Title
Process spillovers and growth: A comment on the existence of a stable closed-loop Nash equilibrium
Date of this Version
1-1-2011
Document Type
Journal Article
ISSN
0022-3239
Abstract
In a recent paper Luckraz (J. Optim. Theory Appl. 139:315–335, 2008) develops a differential game model to show that a lack of intellectual property protection can improve economic growth in economies, where large technology gaps prevail. However, this conclusion depends crucially on the fact that the closed-loop equilibrium of the model degenerates to the open-loop equilibrium. This note generalizes the results of Luckraz by formulating a setup in which the closed-loop equilibrium does not degenerate to the open-loop equilibrium of the differential game.
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This document has been peer reviewed.
Publication Details
Citation only.
Luckraz, S. (2011). Process spillovers and growth: A comment on the existence of a stable closed-loop Nash equilibrium. Journal of optimization theory and applications, 149(1), 229-237.
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2011 HERDC submission. FoR code: 010300, 010200
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