will be least troubled by a sinicizing Asia. This will, in all probability, be judged a region of stability. The United States, with her own inherent idealism, is unlikely to interfere with traditional Chinese values - propelled by economic modernity - reaching out into other parts of the world. The reasonable nature of a *en*-directed society represents more of a help

than a hindrance to future American foreign relations. By not being singled out as the solitary superpower, the global puppeteer, or the remaining evil empire, it is possible for the US to take the *daoist* path to longevity: a *wu-wei* policy of metapower. Otherwise, the drawbacks of being a *superpower* - visibility, enmity and transitoriness - must be faced.

CONCLUSION

Chinese Idealism equates with *li* (proper conduct). From it issues good governance and harmonious relations. True, it *is* an ideal, but it is not one which others in the Chinese cultural orbit (the East Asians) are unable to pursue. Increasingly, their mutual relations exhibit Chinese Idealism (pursued through *Wen* Politics) rather than Western Realism. Proper conduct does not negate self-interest. It redefines it in relation to the greater good. This is why, to take a concrete example, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), regardless of limited economic outcomes, has proved so successful as an exercise in mutually supportive international relations.

Earlier, Mencius was mentioned as the philospher who advised on how the world may be at peace. By way of conclusion, it is worth reiterating his views, as commentated upon by Fung Yu-lan (1966, p. 180):

> Though the First Emperor was thus the first to achieve actual unity, the desire for such unity had been cherished by all people for a long time previous. In the *Mencius* we are told that King Hui of Liang asked: "How may the world be at peace?" To which Mencius replied: "When there is unity, there will be peace." "But who can unify the world?" asked the King. "He who does not delight in killing men can unify it," answered Mencius. (Ia, 6) This statement clearly expresses the aspiration of the time.

It may also be the statement which most clearly expresses the sentiment of our own post-Cold War times. Morality in foreign policy is, paradoxically, and to employ a Deng quote, the truth that can be gleaned from the facts. In this respect, Idealism *is* Realism. That Chinese strategic culture has not only coped with this idea but prospered from it suggests its continued relevance to China's future - and hence, to a large extent, our own. Five-thousand years of statecraft capped by 100 years of humiliation have invested contemporary China with both calculation and reflection in her power relationships. As the Chinese President once said to the American Secretary of State: "The fat man didn't get that way with just one bite" (quoted in Kaye, 1994). Similarly, one could add, scholarship in Foreign Policy Analysis cannot expect to aquire "weight" without the study of culture - and strategic culture in particular.

As to future directions for research, there are a number of tasks which present themselves. First, further research is required in defining the elements and components of strategic culture. Second, more needs to be done in explaining the linkages (cause and effect) in foreign policy and strategic culture. Third, a wider range of case studies is needed to bring scholarship further out from the old US-USSR focus. Thus, what is the strategic-cultural framework in, for example, the Beijing-Moscow or New Delhi-Beijing case studies - or the role of Sufism in understanding Central Asian international relations? Fourth, security constructs other than the mainstream Western ones need to be elaborated. The Security Mandala is a beginning in this direction. Alternative security constructs help break the disservice of ethnocentric thinking in the application of strategic-cultural analysis. If we are to apply strategic-cultural analysis to foreign policy problems we must begin by experimenting with the conceptual templates of that which is called "security".

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