Title

On innovation cycles in a finite discrete R & D game

Date of this Version

1-1-2013

Document Type

Journal Article

Publication Details

Citation only

Luckraz, S.(2013). On innovation cycles in a finite discrete R & D game. Economic Modelling, 30, 510-513.

Access the journal

2013 HERDC submission. FoR code: 10303

© Copyright, Elsevier B.V., 2012

ISSN

0264-9993

Abstract

This paper shows that innovation (or Schumpeter's) cycles can be demonstrated in a discrete and finite dynamic game of innovation and imitation. We find that the cycles depend crucially on whether imitation is a credible threat and hence, we conclude that strategic interactions are sufficient to generate cycles in an innovation game.

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This document has been peer reviewed.