Title

Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link

Date of this Version

2016

Document Type

Journal Article

Publication Details

Citation only

Kent, P., Kercher, K., & Routledge, J. (2016). Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link. Accounting and Finance.

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© 2016 AFAANZ

ISSN

0810-5391 print , 1467-629X online

Abstract

We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority- and majority-independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay– performance link. In addition, a majority-independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.

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This document has been peer reviewed.