Title
R&D games in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand functions: A comment
Date of this Version
7-29-2011
Document Type
Journal Article
Abstract
In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350–357, 2010) investigates the stability properties of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122–1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a
Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350–357, 2010) investigates the stability properties
of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122–1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.
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Publication Details
Citation only.
Luckraz, S. (2011). R&D games in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand functions: A comment. Economic modelling, 28(6), 2873-2876.
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2011 HERDC submission. FoR code: 140303, 010303
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