Title

R&D games in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand functions: A comment

Date of this Version

7-29-2011

Document Type

Journal Article

Publication Details

Citation only.

Luckraz, S. (2011). R&D games in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand functions: A comment. Economic modelling, 28(6), 2873-2876.

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2011 HERDC submission. FoR code: 140303, 010303

© Copyright Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

ISSN

0264-9993

Abstract

In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350–357, 2010) investigates the stability properties of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122–1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a
Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350–357, 2010) investigates the stability properties
of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122–1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.

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This document has been peer reviewed.