Date of this Version


Document Type

Working Paper

Publication Details

Jeffrey J. Kline (2001) Minimum memory for equivalence between ex-ante optimality and time-consistency

Acknowledgements: The author thanks Mamoru Kaneko, participants at the Economic Theory Workshop at Flinders University and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.

School of Business Working Paper ; No. 2, Mar. 21, 2001

© Copyright Jeffrey J. Kline and the School of Business, Bond University


We give a necessary and sufficient condition on memory of a player in an extensive game for equivalence between ex ante optimality and time- consistency (for all payoff assignments). The condition is called A-loss recall and requires that each loss of a player's memory can be traced back to some loss of memory of his own action. A-loss recall is also shown to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a time- consistent strategy (for all payoff assignments) if the player is conscious- minded.



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