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Mandalas of Security

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Mandalas of Security

Abstract

Extract:

In employing the constructional metaphor of architectures for the constructive purpose of security enhancement in the eastern Asian region, it is but a small step to indigenise the process by slipping into the mentality of mandala-building. In doing so, it is that Asian security architectures will prove more acceptable and to be hoped accessible to participants - and thus efficacious in their purpose. The mandala adds nothing new to the experience of Asian communities but redirects effort towards existing cultural orientations. In effect, it is a conceptual device for refining Western technostructures in ways more meaningful to the needs and expectations of Asian societies. There is nothing to prevent the security mandala from being applied to other regions with differing cosmoilogies. After all, despite its Asian - particularly Indian and Tibetan - associations, the symbolism of the mandala is a cross-cultural phenomenon. The focus in this paper, however, will be on the Asian region.

Keywords

security, mandala, economics, defence

Mandalas of Security¹

by Rosita Dellios

Abstract

In employing the constructional metaphor of 'architectures' for the constructive purpose of security enhancement in the eastern Asian region, it is but a small step to 'indigenise' the process by slipping into the mentality of mandala-building. In doing so, it is to be hoped that Asian security 'architectures' will prove more acceptable and accessible to participants - and thus efficacious in their purpose. The mandala adds nothing new to the experience of Asian communities but redirects effort towards existing cultural orientations. In effect, it is a conceptual device for refining Western technostructures in ways more meaningful to the needs and expectations of Asian societies. There is nothing to prevent the 'security mandala' from being applied to other regions with differing cosmologies. After all, despite its Asian - particularly Indian and Tibetan - associations, the symbolism of the mandala is a cross-cultural phenomenon. The focus in this paper, however, will be on the Asian region.

At its best, a 'regional security architecture' is a metaphor for building security in an inclusive system. It builds *with* others rather than *against* others, within an institutionally mediated framework. The concept thereby presents itself as a saner and safer option to the threat spiral which feeds on its own interactive insecurity of ever heightening threat perceptions. The phenomenon of a threat spiral is a familiar one. One state's defensive armour is perceived by its neighbour to be a cloak for offensive intent, instigating a 'defence build-up' on the part of the neighbour. This action, in turn, causes a similar response in the first state which now perceives itself to be lagging behind in defensive capability. From this classic condition of reinforced suspicion, in which communication becomes a misguided and inflammatory affair, have issued expensive arms races, the deterrent logic of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), and the pathologies of exclusion. Such pathologies refer not only to a propensity for demonising the enemy, but also to the seemingly innocuous act of referring to the United States of America as 'US' or designating it, 'the West'. With 'US' there is, from habit of recent history, an oppositional 'them' - first the Germans and Japanese, then the Soviets, and now possibly the People's Republic of China, Islam, and an unruly South. Indeed, with the unitary 'West' must come the third worldly 'Rest'.² How often do Westerners, and those who are politically Westernised, speak of 'we' meaning the West? These are not intended outcomes of terminology usage but implied meanings through habits - or tricks - of thought.

¹ This article was presented as a conference paper to the 'Internationalizing Communities': *Australia, Asia and the World Conference*, Security Architectures panel, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, 27-30 November 1996. Associate Professor Rosita Dellios is Head of International Relations at Bond University and International Relations Analyst for the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies.

² See Kishore Mahbubani, 'The West and the Rest', *The National Interest*, Summer 1992, pp.3-13

Hence one's choice of metaphor requires as much care as selection of empirical claims³ or institutional models.⁴ The metaphor of architecture is a useful one in overcoming destructive, oppositional, modes of thought. One builds security instead of fighting for it. The raw materials of states, their histories and their aspirations are structured into institutional arrangements which allow for 'confidence building', 'transparency' and 'constructive engagement'. These represent a new generation of security terms which have replaced the one-time strategic imperatives of demoralising, surprising and destroying the enemy. That the latter have now largely been adopted (and glamorised⁵) by market fundamentalists, who 'aggressively penetrate' foreign markets as if they were on a military mission, should be borne in mind when contemplating the broader meaning of security. To what avail a sheathed sword when 'trade issues' cut deeply into relations? Fortunately, East Asia's nascent open regionalism mitigates against bleak scenarios of MAD⁶ trade wars.

Contemporary East Asian Security Architectures: Renovation and Renewal

For a region with seemingly few formal multilateral arrangements, it may seem surprising to find that it is indeed made up of a number of overlapping security and economic 'architectures'. They are most readily detected through the proliferation of acronyms describing purposeful constructions, both symbolic and functional. In the security domain there is the formalised but low-profile Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) among Britain, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Australia, dating from 1971. Beyond its practical function of instituting an integrated air defence system,⁷ the 'Arrangements' have taken on a primordial role in underpinning certain expectations of mutual support among the British imperial offspring. They were constructed in the now mythically-rendered modern past. This was a time when ex-colonies were 'nation-building', 'confronting' their legitimacy (Indonesia's 'confrontation' of the new Malaysia on the grounds that it was a neo-colonial construct) and a young superpower was reaching its psycho-military limits in Vietnam.

Indeed, Washington's own 'arrangements' with regional states - in this case, a series of bilateral defence ties rather than a quinary arrangement - stand

³ Such as whether 'balances-of-power' fare better at keeping the peace than, say, empires or consensus-based regional systems.

⁴ An example of an institutional model at the global, regional, and state level, respectively, is the United Nations, the European Union (EU), and the constitutional division of powers in United States of America. Among the equivalent non-institutional models are self-help systems of alliance and deterrence or even conscious non-alignment; voluntary open regionalism; and, at the state level, what the Chinese call *renzhi* (rule by individuals) as distinct from *fazhi* (rule of law). This last example I include as it sheds light on East Asian political traditions of a charismatic centre in state-building as well as regional security systems.

⁵ This is done via the 'wisdom' of Chinese and Japanese strategic thought, especially Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. It is also glamorised as progressive in the sense of a country becoming an 'economy' which is competitive and whose business people are astute at gaining 'market share' - always 'aggressively'.

⁶ The transference of MAD from nuclear war to trade war is made by Segal, who states that: "There are a series of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) relations that link East Asia, the EU and the North Americans in a *de facto* suicide pact in trade. Any attempt to wage a trade war will do serious damage to everyone's economy." (Gerald Segal, *The World Affairs Companion: The Essential One-Volume Guide to World Issues*, 5th edn, Simon & Schuster, London, 1996, p. 39.)

⁷ Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, *Australia's Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990* (2nd edn.), Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 1995, p. 114.

like old foundations at a time of renovation. Typically, it is felt that they are best left undisturbed until the new structure is self-supporting. Not that the old structure should be tested for its support capabilities, lest it reveal its failings. These might include a lack of commitment on the part of any of the parties to participate in a war which could cause offence - diplomatically rather than militarily - to any other party, including the home constituency. Still, attempts to build in the old style are evident from time to time. For example, the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding allows American military access to certain Singaporean air and port facilities. In 1996, Australia deepened its military relations with the United States to the extent that it was criticised for behaving in a provocative fashion to Chinese sensibilities. China's concern was that the United States, in classical pincer strategy, was using Australia and Japan as "two crab-claws" to encircle and contain China.⁸

The more recent 1990s ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)⁹ represents the emergence of an innovative regional architecture with 'ASEANised' features. As with any innovation, it has its detractors. China's 'missile diplomacy' with Taiwan in 1995-1996 has served as a case in point of ARF's alleged ineptitude but, at the same time, the USA's assumed indispensability. In other words, the arguments for non-intervention versus intervention - whether through words or actions - are at issue in defining an effective security architecture. Also at issue is agency - or who caused what to happen to whom. This is not entirely clear. Were American aircraft carriers the agents of stability? Or the deliberate absence of Thai, Malaysian, Indonesian and other Southeast Asian warships in the vicinity of Taiwan? The careful avoidance of condemnatory statements directed at Beijing? Was agency to be found (and worked with) within the Chinese world, rather than through deterrent action outside it?

Flowing on from this, differences in the assessment of what constitutes a security threat, and how it ought to be approached, also help define the type of security architecture put in place. That the American bilateral security arrangements were not activated in the Taiwan situation, nor are likely to be in almost any situation short of major war, is a telling comment on the power of non-action. Had they been, these primordial defence arrangements would have ceased to function. To reconstitute a Napoleonism, 'Let the American alliances sleep, for when they wake they will face China.'¹⁰ The prospect of Japan or Korea or Thailand joining forces with the American armada against China is as implausible as the opposite scenario - an emergence of an 'armchair' ARF taking a spectator role in regional security maintenance.

To the contrary, it has already produced, in a proactive fashion, a gathering of defence planners called the Forum for Defence Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region. This forum met for the first time in October 1996 and in a

⁸ The crab analogy was used in pro-government *People's Daily* in August 1996. Another influential newspaper, the *Guangming Daily*, also likened Australia to a parrot, in the sense of parroting Washington's foreign policy. (Cited in Greg Sheridan, 'Caught in the Middle', *The Weekend Australian*, 16-17 November 1996, p. 25. See also Robert Garran, 'US Joint War Games an Affront to China', *The Australian*, 15 October 1996, p. 9.)

⁹ It is a 21-member group made up of the 7 ASEAN states; plus Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, United States, Russia, China, Laos, PNG, Cambodia, India and Burma. It met for the first time in July 1994. While a comparatively large group is involved, it is being held under the auspices of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Therefore ASEAN has become a facilitator of a multilateral security regime in the region.

¹⁰ The original warning is: 'Let the Chinese dragon sleep, for when she wakes she will shake the world.'

location which could be described as the pacifist heart of late 20th century East Asian civilisation - Japan. The new forum comprises representatives from each of the ASEAN countries, Cambodia, Laos, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, European Union (EU), Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the United States, and Canada. Designed to enhance defence cooperation among the members, it is viewed as a means by which defence authorities may "deepen their shared trust through dialogue and direct interaction, thereby enhancing the transparency of their armaments and defence policies".¹¹

ARF (with its defence planners offshoot) represents a 'soft-edge' security architecture in contrast to the institutionally 'hard-edge' North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), whose identity as a military alliance is never in doubt. This identity may have doubtful outcomes, of course. European uncertainty over how to relate as a NATO entity to a post-Cold War Eastern Europe, and Russian suspicion of an expanding NATO, are the more common manifestations of the pitfalls of a strong sense of boundary-definition in a security design. ARF differs also from NATO's more enlightened relative, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, the 1994 incarnation of the CSCE - Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). This organisation seeks to address the sources of conflict rather than the symptoms. ARF values the preventive approach also; however it is not so primly prepared for the task, as the following observation indicates:

[OSCE's] operational structure, non-existent in 1990, now includes a secretariat in Vienna, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in The Hague, a parliamentary assembly in Copenhagen and a Prague sub-office of the secretariat.¹²

OSCE reflects the European preference for working within a clear structure (as evident in the set-up of the EU), much as ARF reflects the 'ASEAN Way' of developing cooperative relations first. Hence:

As a sequel to the Bangkok Declaration [of 1967 establishing ASEAN], development and institutionalization took place gradually. The principle behind this was that the process is more important than the structure. It was not until the Bali Summit of 1976, that means almost ten years after it started, that the ASEAN countries came to an agreement on further regional cooperation and decided on the installation of a permanent secretariat.¹³

While the architectural metaphor goes well with the language of structures, it may not suit the relational processes advanced by the ASEAN Way. These relational processes are also structured, but far more subtly than the institutional-bureaucratic model permits. For this reason, APEC (Asia-Pacific

¹¹ Hideo Usui, director-general of the Japan Defence Agency, in his opening speech to the Regional Defence forum's inaugural meeting in Tokyo, quoted in Robert Garran, 'Tokyo Forum Covers Security Hot Spots', *The Australian*, 30 October 1996, p. 11.

¹² 'The OSCE: Theory and Practice', IISS, *Strategic Comments*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 31 January 1996.

¹³ Leo M. van der Mey, 'Securing Asia: Peace in Regional or Sub-Regional Parts?', conference paper, International Studies Association-Japan Association of International Relations Joint Convention, *Globalism, Regionalism and Nationalism: Asia in Search of Its Role in the 21st Century*, Makuhari, Japan, 20-22 September 1996, p. 18.

Economic Cooperation)¹⁴ is not an organisation like OSCE or a community like EC (let alone a union like EU, or even an agreement as is the case with the North American Free Trade Agreement - NAFTA). It is a 'cooperation', a non-binding forum with a small secretariat in Singapore. By being non-binding, it is not endangering its commitment to free trade by 2020 at the latest - a feat which is by any measure considerable. Rather, as was said of ASEAN, the idea was to "make every member country feel comfortable".¹⁵ APEC is modelled on the ASEAN human-centred etiquette: peer group pressure, voluntary agreements, recognition of the crucial role of leaders' meetings, respect for the individual integrity of each member, trust and a sense of responsibility (or 'face'). It has not been necessary so far to 'get it all in writing' with regard to each member's trade liberalisation promises. Instead, like donations to temples, members commit themselves to Individual Action Plans saying what they intend to do. The weight of responsibility falls, in effect, on the individual member. Of course, the encouragement of this type of 'individualism' represents the polar opposite of the mercantilist exclusionary view which sees trade as a predatory game of winner and loser.¹⁶ The former recognises the win-win nature of inclusiveness; the latter provides the seedbed for MAD trade wars and an environment for pseudo Sun Tzu practitioners.¹⁷

Attempts to change APEC - or, rather, to change it too rapidly and without proper regard for the consultative process - could result in a outflow of energies into the Malaysian-sponsored East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). In this situation, APEC would be left resembling an unfinished office tower amid a bustling street market of local traders. In other words, concepts that prove too expensive (for economic, political or cultural reasons) can be abandoned, while those that function well need no formal acknowledgement. In this regard, EAEC is worth closer inspection.

The East Asia Economic Caucus was first proposed by Malaysia's Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, in 1990. It was then called the East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) and was designed to promote cooperation and economic prosperity in East Asia - but without the American members on the Pacific rim as well as Australia and New Zealand. Dr Mahathir defended his proposal on the grounds that he was "finding intolerable the self-centred negotiating stance of Western nations, which seemed to ignore the voices of developing countries seeking an early Uruguay Round [of the GATT] agreement".¹⁸

As one analyst, David Camroux explained: "Mahathir's proposal of an EAEC was initially prompted by concerns over the consequences of a failure to

¹⁴ Formed in 1989, APEC comprises 18 'economies' (or 16 states plus 2 'economies' in the form of Taiwan and Hong Kong), these being: the six ASEAN countries of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei; the 'three Chinas' of People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong; Japan and South Korea; the Oceania countries of Australia, New Zealand and PNG; and the American countries of USA, Canada, Mexico, and Chile. APEC represents a combined population of more than 2 billion.

¹⁵ From an interview with ASEAN director-general, Datuk Abdul Majid Ahmad Khan, in Sher Habib, 'Developing an Asean Consciousness', *Sunday Star*, 23 June 1996.

¹⁶ See Alan Wood, 'Free Trade is Part of the Parcel', *The Australian*, 22 November 1996, p. 33.

¹⁷ I refer here to business devotees of the wisdom-of-the-East style war manuals, particularly Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. Sun Tzu's philosophy is popularly contrived to fit the economic warfare mindset.

¹⁸ In *Nikkei Weekly*, and quoted in Robert Garran, 'Mahathir Launches East Asia Grouping', *The Australian*, 6 February 1996, p. 14.

reach agreement in the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations. It has rational market-driven causes and is tactically designed to anchor China into a larger body."¹⁹ Camroux explains that the interpretation about China is not his own speculation but that he owes it to "a senior government advisor in Kuala Lumpur".²⁰

Launched implicitly as a rival to APEC, itself launched the previous year, it became controversial as an Asians-only club, and was left unrealised in view of APEC's stronger support base. Subsequently the idea of EAEC was kept alive by being presented as a grouping within APEC. APEC's popularity over EAEC derived from the need to include the United States for reasons of market access to East Asia's global traders. Japan and Indonesia clearly addressed this need to keep the Americans in an Asian grouping. There was also the perceived *strategic* role of APEC in "providing reassurance to the countries of East Asia of continuing American engagement across the Pacific".²¹

In February of 1996, 10 East Asian foreign ministers met in Phuket, Thailand. They came from the ASEAN seven, plus Japan, China, and South Korea. These became known as the seven-plus-three-group. Their purpose in meeting was to prepare for the first Asia-Europe Summit (ASEM) the following month. As it turned out, the summit process not only excluded Australia but also India, which would surely have had a more substantial claim to an Asian identity. Indeed, the European delegation recognised this by attending a meeting in India after ASEM in Bangkok. These considerations suggest that the Bangkok meeting was really an EAEC-Europe summit.

According to one Japanese analyst this is precisely what has been happening. Eiichi Furukawa, executive director of the Japan Centre for International Strategies, believes that EAEC came to fruition under the disguise of the Phuket meeting and that Japan participated because it hoped to maximise its diplomacy through a 'dual-track policy'²² - one track to APEC and the other to EAEC. This interpretation is also supported by Sheldon W. Simon, who says that: "In fact, an EAEC is informally functioning, and it held a meeting with European Union members in the spring of 1996."²³

While EAEC shows prize-winning potential in the contest for *affective* architectures in Asia-Pacific (or 'hearts and minds' architectures rather than instrumental ones), it has been criticised as divisive, diversionary and unconvincing in its rationale; in all, dysfunctional. Richard L. Wilson pronounced it to be:

. . . in direct conflict with one of APEC's primary purposes - to provide a mechanism for encouraging the United States and Japan to be mindful of regional concerns when trying to resolve their bilateral trade and investment frictions. (APEC could play a similar role in future U.S.-

¹⁹ David Camroux, 'Looking East' . . . and Inwards: Internal Factors in Malaysian Foreign Relations During the Mahathir Era, 1981-1994, Australia-Asia Papers No. 72, CSAAR, Griffith University, October 1994, p. 31.

²⁰ Ibid., footnote 27.

²¹ Patrick Walters, 'Expansion May Destroy APEC, Says Former PM', *The Australian*, 1 November 1996, p. 6.

²² Garran, 'Mahathir Launches East Asia Grouping'.

²³ Sheldon W. Simon, 'Security, Economic liberalism, and Democracy: Asian Elite Perceptions of Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Values', *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 7, No. 2, September 1996, p. 19.

China trade relations.) In short, the EAEC appears more likely to retard than advance trade liberalisation in the region.²⁴

EAEC's perceived failings do not imply that APEC has emerged unscathed by comparison. Far from it, and despite the attractions of its style, APEC is often considered doomed if it does not change from "a transitional institution, a hodgepodge of semiformal committees and working groups that are sustained by a shared desire for continued economic growth . . ." to "an international organisation that satisfies the needs of the region it was established to serve"²⁵ - or, more simply expressed, from "a consultative to a negotiating institution".²⁶ Thus, rather than suffering as a regional grouping if it were to institutionalise, the argument here is that it will suffer if it does not. Such an impasse need not be as serious as it might seem. A switch in metaphors may provide better grounds for moving forward. I have in mind that equally constructive symbol, the mandala.

Mandala-Building

Architectures are about building, but so are mandalas. In Asian societies, both past and present, mandalas build on consciousness. In modern Western thought, by comparison, they remain largely unconscious. The pioneering Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung found mandalas to be therapeutic in reintegrating the personality. Mandalas suggested themselves naturally in his patients' dreams or artistic creations.²⁷ At this stage, and in view of the conventions of our strategic culture which demand disciplinary relevance, the question cannot help but arise: How does this personal and private experience relate to security issues in international relations? To which one might reply, how do 'architectures' relate? Indeed, this second question is the clue for the utility of both metaphors, but with mandalas having an added explanatory value for the *affective* dimension of architectures in Asian security efforts. Architecture remains a conventional marker of civilisational grandeur. 'Dreaming', shamanism and myth-making, by comparison, have not been designated 'wonders of the world'. Civilisations are still remembered primarily through their monumental material culture, (admittedly reinforced by other 'preservable' products in the form of writing and works of art).

Upon closer examination, however, all the great architectures - without exception - signify a metaphysical quality. In Greece it was harmony of form, a consciousness of the ideal. The Egyptian pyramids were royal tombs designed to connect with a cosmic afterlife. Also built for the purpose of royal burial was the Taj Mahal - but from the intimate perspective of a king dedicated to his queen.

²⁴ Richard L. Wilson, 'Subregional Groupings Within APEC', *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 6, No. 1, April 1995, p. 40.

²⁵ Donald C. Hellmann, 'APEC and the Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific: New Myths, Old Realities', *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 6, No. 1, April 1995, p. 35.

²⁶ Charles E. Morrison, 'The Future of APEC: Institutional and Structural Issues', *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 6, No. 1, April 1995, p. 82.

²⁷ See C. G. Jung, *Mandala Symbolism* (trans. R. F. C. Hull), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1972.

Architecture of Meaning

When a meaning is extracted from a physical structure, so that its "magnificence is far outweighed by its significance",²⁸ it is possible to shift the emphasis to an architecture of meaning, thereby exploring other structured modalities - including myths, sound (music, mantras), and the cosmograms popularly known as mandalas. Here, in this paper, the concentration is on mandala. It is Sanskrit for circle, a word I have chosen not arbitrarily but from a tradition of regional politics and contemplative practices in Asian societies.

Mandala as Regional Politics

The *Arthashastra* or *Treatise on Polity* (attributed to Kautilya, chief minister to the founder of the Mauryan Empire, circa 325 BC), described the regional security architecture of ancient India as a mandala of *rajyas* - a 'Circle of States'.²⁹ 'State' is only an approximation for *rajya*. Some scholars prefer to translate it more fluidly as "rule or regime"³⁰ pertaining to kingdoms of that time and place. The mandala inter-state or inter-regime system of Mauryan India has been widely misunderstood as a mandala of fear, a Machiavellian geopolitical exercise in which deterrence and compellence were the staples of statecraft. Certainly, these regional mandalas *operated* through geopolitically-inscribed relationships of power, but to understand the motivating force of such a political structure it is necessary to recognise mandala politics at a systemic level. Mandala politics describes a system created through attraction to a charismatic centre. The centre with its spheres of influence relied upon the astute maintenance of broader economic, diplomatic and status relations. As expressed by Charles Higham:

In Indian political terms, the doctrine of the *mandala* determined the relationships between rulers whose territories were visualised as circles. . . . There is no English equivalent word to provide a neat translation, but essentially in political terms a *mandala* describes a political apparatus fluid in terms of territory and therefore without fixed frontiers. It centres on the court of the overlord, whose sway turns on attracting deference and obligations from other lords in his orbit through his ability to win allies and overtake enemies.³¹

Another authority, I. W. Mabbett, also explains the mandala system in terms of a powerful centre.

The aspiring *cakravartin* [the 'universal' emperor] is at the centre of a circle, *mandala*, whose constituents are *rajyas*. . . . Within the *mandala*, neighbouring regimes are automatically enemies, and it is the ambition of the ruler to secure, not the destruction of other *rajyas* (which would

²⁸ Nadia Julien, *The Mammoth Dictionary of Symbols*, Robinson, London, 1996, p. 339, in relation to pyramids.

²⁹ Kautilya, *Arthashastra* (trans. R. Shamasastri), Mysore Printing and Publishing House, Mysore, 1967. For an analysis with applications to the present, see R. James Ferguson, 'Complexity in the Centre: The New Southeast Asian Mandala', *The Culture Mandala*, Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Bond University, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1994, pp. 16-40.

³⁰ I. W. Mabbett, 'Kingship at Angkor', *Journal of the Siam Society*, Vol 66, No. 2, 1978 (pp. 1-58), p. 36.

³¹ Charles Higham, *The Archaeology of Mainland Southeast Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 240.

cause the *mandala* to cease to exist), but their submission and homage to his glory . . . ³²

Thus the politics of patronage and charisma prevailed in the 'Circle of States'. But far from being bureaucratised states, with fixed boundaries and designated populations, mandalas were processes which entailed group dynamics toward persuasion, cohesion and 'flexible consensus'³³ in the service of a prevailing politico-economic order. Certainly, the 'military option' existed then as it does now; but it does not help explain how the mandala system (or how today's system) was validated. The 'Indianised' states of Southeast Asia, as they have been known,³⁴ were also referred to as mandalas by Western scholars.³⁵ This was because the Indian political system with its associated vocabulary had been widely adopted by these 'states', much like post-colonial Asia modelled itself on the European state system. Of course the Chinese world was also a mandala formation, with many of the Indianised states of Southeast Asia, which were operating as mandalas in themselves, being part of the then Greater China mandala. An outstanding example is the Sumatra-based maritime mandala of Srivijaya (7th to the 13th centuries). It had its own tributaries as well as being a tributary of China. As such, Srivijaya had the right to trade with China and so surpassed its rivals as a maritime power.

The search for parallels between current consultative fora in eastern Asia - the 'architectures' of ASEAN, ARF, APEC, EAEC and their derivatives - and mandala processes of old, is not the prime concern of this paper.³⁶ Despite apparent similarities, political mandalas are not as compelling as the contemplative variety. This is because the political version equates, in my view, with second stage Daoism in Chinese strategic thought.³⁷ (See Figure 1.) Here is to be found the application of knowledge, in the form of instrumental action, moving past first stage Daoism (which entails retreat from the human world in order to understand the 'unchanging laws of change', the *dao*). It is refined somewhat when, besides pursuing the

³² Mabbett, 'Kingship at Angkor', p. 36. Note the resemblance to the Chinese tribute system which was also inclusive of potential enemies. The Chinese sought to convert these potential enemies to allies largely through the lure of access to the China trade, which the Chinese state controlled.

³³ Here I borrow an Indonesian term employed in the context of APEC. It implies that consensus "does not necessarily require unanimity" (Morrison, 'The Future of APEC', p. 82).

³⁴ See G. Coedès, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia* (ed. Walter F. Vella, trans. Susan Brown Cowing), Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1968.


³⁵ Mabbett, 'Kingship at Angkor'; Higham, *The Archaeology of Mainland Southeast Asia*, Ch. 5; and O. W. Wolters, *History, Culture and Religion in Southeast Asian Perspectives*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1982.

³⁶ Application of the mandala metaphor to contemporary regional and global politics has been developed by the members of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies at Bond University, specifically: Martin Lu, 'Sino-British Disputes Over Hong Kong in the Light of the Chinese Culture Mandala', *The Culture Mandala*, Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Bond University, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1994, pp. 3-15; R. James Ferguson, 'Complexity in the Centre: The New Southeast Asian Mandala', *The Culture Mandala*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1994, pp. 3-15; Rosita Dellios 'Mandala-Building in International Relations as a Paradigm for Peace', *Social Alternatives*, Vol. 15, No. 3, July 1996, pp. 58-63; and Rosita Dellios, "How May the World be at Peace?": Idealism as Realism in Chinese Strategic Culture', in Valerie M. Hudson (ed.), *Culture and Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, (forthcoming, Jan. 1997).

³⁷ Discussed in two research papers published by the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia: Rosita Dellios, 'Chinese Strategic Culture - Part 1: The Heritage from the Past', Research Paper No. 1, April 1994; and 'Chinese Strategic Culture - Part 2: Virtue and Power', Research Paper No. 2, November 1994.

instrumental domain of the *artha* (managing the political economy), it includes the higher level of *rajadharma* whereby the king performs his protective duty in society by upholding the moral order. The *rajadharma* is a Hindu conception which I locate between second and third phase Daoism. It has both 'artha-type action'³⁸ and a higher order morality (approximating *de* or virtue in Chinese).

Fig. 1: Cross-Cultural Conceptual Components in Mandala-Building



By comparison, the contemplative mandala finds equivalence with the more globally-minded (and thus nationally transcendent) third stage Daoism. Here may be found the idea of *datong* (greater community in the Chinese conceptual system) in which diverse peoples are conscious of their essential unity.³⁹ Also located here is the Hindu concept of *nishkama karma* (desireless action). The contemplative mandala, moreover, has more in common with the Theravada Buddhist *dharmaraja* - the 'righteous ruler', whose *dharma* (righteousness) is encompassed by the higher *dharma* of cosmic law. Thus: "The symbol of dharma in political life for the Buddhists was the wheel (*cakka*), which replaces the scepter or rod (*danda*), the symbol of authority in the . . . Kautilyan doctrines."⁴⁰ This is the same wheel represented on the Indian flag.

Political mandalas, of course, are useful. However, while they may make 'security architectures' more cohesive, they do so primarily in a self-interested way. The object of architectures in the open regionalism mode is inclusiveness; or, as stated in the opening paragraph, security (including economic) *with* not *against* others. The need to focus on another kind of mandala - the contemplative variety - clearly arises.

This may seem a circuitous route to the same premise. From another perspective, however, 'regional security architectures' are the long way around to understanding mandala-building. It is this other perspective which should concern us, for it is a perspective drawn from cosmologies indigenous to the site of construction. It may be postulated that the mandala

³⁸ A term used by S. J. Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand Against a Historical Background*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, p. 25.

³⁹ This is elaborated upon in Dellios, "How May the World be at Peace?": Idealism as Realism in Chinese Strategic Culture'.

⁴⁰ Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Renouncer*, pp. 41-42.

metaphor could prove more acceptable and accessible to participants - and thus efficacious in its purpose. The mandala adds nothing new to the experience of Asian communities but redirects effort towards existing cultural orientations. In effect, it is a conceptual device for refining Western technostructures in ways more meaningful to the needs and expectations of Asian societies. There is nothing to prevent the 'security mandala' from being applied to other regions with differing cosmologies. After all, despite its Indo-Tibetan refinements, the symbolism of the mandala is a cross-cultural phenomenon. It is to be found in the Mexican 'Great Calendar Stone' or a stained-glass window of a Christian cathedral. The mandala metaphor also subsumes architectures - Borobudur and Angkor Wat are mandalas in stone; mandala is equally an object of impermanence (mandalas of coloured sand) as it is, in Jungian understanding, a dormant or active presence of the human psyche. Its pervasiveness suggests an ease of application within culturally specific sites. It is for this reason that the language of the *dao* and the *dharma* have been engaged. These are equally pertinent for the Malay world whose pre-Islamic cultures have not been discarded, as readily affirmed by any comparison between Arab and Malay or Javanese culture. Even their Islamic (particularly Sufi) cultures, are likely to be more at ease with mandala thinking than institutional constructs. It may be concluded that concepts of security are best translated into a more familiar language, one which has "a rich and extensive literature on the geometrical and topographical 'formulas' (mandala) usually fused with cosmological principles, which provided the design for the construction of communities . . .",⁴¹ much as the Graeco-Roman and Judeo-Christian formulations constructed the West.

Mandala as a Contemplative Practice

I now turn to the Buddhist and Hindu mandalas as an aid to contemplation, from which construction of a 'regional security mandala' may be inferred. Guiseppe Tucci's *The Theory and Practice of the Mandala* identifies two basic properties of a mandala. It serves as: (1) a means of integration; and (2) a map or plan.⁴² The integrative function is summarised by J. E. Cirlot, as follows:

In short, the mandala is, above all, an image and a synthesis of the dualistic aspects of differentiation and unification, of variety and unity, the external and the internal, the diffuse and the concentrated. It excludes disorder and all related symbolisms, because, by its very nature, it must surmount disorder.⁴³

This "struggle to achieve order - even within disorder"⁴⁴ is clearly evident in the quest for consensus politics, 'unity-in-diversity' thinking, and the presence of 'culture-bearing mandarins' (to borrow Robert Hefner's term),⁴⁵ within contemporary mandala architectures. This helps explain a

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁴² Guiseppe Tucci, *The Theory and Practice of the Mandala* (trans. from the Italian by Alan Houghton Brodrick), Rider & Co., London, 1961, p. 23.

⁴³ J. E. Cirlot, *A Dictionary of Symbols* (trans. from the Spanish by Jack Sage), 2nd edn, Routledge, London, 1971, p. 201.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Robert Hefner, 'Reimagined Community: A Social History of Muslim Education in Pasuruan, East Java', in Charles F. Keyes, Laurel Kendall and Helen Hardacre (eds), *Asian Visions of Authority:*

movement variously known as Asian Values, Asian Way, Pacific Way, ASEAN Way, and the 'Asianisation of Asia'.⁴⁶ There is a desire to integrate the various spiritual traditions of Eastern Asia into an Asian Way with common values across the various traditions, primary among them being Confucian, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist. The task of integration is led by a learned or mandarin class of leadership. The old generation of instrumentalist practitioners, who were also operating at something akin to the Vedic level of *rajadharma* (the king who is dutiful to his society) - China's Deng Xiaoping, Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad and Indonesia's Suharto come to mind - are gradually giving way to the more integrated, *dharmaraja*-inclined, leadership found in the successor generation. While no modern-day Asoka⁴⁷ appears on the horizon, there are candidates within the conditions of the emerging 21st century international system. The 'exemplars' here, to my mind, are Burma's democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, the Dalai Lama as well as the post-Deng leadership in China. Jiang Zemin and his team are of a cooler, more reflective disposition compared to previous PRC leaders. They may not have perfected the means of persuading people to accept a 'spiritual civilisation', in which China's cultural heritage is brought into service to fill the 'moral vacuum' left by Communism, but it is a more sustainable alternative than the heady Dengist slogan, 'To Get Rich Is Glorious'.⁴⁸ As for Dr Anwar, he promotes Asian Values without behaving confrontationally towards the West. Indeed, he prefers to synthesise.⁴⁹ Aung San Suu Kyi and the Dalai Lama come closest to a *dharmaraja* ideal, and hence remain unrealised as leaders in a world which is far from ideal. This very deficiency, of course, if read from a *yin-yang* perspective which informs Daoism, suggests a change in polarity. Like the mandala's purpose in finding order, so too the Daoist approach seeks harmony. It reputedly does so in the manner of water seeking its level - naturally. Of pertinence is the teaching that change is caused by the interaction of *yin* and *yang* forces - the polarities of negative and positive, feminine and masculine, defensive and expansive - and that only when the two are in harmony may security be experienced. In strategic terms, this is not a mechanistic balance-of-power but a balance or harmony of relationships based on perpetual interaction - or change. Under such circumstances it is possible to describe 'strategic fluidity' as stability. Thus East Asia, in entering a period of 'strategic fluidity' after the 'certainties' of the Cold War came to an end, is actually finding its balance within a new set of circumstances.

Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1994, p. 76.

⁴⁶ See, for example, Kishore Mahbubani, 'The Pacific Way', *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 1995; Yoichi Funabashi, 'The Asianisation of Asia', *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 1993; 'Developing an Asean Consciousness', *Sunday Star* (Malaysian), 23 June 1996; and, for an article useful for its review of the literature, Alan Dupont, 'Is There an Asian Way?', *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 13-33.

⁴⁷ King Asoka ruled a unified India as a Buddhist polity in the 3rd century BC. His rule aspired to a golden age for peace and the expression of a just world order.


⁴⁸ See Kathy Chen, 'Jiang Latches On to Spiritual Values', *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 14 September 1996, p. 1; Matt Forney, 'Party Line: Beijing Plenum Backs Jiangist Ideology', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 October 1996, p. 28.

⁴⁹ His thinking is represented in a number of public speeches and writings, including: 'Reconstruction of Civilization', *New Straits Times*, 15 July 1996, p. 10; and 'Towards Global Peace, Understanding', *New Straits Times*, 14 March 1995, p. 14.

Mandala Mapping

At this point it is worth turning to that other property of the mandala, noted above, that it acts as a map or plan. Usually a mandala is approached from the outside, circling inwards. From the East Asian perspective, the periphery may be viewed as the domain of barbarism where chaos thrives and 'petty men'⁵⁰ prosper. Here reside *economic animal*, *cultural amnesia*, and *militarism* in its various forms. (See Figure 2.)

Fig. 2: Formative Design of East Asian Security Mandala



jen = human heartedness

li = rules of proper conduct (outer expression of *jen*)

wen = civility (as distinct from *wu*, martiality)

With regard to the first, *economic animal* is frequently depicted in the international *lingua franca* of economics as a dragon or tiger. These are not negative images in themselves, but the fear in East Asia is that a morally unbridled modernisation could unleash their aspect of cruel strength or unmediated supernatural power ('economic miracles' to the hopeful). The absence of 'values' - more specifically, Asian Values which 'are actually 'universal' (of which more will be said below) - results in opportunities for greed, corruption and a *jen*⁵¹-deficient environment. The fear that society would come under the sway of the three-clawed dragon rather than the humanised five-clawed variety; or that the tiger could manifest its strength through voraciousness, lies at the heart of this matter. *Economic animal* is feared because it is thought to represent an unbalanced condition as well as one that is beneath human dignity. Compounding this combination of the misaligned and the degenerate is an everpresent possibility of its

⁵⁰ *Xiaoren* in the Confucian sense of a person who has not cultivated a moral character.

⁵¹ Human-heartedness, the key concept of Confucianism.

actualisation. In other words, humans are capable of being other than human when their moral guard has been lowered or inadequately formed. That the base line for social operations is taken to be a human one, in the sense of humane and civilised comportment, reflects an optimism about 'human nature' which precludes a society accommodating itself to life as *economic animal*. Illustrative of this disposition are tiger myths in Southeast Asian societies which tell of some tigers being humans in disguise; misguided humans perhaps in their (unnatural) ambitions - but humans nonetheless.⁵²

It is therefore not surprising, within this context, that Malaysia and Singapore have led the debate on the revival of Asian Values; for that other 'demon' on the periphery of East Asia's security mandala - *cultural amnesia* - is closely related to fear of society degenerating into *economic animal*. *Cultural amnesia* is induced by a prologued commodification and bureaucratisation of human relations. It is characteristic of the present age which has been called 'late modernity' or 'postmodernity'. It is a time marked, in the words of one interpreter of the age, by "an increasingly fragmented and culturally diverse social reality which at the same time is increasingly global in its technological and bureaucratic organisation".⁵³ Small wonder, then, that such a thing as 'cultural nationalism' should erupt from time to time, not as a reactionary backlash to the latest progressive forces, but as a means toward reintegrating society. John Hutchinson views cultural nationalism as a regenerative phenomenon:

... it puts forward a mobile view of history that evokes a golden age of achievement as a critique of the present, with the hope of propelling the community to even higher stages of development. Indeed, at times of crises generated by the modernization process, cultural nationalists play the role of moral innovators proposing alternative indigenous models of progress.⁵⁴

It is from this vantagepoint that the appearance of Asian Values or the Asian Way begins to make sense. Consider, for example, this excerpt from Suk Shin Choi's opening address to the *First Asian-Pacific Cultural Symposium*, held in Taipei in 1986:

Sharing the common background of history, which may well be characterised by the "late comers in development," we have been in the vortex of transition from a traditional way of life to a modern way of life.

We are still in a massive modernization process. During this process we have been too eager to adapt ourselves to modernization, and we have relegated our tradition to obscurity.

⁵² See Jan Knappert, *Pacific Mythology: An Encyclopedia of Myth and Legend*, The Aquarian Press, London, 1992, pp. 299-300.

⁵³ Helen Olivieri, 'Postmodernity and Notions of "the Self": Developing a Working Account of 'the Self' for Field Research', conference paper, *Regulating Identities Conference*, organised by Queensland University of Technology, Queensland, 3-4 October 1996, p. 2. See also Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Polity Press, Oxford, 1991.

⁵⁴ John Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism*, Fontana Press, London, 1994, p. 41.

During the process, we have also experienced a crisis of identity arising from conflict between the old and new values. We are yet to outgrow that crisis.

Apart from nostalgia and curiosity about our past, we have a duty to preserve our heritage to bequeath to our posterity. I think we may as well exert our efforts toward reevaluating our heritage in a modern context and toward popularising our trove of wisdom for the younger generations, as well as for ourselves. Indeed, it is no less a worthwhile effort to learn things old than to learn things new.⁵⁵

Ten years later the effort continues with such Malaysian-led meetings as the *Dialogue on the Response of Muslims and Chinese Civilizations to the Challenges of the Contemporary World*, opened by Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, in August 1996; and another which he hosted in March of the previous year, entitled *Islam and Confucianism: A Civilisational Dialogue*.⁵⁶

In an effort to continue to allow these 'moral innovators' to continue to speak for themselves, an editorial on the above (1995) conference in the *New Straits Times* is worth quoting, for it also explains what is meant by Asian Values:

By and large, civilisations tend to embody similar values which shows that no civilisation can claim superior status. In seeking to deflect what is perceived to be the excesses of Western civilisation, it has served regional governments well to draw upon the Eastern heritage where the popular ethics with their accent on family, community, education, thrift and diligence are emphasised to bring out a productive workforce and a society grounded in strong moral and ethical values. Values such as that expounded in Xiao (filial) and Islam which place great emphasis on respect, tolerance and patience have been brought forth to deflect what is perceived to be Western decadence which runs contrary to Eastern values. It is a reaction caused by a need to sieve the unwanted elements of Western culture.⁵⁷

Critics, needless to say, abound.⁵⁸ Most counter-argue that 'Asia' is too diverse to claim a common set of values; that its economic success may be explained for reasons other than culture; that Asian Values were concocted to justify authoritarian government, or could be conveniently used by those regimes; and that many so-called Western values such as democracy and human rights may be found in Asian philosophical traditions.

It is true that diversity within what we call Asia exists, but perhaps more in terms of diversity within a family than diversity among strangers. As David

⁵⁵ Suk Shin Choi, opening address, *Proceedings of the First Asian-Pacific Cultural Symposium*, organised by South Korea's Cultural and Social Centre for the Asian and Pacific Region, and Taiwan's Pacific Cultural Foundation, Taipei, 18-21 May 1986.

⁵⁶ See *New Straits Times*, 14 March 1995, pp. 1, 6, 14.

⁵⁷ 'The Best from Two Civilisations', editorial, *New Straits Times*, 15 March 1995, p. 12.

⁵⁸ See, for example the following diverse sources: Chris Patten's and Alan Dupont's articles under the heading, 'The Asian Values Debate', *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 5-33; Jonathan Power, 'Why the "Asian Way" Is Not Uniquely Asian: A Western Viewpoint', *New Straits Times*, 3 August 1996, p. 12; and Loong Wong, 'Asian Values', *Forum*, Centre for Citizenship and Human Rights (Deakin University, Geelong), No. 7, September 1996, p. 7.

Hitchcock found when surveying Asians (in this case, Thais) about an Asian Way:

"you know, our Mother was India and our Father China"; but Thais speak of a "Thai way."⁵⁹

As for economic success being explained in non-cultural terms, this is difficult to prove or disprove. It is perhaps more difficult to exclude culture from the combination of success factors. Not only is culture likely to be present but its role could well be that of catalyst. Here the Biblical refrain: "Where there is no vision, the people perish" (Proverbs 29:18) comes to mind. The next criticism of Asian values, that they are a strategy for regime legitimisation, is not without some validity. Perhaps in this case there should be a differentiation between Asian Values and Asian State Values. However, to call the movement a "fig-leaf"⁶⁰ for purportedly oppressive governments is to trivialise it. Meanwhile, to concede that it is 'well-meaning', but is subject to opportunistic appropriation by governments of the day, is like blaming a woman's beauty for a man's unsolicited attentions. That Asian Values are also found in other traditions, is true; but to what extent? Education, for example, appears to be valued more consistently and to a higher degree in some cultures than in others. Sinologist Pierre Ryckmans made this point in the 1996 Boyer Lectures, a point which also reinforces the role of culture in economic success:

The prosperity of a modern state is a complex phenomenon that can hardly be ascribed to one single factor. Yet there is indeed one common feature that characterises the various so-called 'Confucian' societies, but it should be observed that this same feature can also be found in other social or ethnic groups (for instance, some Jewish communities of the Western world) which are equally creative and prosperous, and yet do not represent any connection with the Confucian tradition: and it is the extraordinary importance which these societies all attach to Education.⁶¹

This leads to consideration of the final criticism of the Asian Values movement - that Asian Values are not unique. Interestingly, uniqueness, is not a claim of the movement; universalism is. As Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, quipped: Asian values are universal; European values are European.⁶² Dr Mahathir's attempt to highlight the hypocrisy of his Western critics has a serious side. Anwar Ibrahim, who has long claimed democratic principles to be part of Asian Values, told a Filipino audience in July 1996, on the occasion of the conferment of an honorary Doctorate in Humane Letters on him, that: "As Asia contributes to the world economy and global order, it must actively work toward the reconstruction of global civilisation."⁶³ Academic Chandra Muzaffar also made the point that: "It is important for

⁵⁹ David I. Hitchcock, *Asian Values and the United States: How Much Conflict?*, The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 1994, p. 19.

⁶⁰ Wong, 'Asian Values', p. 7.

⁶¹ Pierre Ryckmans, 1996 *Boyer Lectures*, Lecture 2, ABC Radio National, transcript on <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/boyers/tboyer12.htm>

⁶² Quoted in Bill Tarrant, 'Asia-Europe Summit Reduces Cultural Gap - Mahathir', *Reuters* (Internet access), 2 March 1996.

⁶³ Anwar Ibrahim, 'Reconstruction of Civilization', *New Straits Times*, 15 July 1996, p. 10.

people in the West to realise that what we are talking about also concerns them and their civilisation."⁶⁴

It could well be that the Asian Values movement is especially relevant to the postmodern quest for a certain 'ontological security', whose symptoms are commonly a fixation on identity and identity politics. People who become alienated by the globalising yet fragmenting present, who are freed from the old stereotypes of who they are or should be, are seeking ways of constructing their identities. Some seek it in identifying themselves with a like-minded group (environmentalists, feminists, indigenous groups, and so on); others choose more idiosyncratic trajectories in achieving a sense of integrity in their relations with the world around them. At heart is the recognition that the self is an 'openness', in which many possibilities reside. While this openness may be interpreted as an overwhelming emptiness by those who feel alienated by social conditions of late modernity, it is not necessarily the case when the traditions that inform Asian Values are brought to bear. Indeed, the Daoist and Buddhist concepts of 'emptiness' offer insights into the non-essential self which lead to the positive attribute of *realisation*, rather than its commonplace negative counterpart of *despair*. Indeed, the view of the self as "perpetual production"⁶⁵ sits well with the *yin-yang* 'laws' of unceasing change.

If it appears by now that security has come a long way from the once familiar military-strategic considerations, then the last of the three identified 'demons' on the security mandala's periphery should be mentioned. *Militarism* in its various forms may be viewed most obviously as internal as well as external. Here Burma's SLORC - State Law and Order Restoration Council - comes to mind; so, too, instances of China's brutal past (including the Tiananmen and Tibetan tragedies of recent times); as well as Indonesia's in regard to East Timor, the treatment of the PDI, and a certain domestic addiction to military control. Indeed, *militarism* may be described as the opiate of Asian politics. Thai generals have had difficulty kicking the habit; their propensity for coups was demonstrated as recently as 1992. The brutality of the Marcos era in the Philippines, which was under martial law from 1972 to 1981, culminated in the assassination of a homecoming opposition leader (Benigno Aquino) which swung politics toward the opposite polarity of 'people power'. Taiwan's overly controlled society (38 years of martial law) inflicted by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had become so rigid it would have 'snapped' if it was not for the reforms introduced by Chiang's son, Chiang Ching-kuo. Similarly with South Korea, which was brutalised by the Japanese occupiers in the first half of this century, and by its own generals until 1981. The now ritualised student-riot police enactments of hostile engagement are but a shadow of a repressive past when students were killed as readily, if not as graphically, as they were in Beijing a media generation later. If one is to contemplate scale of *militarism*, the extent to which it grips a whole nation, the notorious 'killing fields' of Cambodia, in the latter 1970s when hundreds of thousands of people died, must be mentioned. Also, about half a million were killed during the Indonesian bloodbath of 1965, which marked the end of one regime and the start of another. Such 'psychic epidemics', as Carl Jung called them,⁶⁶ were no where more evident than during Japan's *militarism* against the rest of East Asia in the 1930s and early 1940s.

⁶⁴ Teach West by Example, Say Scholars', *New Straits Times*, 14 March 1995, p. 6.

⁶⁵ Olivieri, 'Postmodernity and Notions of "the Self"', p. 6.

⁶⁶ Quoted in Sterling Seagrave, *Lords of the Rim*, Bantam Press, London, p. 125.

The demonic character of *militarism* comes not only from a moral perspective found in many cultures but also from a distinctive tradition in Chinese strategic culture. This is the Confucian tradition of valuing *wen* (civility) over *wu* (martiality). There is a common saying among the Chinese, one which goes back many centuries: Good men should never become soldiers as good iron should not be used to make nails. However, times have changed. As one Thai woman astutely observed, sons are saved from destitution by becoming soldiers or monks; daughters become prostitutes.⁶⁷ Such are the upheavals of socio-economic change in East Asia, that they provide a nexus between *economic animal*, *cultural amnesia* and *militarism*. If there were to be a fourth demon, and mandalas as contemporary organisational devices are open to interpretation of how they are to be constituted, then *statism* would have to qualify. It is the institution *par excellence* of human control by dehumanised means. Under the auspices of 'power politics', the state is seen as an end in itself; quite the reverse to the Confucian emphasis on family and society, Daoist anti-statism, and Buddhist pacifism. Militarism finds a generous patron in the institution of the state, which is itself well-served by its possibilities. That European, American and Japanese colonial conquest was enabled by the coercive diplomacy of superior military technology was a lesson not lost on East Asian societies. Once the European nation state model was adopted during the decolonisation period, the position of the military as an instrument of 'nation-building' was assured. As the inner reaches of the mandala are approached in the new configurations of open regionalism, with an emphasis on economic relations performed through the Asian Values etiquette of *li* (rules of proper conduct), *militarism* - along with crass *statism* - may be expected to fall away.

The Centre

In discussing the periphery much has already been said about expectations of the centre: morality; constructive internationalism; exemplar politics; civilisation; *jen* (human-heartedness) - the outer expression of which is *li*; harmony; transcendence. Normally, the centre does not require naming and is left empty. Like the *dao*, it is alluded to. Sometimes the void is taken as understood and a *yin-yang* symbol is placed in the centre. Between the periphery and the centre are domains or sectors of transition. The above-named attributes which the demons of *economic animal*, *cultural amnesia*, and *militarism* obstruct or elicit, may be found in these domains of transition within the mandala.

Polycentricity

While the mandala design may appear concentric in one sense, it is polycentric in another. This is a significant point in dispelling suspicion that its adoption as a metaphor for regional security might endorse a hierarchy of relations in the family of Confucian-style nations, thereby excluding alien political cultures such as the Australian and American. Here is where EAEC's limitations become apparent in Third Stage Daoism with its *datong* (great community) requirement. Inclusiveness is indeed the key concept. APEC represents a better fit; though EAEC in harmony with APEC cannot be faulted. The concentric and polycentric attributes of mandala may be explained in Buddhist terms of a dynamic relationship of intercausality:

⁶⁷ Nanniya Sudsawaeng, postgraduate seminar, *Southeast Asia in the Pacific Century*, Bond University, Gold Coast, 20 November 1996.

"Each entity is the cause of the whole and is caused by the whole."⁶⁸ (See Figures 3 and 4.) Like the political world of complex interdependence in which we live, mandalas as constructs also represent interdependence. However, they do so at a more fundamental (and advanced) level. Beyond second stage Daoism or *artha* in which 'great powers' contrive to manipulate small powers and vice versa - that is, the 'power politics' paradigm in which dependence, preponderance and balance of power are deemed to be the artful possibilities within an empirical reality - lies the transcendence of third stage Daoism. The mandala metaphor provides a more conducive platform for its realisation. The mandala system is such that the fate of the rich and powerful nations is causally linked to the fate of the poor and weak ones. This is obvious, though not always appreciated. There is no point in using Asian Values in an instrumental sense of making and maintaining a prosperous East Asia if West Africa, for example, languishes in corruption and social poverty. If other regions of the world collapse, producing globally felt crises such as refugee problems and the export of criminal activities, the mandala is shaken. Hence the East Asian mandala is not only made up of subregional mandalas like ASEAN but must ultimately affect, and be affected by mega regions like Africa and the Middle East. In this way a global security mandala may be conceived. Anwar Ibrahim's above-mentioned view that Asia "must actively work toward the reconstruction of global civilisation" makes sense within this context.

To return to polycentricity, each point represents its own centre and there are many mandalas within a mandala. Hence this is not a strictly hierarchical system; rather it is a system inclusive of a great deal of diversity - but with a centring or ordering principle. Whether that principle is called *stability* (as it has been in the Western International Relations system) or *harmony* in the language of Eastern ideals,⁶⁹ depends on the prevailing international political culture. Certainly with economic and ecological concerns being highlighted in late 20th century international security, an Easternised mandala with Western inputs on the quality of the environment and other 'soft power' features is entirely feasible.

To return to the particular, the East Asian region under examination and the relevance of its spiritual heritage in determining security, it may be concluded that East Asia's greatest security asset is its wealth in cultural resources. These resources modernisation has still not depleted. The Asian Values movement, irrespective of its occasional misappropriation, appears to have arisen in recognition of the need to preserve such resources for present and future generations. In the modernising present, the mandala may be viewed as a kind of 'spiritual technology' for the construction of cooperative relationships of power. These are not only inclusive but expansive - like the circles upon which the mandala is based.

⁶⁸ Adrian Snodgrass, *The Symbolism of the Stupa*, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, NY, 1985, p. 125.

⁶⁹ The difference being that it is permissible to go to war in the interests of *stability* but not so convincingly for *harmony*. Traditionally, to the Chinese, war is regarded as a calamity.

Fig. 3: Mandala Polycentricity





Fig. 4: Mandala Polycentricity expressed as the Mutual Reflection of Centres and Interpenetration of Spheres



Source: Adrian Snodgrass, *The Symbolism of the Stupa*, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, NY, 1985, p. 125.