Title
Conviction and punishment: Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruption
Date of this Version
1-1-2009
Document Type
Journal Article
Abstract
Democratic institutions are not equally effective in curbing corruption. Using a criminal behavior model, this study formulates the hypothesis that corruption offenders, being risk-inclined, are deterred more by conviction-reinforcing democratic institutions than by punishment-reinforcing democratic institutions. Evidence based on cross-country regressions strongly supports this hypothesis, indicating that compared with competitive election, free press is a more effective deterrent to corruption. While shedding light on why corruption remains rampant in some electoral democracies - particularly the illiberal democracies - this study identifies a key to corruption control.
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This document has been peer reviewed.
Publication Details
Interim status: Citation only
Tian, X. & Lo, V. I. (2009). Conviction and punishment: Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruption. Public management review, 11(2), 155-172.
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2009 HERDC submission. FoR code: 1503
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